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ABSTRACT  
Cross-sectoral policy coalitions: a case study of Sustain 
Ontario: the Alliance for Healthy Food and Farming’s efforts 
to reform public policy. 
How a policy coalition’s choices contributed to its 
legitimacy and influence. 
This paper is a case study of the formation and early development of one civil society 
organization (CSO), Sustain Ontario, the Alliance for Healthy Food and Farming 
(Sustain, the Alliance, the Network). Sustain is an example of a non-governmental, cross-
sectoral policy coalitiona. In an era of complex problems and constrained resources such 
policy coalitions or networks appear increasingly common in Canada, yet there has been 
limited research into their approaches. This paper investigates the choices Sustain made 
related to structures, strategies and processes; it presents integrative research on the 
relationships between Sustain’s choices, and the Alliance’s ability to cultivate legitimacy 
and influence policy in Ontario, Canada. Sustain’s network organizational structures and 
membership enabled Sustain to engage and leverage requisite skills and knowledge. The 
Alliance employed five core strategies that enabled it to facilitate widespread member 
engagement, develop and disseminate research and other materials, and establish 
constructive relationships with policy makers. While I appreciate the limitations of a 
single case study, I think Sustain’s experience and choices may be of interest to 
provincial food networks and cross-sectoral policy coalitions addressing similarly 
complex challenges. 
                                                 
aI apply the terminology ‘non-governmental, cross-sectoral policy coalition’ to a group of organizations 
from different sectors (i.e. issue-focused organizations that may operate on a non-profit or for-profit basis) 
that join forces to advocate for changes to public policy. Although the term ‘coalition’ is often applied to 
informal, temporary alliances, it is also applied to groups that develop formal agreements outlining terms of 
cooperation. 
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ACRONYMS 
The following acronyms appear frequently throughout this paper, they are included here 
for easy reference.  
 
 AC – Advisory Council 
 CSO – civil society organization 
 GRWG – Government Relations Working Group 
 GTA – Greater Toronto Area 
 LFA – Local Food Act 
 OMAFRA Ontario Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs (Note this 
ministry changed its name to OMAF (the rural affairs division was separated out) for 
a period of time in 2013-2014, but since the June 2014 election has been called 
OMAFRA. For the sake of simplicity, I refer to this ministry as OMAFRA 
throughout).  
 NAO – Network Administrative Organization 
 PNO – Provincial Network Organization 
 SC – Steering Committee 
 WG – Working Group 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION  
 
This paper is a case study of the formation and early development of one civil society 
organization (CSO), Sustain Ontario, the Alliance for Healthy Food and Farming 
(Sustain, the Alliance, the Network). Sustain is an example of a non-governmental, cross-
sectoral policy coalitionb. In an era of complex problems and constrained resources such 
policy coalitions or networks appear increasingly common. Working together non-
governmental actors can be influential policy actors by expanding understanding of 
issues and developing and promoting integrated policy solutions. This paper investigates 
the choices Sustain made related to structures, strategies and processes; it presents 
integrative research on the relationships between Sustain’s choices, and the Alliance’s 
ability to cultivate legitimacy and influence policy in Ontario, Canada. Sustain’s network 
organizational structures and membership enabled Sustain to engage and leverage 
requisite skills and knowledge. The Alliance employed five core strategies that enabled it 
to facilitate widespread member engagement, develop and disseminate research and other 
materials, and establish constructive relationships with policy makers.  
 
 
Growing complexity means that policy issues today often can’t be solved by a 
government acting alone.  
~ Don Lenihan in Rescuing policy: The case for public engagement, 2012, p. 24.  
 
Historically CSOs – a category that encompasses non-profit and charitable organizations 
– have played important roles in the public policy process and the creation of public 
                                                 
bI apply the terminology ‘non-governmental, cross-sectoral policy coalition’ to a group of organizations 
from different sectors (i.e. issue-focused organizations that may operate on a non-profit or for-profit basis) 
that join forces to advocate for changes to public policy. Although the term ‘coalition’ is often applied to 
informal, temporary alliances, it is also applied to groups that develop formal agreements outlining terms of 
cooperation. 
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policy in Canada (Northcott, 2014). Practitioners and researchers today acknowledge that 
CSOs have a legitimate and important contribution to make in policy development 
because of their work with, knowledge of, and ability to convene the communities 
impacted (MacRae and Abergel (eds.), 2012, Moore, 2005, Kirkby, 2014, Northcott, 
2014). Contributions often assume the form of advocacy, which involves identifying and 
promoting policy solutions. 
 
Koc and Bas (2012) suggest CSOs are becoming recognized in policy circles as having 
important roles as “a vital driver of change and the democratization process, contributing 
to the transparency and accountability of policy making; bringing forward new 
information, different experiences and perspectives and contributing to the practical 
implementation of various initiatives…” (p. 174). As the opening quote suggests, this is 
partly due to the growing complexity of today’s societal challenges.  
 
Many charities and other CSOs appreciate that systemic barriers and enablers to their 
work may only be redressed through policy reform. Crutchfield and McLeod Grant, in 
their book Forces for Good (2007), identify and analyze twelve national ‘high-impact’ 
non-profit organizations in the U.S.; each of these organizations achieved significant 
results, advancing social change related to their respective missions. The organizations 
work in diverse issue areas such as hunger relief, youth leadership, the environment, 
housing and economic development. The authors distill six common practices that 
contributed to the organizations’ ability to make an impact. One of the practices involves 
engaging in service delivery and advocacy. All twelve organizations, at some stage in 
their development, concluded that their connections to communities and the knowledge 
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they gained through service delivery were critical perspectives in policy development and 
systems change. This led some, that hadn’t already done so, to invest a portion of their 
resources in advocacy work and to integrate this with service delivery. American 
charities’ ability to engage in advocacy is also defined by law; below I discuss the 
situation in Canada.  
 
Although CSOs have valuable knowledge and perspectives to offer policy makers, their 
ability to engage in policy development and advocacy is often constrained by factors such 
as capacity limitations and a limited understanding of the policy process (Lasby and 
Vodarek, 2011, MacRae, 2009). These constraints, along with an “advocacy chill” 
experienced by charitable organizations (see below), have contributed to the emergence 
of policy networks and coalitions in which organizations and individuals, sometimes 
from different sectors, combine their knowledge and resources to make sense of complex 
problems and identify and advocate for policy solutions. Their perspectives can enlarge 
the democratic space, illuminate the interconnectedness of policy issues, and lead to the 
development of better informed, more robust policy solutions. 
 
Roughly half of Canada’s approximately 170,000 non-profit organizations have 
charitable status (Imagine Canada, 2014). Becoming a registered charity enables an 
organization to issue tax receipts for individual donations and to access funding from a 
larger number of granting bodies such as public and private foundations. While this 
means that charitable organizations may access more resources compared to a non-profit 
organization with a similar mandate, it also means charities must abide by the rules 
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related to advocacy and political activity set out by the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA), 
the governmental body that registers and monitors charities. 
 
CRA defines three categories of advocacy activities: ‘unrestricted’, ‘limited’, and 
‘prohibited’ (CCVO, 2010). ‘Unrestricted’ activity refers to charitable activities that 
relate to, and support, the organization’s charitable purposes; public awareness 
campaigns and meetings with policy makers may fall under this category. Non-partisan 
political activities that include a ‘call to action’ would fall under the ‘limited’ category, 
and charities can devote up to 10% of their resources (including staff, volunteers, 
equipment, etc.) to such activitiesc. Undertaking any form of partisan political activity is 
‘prohibited’ for charities and can lead CRA to revoke a charity’s status.  
 
In my work as a consultant assisting non-profit organizations to develop strategy, I have 
noticed that while CSOs appreciate they have a role to play in public policy, in a 
constrained funding environment many organizations feel compelled to direct scarce 
resources to service-related initiatives (Bardach, 1994) aligned with their mandates. 
Funders’ reluctance to invest in this work may stem partly from the fact that policy and 
advocacy work is challenging to evaluate and rarely delivers quick results. The limited 
funding available for policy and advocacy work in Canada and challenges resourcing this 
work has gradually eroded skills and expertise in the non-profit sector.  
 
                                                 
c The CRA’s rules specify that Canadian charities can allocate no more than 10% of their resources on non-
partisan ‘political activities’. This CRA policy (Policy Statement CPS-022, Political Activities) is often 
referred to as the ‘10% rule’. 
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Capacity limitations were identified in the first Canadian “National Survey of Nonprofit 
and Voluntary Organizations” in 2003, where many respondents expressed dismay about 
their inability to contribute to policy development due to a lack of resources, skills and 
connections (Hall, Andrukow, Barr, Brock, de Wit, Embuldeniya, Jolin, Lasby, 
Levesque, Malinsky, Stowe, Vaillancourt, 2003). More recently, Lasby and Vodarek 
(2011) report barriers to engaging in public awareness and advocacy activities include a 
lack of staff time and to a lesser extent a lack of skills. According to Wyatt and Bourgeois 
(2011), this is particularly true of Canadian voluntary sector organizations, a sub-set of 
CSOs that tends to rely more heavily on volunteer resources.  
  
Charitable organizations’ willingness to engage in public policy and advocacy work has 
been dampened by an ‘advocacy chill’, engendered partly by the federal government’s 
2012 decision to allocate $8 million to the Canada Revenue Agency to increase its 
capacity to investigate charities’ advocacy activities (Dallaire, 2012, Kirkby, 2014, 
McKinnon, 2014). This decision has been questioned when only a small percentage of 
charities are politically active: “A Canadian Press analysis of the Canada Revenue 
Agency's charities database found 450 of the 85,000 charities registered in Canada 
reported spending money on political activities” (The Canadian Press, 2012a).  
 
Some researchers have suggested this ‘chill’ is self-imposed as few Canadian charities 
clearly understand the laws that limit charitable organizations’ participation in advocacy 
and lobbying (Northcott, 2014, Hashi, Langlois and Serbanescu, 2012). Fearful of 
compromising their charitable status, many charities have restricted their advocacy work 
to public awareness campaigns and sharing information with government representatives 
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(Lasby and Vodarek, 2011). One Canadian charity, ForestEthics, relinquished its 
charitable status in order to continue to challenge the Federal government on issues 
related to the oilsands (The Canadian Press, 2012b). 
 
Despite these challenges, a growing number of CSOs appear to be responding to the 
‘advocacy chill’ by collaborating in policy networks or coalitions. Participation in a 
policy network offers CSOs an opportunity to share and expand access to knowledge, 
experience and resources; present a stronger voice by amplifying a key message (Nova 
Scotia Nutrition Council and AHPRC, 2004); and reduce the risk to charitable status that 
comes with acting alone – i.e. safety in numbers. 
 
A policy network or coalition approach appears increasingly common among CSOs 
attempting to solve complex, challenging problems that cross sectors, involve many 
different types of knowledge and expertise, and span several levels and departments of 
government. This reflects a growing appreciation that the complexity of today’s social 
problems requires change at a systems level to complement, support and/or scale on-the-
ground work and innovation. Systems change work is complex, and some have suggested 
coordinated, collective action may be required for problem solving (Kania and Kramer, 
2011). Networks can play essential roles in collective action initiatives by “building 
linkages and connection with a broader movement” (Katcher, 2010, p. 54); they can also 
“deepen agreement on a shared political frame… coordinate efforts, take joint action and 
disseminate information about what works… and engage in advocacy campaigns” (ibid, 
p. 55). This interdisciplinary research is informed by theory about policy networks 
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(public policy) as well as social network theory (sociology); the literature related to each 
is explored in Chapter 3.  
 
Similar sentiments are expressed by RE-AMP consultant Ruth Rominger, in a case study 
of the US-based RE-AMP Energy Networkd. “It was a complex system we were trying to 
change, so we realized we needed to operate as a network. Only in the last few years has 
it become much clearer how the network structure and organization is critical to the 
success of a systems strategy.” (McLeod Grant, 2010 p. 8).  
 
Gormley and Cymrot (2006) cite 1985 research by Hansen that found coalition 
membership in the non-profit sector tends to increase significantly in threatening times – 
such as the current Canadian environment characterized by scarce resources and an 
‘advocacy chill’. In recent years I have observed examples of organizations collaborating 
in Ontario to advocate for, among other issues, systems change in areas such as child care 
(Quality Early Learning Network, established 2009), autism (Autism Speaks, 2005), 
immigrant employment (Consortium of Agencies Serving Internationally-trained 
Professionals, 2002), and food (Sustain Ontario, 2009). I think the formation of these 
groups to some degree reflects the current political and fiscal environment, as well as a 
desire to access some of the other benefits of participating in a policy-focused network 
identified previously. 
 
                                                 
d RE-AMP is a network of 125 non-profit organizations and funders in eight mid-West states that advocates 
for legislative changes with a goal of reducing regional global warming emissions by 80% from 2005 
levels. The network’s efforts over a six-year period contributed to the adoption of renewable energy 
standards in five states, and to the passage of new transportation legislation aimed at decreasing emissions 
in three states (McLeod Grant, 2010). 
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Working collaboratively in a policy coalition is time consuming, however, and demands a 
range of resources and capacities. In reflecting on the formation and approaches of non-
governmental policy coalitions working on complex social issues in Ontario, I noticed 
that the choices a coalition makes about structures, strategies and processes seem 
significant to its ability to solve collective problems and realize a common vision. I 
became interested in learning more about why some of these groups endured and 
succeeded in influencing policy change. 
 
For such coalitions to have influence on the decisions and actions of policy makers and 
others outside their network, I suspected they needed to cultivate legitimacy internally, 
among coalition members, and externally, among those the coalition wanted to influence. 
The importance of cultivating legitimacy internally and externally was confirmed and 
reinforced in my literature review. Human and Provan (2000) and McEvily and Zaheer 
(2004) identify evidence of this, albeit in U.S.-based studies of single sector for-profit 
network(s) (described in more detail in Chapter 3, Literature Review). Because I 
understood from this literature that “legitimacy” is a key factor related to policy 
influence, I began to speculate on the role that coalition structures, strategies and 
processes play in cultivating the kind of legitimacy that enables a coalition to influence 
public policy. I crafted the following research question: How does a non-governmental, 
cross-sectoral policy coalition’s choices related to structures, strategies, and 
processes, affect its ability to cultivate legitimacy and influence public policy?  
 
I decided to investigate this question by selecting and examining the experience of one 
such policy coalition in detail using an interdisciplinary, case study approach. I focus on 
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Sustain Ontario, the Alliance for Healthy Food and Farming as an example of a 
Canadian-based ‘non-governmental, cross-sectoral policy coalition’. Sustain’s 
membership includes non-profit and for-profit groups from different sectors that have 
different, and at times competing, food system interests. A brief overview of Sustain in 
2013 is included on page 11.  
 
I selected a case study approach in part because there has been limited research into, and 
documentation of, how such Canadian groups form and operate, with the exception of 
recent work done by Levkoe (2014), Kneen (2011), Makhoul (2011) and Miller (2008). I 
also thought it would be timely to examine Sustain’s experience given the shifting 
relationship between government and CSOs in Canada. Finally, I hoped that my research 
and engagement of internal stakeholders might contribute to Sustain’s reflection, learning 
and evolution during the Alliance’s formative yearse. 
 
I am mindful of the limitations of using a single ‘case’ to answer a general research 
question. I explore this in more detail in Chapter 4, Methodology. While Sustain’s early 
experience will not be replicable, I think it may assist other diverse policy coalitions and 
networks – whether they are advocating for food or other complex social issues, in 
Ontario and beyond – in making choices about structures, strategies and processes.   
 
Sustain is an appropriate subject for this case study because food is an issue that is at the 
nexus of many of today’s interconnected social challenges: hunger, poverty, health, farm 
                                                 
e I first encountered Sustain through a brief work assignment with the Alliance in September 2010 where I 
learned about Sustain’s cross-sectoral composition and objectives. 
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sustainability and environmental degradation. Additionally, food-related policy is 
developed by all levels of government and multiple government ministries – agriculture 
and rural affairs, health, education, environment, etc. Sustain’s efforts to reform 
provincial food and agriculture policy thus provides the cross-sectoral and multiple-issue 
data I wish to analyze. Moreover, as a recently formed organization, Sustain provides an 
opportunity to examine the formation and early development of a cross-sectoral coalition 
and the strategies and related processes the Alliance selected and implemented to 
influence policy reform. In doing this research, what soon became evident was that the 
choices a coalition makes and the strategies it adopts are not strictly intentional and 
deliberate, but also emergent (Mintzberg, 1987, 1994). 
 
To answer my research question, I determined it would be important to draw on research 
and theory from different disciplines. I conducted a wide-ranging review of literature (see 
Chapter 3). Management research offers insights into strategy formation, collaboration, 
organizational structure, and governance. Sociology, and in particular social network 
theory, provides theoretical frameworks elucidating the structure, interactions and value 
of intra- and inter-group relationships. The field of public policy describes various policy 
development processes and contexts and examines the role of non-governmental actors 
and policy networks or coalitions in public policy development.  
 
In reviewing the literature I wanted to better understand how existing research could 
inform practitioners’ approaches, and to what extent, and in what ways, their experiences 
reflected existing research. I understand this is a more recent interpretation of ‘action 
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research’ (Kirby, Greaves, and Reid, 2006, p. 30 cited Gustaven, 1996 in Reason and 
Bradbury, 2001, p. 17).  
 
In reviewing the literature I found few examples of research examining the advocacy 
efforts of Canadian non-profit organizations, coalitions and networks – something 
acknowledged by long-time Canadian lobbyist Sean Moore (2005). Selsky and Parker’s 
(2005) research into cross-sector partnerships indicates more research is required on how 
partners overcome or exploit sectoral differences and how such groups evolve over time. 
In their research on strategic alliances, Van Dyke and McCammon (2010) suggest that to 
understand the structural dynamics of coalitions, further study of internal organizational 
processes in coalition organizations is needed. They also indicate that more research is 
needed regarding the outcomes of coalition work. Schlager (1995) notes that coalition 
structure, stability and longevity have received limited attention. And, with the exception 
of work done by Provan and Kenis (2008), limited attention has been paid to the 
governance of networks. They conclude, “There is still much work to do to build and test 
theory related to network-level activities, structures, and outcomes” (ibid, p. 247). I hope 
to contribute to this literature through my detailed study of Sustain and its experience 
weaving and nurturing a cross-sectoral policy coalition.  
 
1.1 A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF SUSTAIN IN 2013 
Sustain aims to transform Ontario’s food system into one that is “healthy, ecological, 
equitable and financially viable”. This ‘vision’ for the food system challenges the status 
quo that reflects, and to some extent serves, the interests of the more traditional food and 
agriculture actors that generally farm on a larger scale using less sustainable production 
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methods. Sustain describes its role as promoting “systems-level changes that will enable 
Good Food ideas – ideas contributing to the creation of a healthy, resilient and 
sustainable food system – to thrive” (Sustain Ontario, 2013f, p. 2).  
 
Sustain describes itself not as a coalition or organization, but as a cross-sectoral alliancef 
and networkg of diverse groups and organizations from the farm, food, health, and 
environment sectors. Many network members might describe themselves as ‘alternative’ 
food system actors because they employ and/or advocate for sustainable practices such as 
organic and permaculture on smaller, diverse farms. Some are closing the gap between 
production and eaters by establishing urban farms and forming consumer supported 
agriculture (CSAsh) relationships. Many of Sustain’s members operate as non-profit or 
charitable organizations although some operate on a for-profit basis (e.g. farmers and 
restaurateurs). I use Sustain’s language, ‘network’ and ‘alliance’, throughout this case 
study.  
 
Levkoe (2014), in his research into Sustain and other provincial food networks in 
Canada, describes them as ‘Provincial Network Organizations’ (PNOs). Sustain’s 
network organization staff support the network by performing many of the organizational 
functions similar to those played by ‘backbone support organizations’ within a ‘collective 
impact’ initiative (Kania and Kramer, 2011, Kearns, 2003). Kania and Kramer describe 
                                                 
fAn alliance is similar to a coalition, or partnership, in that it involves groups working together to advance 
shared interests.  
g Plastrik and Taylor (2010) describe a network as an interconnected set of nodes (i.e. people or things) and 
links (relationships or connections); they describe social networks as “systems of social ties that link people 
to one another”. 
h CSAs are contractual arrangements between a farmer and consumers whereby consumers purchase a 
defined share of a season’s crop. The contract enables eaters and farmers to share in the risk or bounty of 
the year’s harvest. 
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the ‘backbone’ as a separate organization charged with network coordination. They 
suggest staff in these organizations should assume three key roles: project manager, data 
manager and facilitator. Although Sustain’s staff roles are not defined in this way, they 
do fulfill these functions. 
 
The Alliance has articulated two long-term ‘goals’, or outcomes, which its members believe 
are required to bring about positive food system transformation in Ontario:  
“1) New laws, regulations and policies are enacted and implemented that reflect 
Sustain’s vision (i.e. policy reform).  
2) Ontario groups are adapting and adopting feasible, on-the-ground food systems 
solutions and innovations” (Sustain Ontario, 2013h, p. 3). 
 
I believe the broadness of these outcomes reflects the fact that Sustain set off on its journey 
without a map. The first outcome refers to influencing and reforming public policy to 
remove barriers to a more sustainable food system as well as to support and/or promote 
more sustainable practices. The second acknowledges the role a network can play in 
identifying and encouraging the adoption of sustainable innovations at a member level, to 
change the food system from the ground up. Understanding the work being implemented on 
the ground is a critical input to the development of viable policy recommendations. As I am 
focusing on factors affecting legitimacy and policy influence in this study, I have collected 
and analyzed data about Sustain’s structures, strategies and processes related to the first of 
the above outcomes.  
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Human and Provan (2000) suggest that coalitions wanting to influence policy need to 
cultivate internal and external legitimacy. Suchman (1995) defines legitimacy as “a 
generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are socially desirable, 
proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and 
definitions” (p. 574). Because legitimacy is perceived by others and it is ‘socially 
constructed’ (ibid), a coalition has limited control over it. Despite a lack of control, it 
requires attention from any group attempting to influence others. Provan and Kenis (2008) 
note that networks often need to balance the tensions between internal and external 
legitimacy. Internal legitimacy is required to attract, engage and retain diverse leaders who 
give a network access to knowledge, expertise, networks and other resources. In Sustain’s 
case, these resources are critical to the Alliance’s ability to generate viable policy solutions 
for external stakeholders to consider and ideally adopt. In Chapters 7 and 8, I illustrate how 
the network’s internal legitimacy is affected by the choices Sustain made about structures, 
strategies and processes. The Alliance’s external legitimacy is a function of others’ 
perceptions – for example of its composition, publications, and proposed solutions. 
Cultivating external legitimacy is therefore also important as Sustain attempts to influence 
public policy. 
 
The descriptions of Sustain presented in this paper are based on the following data 
sources. A review of organizational documents and communications including Sustain’s 
Advisory Council (AC) meeting minutes; policy backgrounders; evaluation data, reports 
and tools; website content; and e-newsletters. 39 semi-structured interviews with internal 
(e.g. AC and Steering Committee (SC) members, staff and interns) and external 
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stakeholders (e.g. policy makersi whom Sustain had engaged with, partners and a funder). 
Insights gained through my participation as a volunteer member of Sustain’s Evaluation 
group, my experience sitting in on AC meetings, and attending two of Sustain’s Bring 
Food Home conferences. My data sources are described in more detail in Chapter 4, 
Methodology. 
 
Chapter 4 also outlines my qualitative research methodology and describes my 
involvement with Sustain as an ‘inside/outside’ researcher (Dwyer and Buckle, 2009). 
Although interdisciplinary approaches to research sometimes involves researchers 
collaborating with researchers from other disciplines (Kirby, Greaves, and Reid, 2006, p. 
35 cited Thompson-Klein, 2000), I did not actively engage researchers from these 
disciplines in discussion with the exception of my three supervisors. I did however, 
collaborate with two of Sustain’s Directors by engaging in ‘mutual dialogue’ (Van Den 
Bergh, 1995) throughout my course of study from 2011-2014. Kirby, Greaves and Reid 
(2006) suggest collaboration with community organizations is another form of 
interdisciplinary research. 
 
In the next chapter I describe Sustain’s origins and key factors that led to the Alliance’s 
formation in late 2008 – i.e. how its members recognized and “seized the moment”. The 
literature that informed my research and assisted me in analyzing Sustain’s experience is 
explored in Chapter 3, Literature Review.  
                                                 
i Note: I use the term ‘policy makers’ to refer to those external stakeholders I interviewed that Sustain 
engaged as part of its policy reform efforts. Some of these individuals work, or formerly worked, in 
government in a political capacity, others on the bureaucratic side. Chapter 4, Methodology, contains 
additional information about the policy makers I interviewed. 
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Sustain’s journey from 2009-2013 is presented in Chapters 5 and 6. In Chapter 5, 
Structuring and Weaving the Network, I examine the strategies and processes the network 
organization used to structure, grow and engage a network with the capacity and 
legitimacy to influence policy. In Chapter 6, Policy Development and Influence, I 
examine Sustain’s structures, strategies and processes related to research, government 
relations, and policy development and reform. In both these chapters I highlight some of 
the challenges and network tensions the Alliance encountered and how it responded to 
those.  
 
In Chapter 7, Case Discussion and Analysis, I analyze the data presented in the previous 
two chapters through the lenses of network connectivity and health, and policy influence. 
I present evidence of Sustain’s success to date and identify factors that have contributed 
to the Alliance’s internal and external legitimacy. In Chapter 8, Findings and Conclusion, 
I discuss my findings in relation to my original research question, including factors that 
impacted Sustain’s “legitimacy” and I outline conclusions that may be of interest to other 
networks, movements and network funders. 
 
To begin the story, the next chapter provides an overview of Sustain’s genesis in the 
context of the broader food movement in Southern Ontario.  
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CHAPTER 2 THE ORIGINS OF SUSTAIN ONTARIO  
The Greek concept of ‘kairos’ refers to: “a time when conditions are right for 
the accomplishment of a crucial action: the opportune and decisive moment.”  
~ Merriam-Webster, 2014. 
 
In this chapter I describe Sustain’s origins in 2007-2008: what catalyzed the Alliance’s 
formation, as well as its initial leaders and resources. And because timing appears to have 
been a factor in Sustain’s formation, I identify dynamics in the broader societal and 
political environment that suggest the moment was ‘ripe for action’ (Barndt and Freire, 
1991). 
 
2.1 RECOGNIZING AND SEIZING THE MOMENT 
 
The George Cedric Metcalf Charitable Foundation (Metcalf, or the Foundation)j was the 
‘catalyst’ (Scearce, 2011) in the formation of Sustain. The Foundation’s mission “is to 
enhance the effectiveness of people and organizations working together to help 
Canadians imagine and build a just, healthy, and creative society” (Who we are - mission 
and history, 2014). Toward this end, Metcalf had been funding a variety of food and 
agriculture projects through its environment program; simultaneously food had become a 
prominent element of many of the community projects it funded in the areas of social 
justice, community building and planning. As Metcalf’s President and CEO stated during 
an interview, 
…when we first started thinking about food we were really thinking the food 
lens was an environmental lens; then at some point the light bulb went off here 
                                                 
j This section draws on data gathered through interviews with two representatives of the George Cedric 
Metcalf Charitable Foundation, notes from three meetings Metcalf convened and facilitated in 2007-2008, 
and a paper outlining a preliminary strategy for the development of a food and agriculture network (Metcalf 
Foundation, 2007a,b,c and 2008b). George Cedric Metcalf founded the family foundation in 1960 in 
Charlottetown. Since relocating the Foundation offices to Toronto, Ontario in the 1970s, the Foundation 
has supported and invested in the formation of a number of innovative local charitable organizations (Who 
we are - mission and history, 2014).   
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and we realized, you know, there was a much larger constituency – food is 
central to a lot of people’s concerns…  We’ve always thought we should be 
able to pull the threads across the Foundation’s work more than we had in 
past – and food could play that role – as the paperk said, ‘food connects us all’.   
 
In 2007 many of Metcalf’s grantees working on interconnected food, environmental and 
social justice issues were largely disconnected from each other. To better understand who 
was doing what, and increase connectivity among actors, in May 2007 Metcalf convened 
approximately twenty-two of its grantees (many of whom are considered sector leaders) 
and advisors (e.g. individuals working in academia and government) for whom food was 
a part of their work. Participating grantees were focused on issues such as food security, 
farm viability, agricultural land preservation, etc. (Metcalf Foundation, 2007c).  
 
The May 2007 meeting was the first of a series of three full-day meetings Metcalf 
convened with members of this group, many of whom represented urban perspectives on 
Ontario’s food system. Metcalf exercised leadership by hosting the meetings, inviting 
participants and setting loose agendas. The Foundation documented meeting notes 
highlighting discussions and decisions from each of the three meetings (Metcalf 
Foundation 2007a,b and 2008b). Notes from these meetings provided insight into the 
factors and discussions that lead to Sustain’s formation. 
 
The initial meeting focused on the identification of priorities for agriculture and food 
system reform in Southern Ontario (Metcalf Foundation, 2007a). According to one 
                                                 
k This refers to the February 2008 Metcalf-funded paper, “Food connects us all: Sustainable local food in 
southern Ontario”, described in more detail on page 20. 
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Metcalf representative (O6l), the Foundation “became very aware in the first meetings 
that there were fissures and tensions; some differences around language – for example, 
for some ‘subsidies’ was a really bad word, and for others, great”. The group 
acknowledged that although previous attempts to reach agreement on issues had been 
unsuccessful, “momentum around local sustainable food” (Metcalf Foundation, 2007a, p. 
1) was starting to grow and that there was an opportunity to build on this at a public 
policy level (see also Indicators of the Moment below).  
 
Participants observed that not everyone was at the table who should be – i.e. key non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), farmers and representatives of racialized and 
immigrant communities were missing. Based on a comparison of participant lists for the 
second and third meetings (no list was included as part of the first meeting notes). It’s not 
clear these gaps were addressed. By the third meeting participants included those more 
actively involved in food and farming work; there were fewer academics and less directly 
connected actors (e.g. those involved in housing and community work). After Sustain 
was formed, the network organization gradually engaged a more diverse set of actors 
from a sectoral and geographic perspective (member composition is discussed in 
Chapters 5 and 7).  
 
Metcalf re-convened the initial group for a second meeting in June 2007 to determine if 
there was interest in framing common issues and goals and to assess the potential value 
of forming a food and agriculture network to bring different parts of the food system 
                                                 
l In the interest of anonymity, this and other codes are used to identify interviewees, in this case (O6) refers 
to ‘Other’ interviewee number 6. See Appendix C for a list of all interview categories, codes and dates.  
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together (Metcalf Foundation, 2007b). Participants acknowledged that work needed to be 
done in a number of areas, including at a public policy level, an area where many food 
and farming organizations lack skills and capacity. The group concluded that a network 
approach – i.e. establishing a network to help connect and engage actors from different 
sectors rather than a standalone organization – might make sense. A working group 
crafted a preliminary strategy for the development of a food and agriculture network for 
Southern Ontario and Metcalf documented the strategy in September 2007 (Metcalf 
Foundation, 2007c). 
 
During the second meeting participants identified a need to analyze the current food and 
farming landscape by consulting with various food and farm-related organizations and to 
document their food system concerns in a context paper. One participant stressed that, to 
avoid breaking the group apart in early days, the paper should document what is 
happening, rather than attempting to identify solutions or recommendations. In retrospect, 
according to one representative from Metcalf, this seemed “the right call because it kept 
people in the room talking about and really grappling with issues and not going straight 
to the solutions” (O6). It also set up the possibility for subsequent papers (email 
communication November 25, 2014); Metcalf ultimately funded the publication of a 
series of four additional ‘food solutions’ papers in 2010 (Publications, 2014).  
 
The Foundation committed to fund a working group to guide the paper’s development 
and craft terms of reference for a loose network. The information gathered through the 
scan and consultation process was incorporated into the paper “Food connects us all – 
Sustainable local food in Southern Ontario” (Metcalf Foundation, 2008a). Participants 
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reviewed and commented on draft versions and Metcalf published the final paper in 
February 2008. The paper described the state of food and farming and some of the 
barriers to a local, sustainable provincial food system; who was doing what at that time, 
and potential areas for collaboration. The “Food connects us all” paper has gradually 
come to be associated with Sustain as the network has continued to refer to, and build on 
the ideas outlined in it when engaging internal and external stakeholders. 
 
The 2008 context paper was distributed to local media and policy makers and it brought 
attention to local, sustainable food and farming issues. The messages resonated – one 
political staffer (PM1) referred back to this foundational paper as an example of a useful 
contribution Sustain made to policy discussions. According to one Metcalf representative 
(O4), the provincial government had anticipated, and was surprised about the absence of 
recommendations in the paper; they were interested in acting on the issues identified, but 
wanted more direction regarding what actions stakeholders wanted government to take. 
Part of the reason government was receptive and looking for ideas was that other food 
and farming initiatives were also starting to get underway such as the ALUS (Alternative 
Land Use Services) pilot project in Norfolk County (Ontario, 2001). See also ‘Indicators 
of the Moment’, below.  
 
The third and final meeting Metcalf hosted took place in February 2008. For it, the 
Foundation engaged an outside facilitator who was less connected to the participants than 
Metcalf’s President and CEO (who facilitated the first two meetings). The goal for the 
third meeting was to develop a plan to move the network concept forward. Eighteen 
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participants attended, including Jeanette Longfield, the Coordinator of Sustain UKm. 
Longfield was in Toronto as part of Metcalf and Ryerson University’s “City-Builder-in-
Residence” series which brought renowned city builders to Toronto for town-hall 
meetings and discussions. One of Metcalf’s program directors attended the discussions 
and heard Longfield speak about Sustain UK and realized that she could inspire the 
formation of an Ontario version, “even though we weren’t thinking about it in those 
terms” (O6). The Foundation subsequently invited Longfield to join the February meeting 
as she was already in Toronto. Connecting with Sustain UK was “an important piece of 
the puzzle, although not as deliberate as it might look now, but it became quite 
deliberate” (O6).  
 
Sustain UK has a highly diverse membership consisting of traditional agricultural 
organizations, health organizations, consumer organizations, and radical activist 
organizations; these organizations represent both urban and rural perspectives. When 
meeting with the Metcalf-convened group, the Coordinator indicated Sustain UK had 
been able to keep everyone in a ‘big tent’, get food on the political agenda, and move 
policy (Metcalf Foundation, 2008b). Successes Sustain UK identifies on its website 
include protecting children from junk food advertising, increased government investment 
in sustainable fisheries, and an expansion of urban agriculture in London (Sustain UK, 
2014). 
 
                                                 
m Sustain UK: The alliance for better food and farming is a national organization that was established in the 
United Kingdom in 1999. Their website indicates their membership consists of approximately 100 national 
organizations that “operate in the public interest”. As a network, Sustain UK’s members advocate for “food 
and agriculture policies and practices that enhance the health and welfare of people and animals, improve 
the working and living environment, enrich society and culture and promote equity”. 
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The opportunity for participants to learn more about how the UK model worked was 
valuable. Sustain UK’s achievements and network approach appealed, and with the 
Coordinator’s permission, the group selected the name “Sustain” for the Ontario food and 
agriculture network. Longfield advised the group to get started, rather than worrying 
about getting things just right at the start. Participants agreed, and acknowledged that “the 
thought processes and structures of the group will evolve over time”. During the third 
meeting this group identified possible areas for action, established the network’s broad 
mandate encompassing healthy food, farms and people, and considered its relationship to 
pre-existing projects (Metcalf Foundation, 2008b).  
 
Metcalf representatives invited the group to imagine what Sustain might look like and 
determine what kind of support it would take to get the network up and running. Metcalf 
ultimately agreed to provide core operational funding for the network’s first three years 
beginning in late 2008. Sustain incorporated in 2008 and with encouragement from 
Metcalf, it became a ‘project’ of Tides Canadan . This relationship gives Sustain access to 
a ‘shared administrative platform’ (McIsaac and Moody, 2013) and in 2008 it enabled the 
network to maintain momentum and get to work rather than developing a full 
organizational infrastructure.  
 
Many refer to the 21 who participated in at least some of the three formative meetings 
Metcalf convened in 2007-2008 as Sustain’s ‘founders’. As noted previously Metcalf’s 
                                                 
n Tides Canada is a national charity, and as a project of Tides, Sustain has charitable status and thus is able to 
access a wider range of funding options than if it operated as a non-profit organization. 10% of all funding is 
paid to Tides Canada, and in exchange Tides carries out some of Sustain’s administrative functions. Tides 
Canada’s board of directors is responsible for governance of all Tides’ projects.  
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President and CEO facilitated the first two meetings and in the third he played more of a 
participatory role. During the formative meetings participants worked collectively and 
there was no obvious leader within the group according to one Metcalf Foundation 
representative who attended (O6). Most members of this group, which was instrumental 
in establishing Sustain’s foundations, remain actively involved in 2013, by which time 
Sustain’s membership had expanded to approximately 450 members. Periodically 
founding members act as a compass, reminding newer network members of Sustain’s 
original intent. Despite their efforts keep to Sustain focused on the original intent, Sustain 
has shifted somewhat to reflect the interests of its larger and more diverse membership. 
 
The Metcalf Foundation’s grantee relationships and advisory networks (e.g. relationships 
with academics) strongly influenced Sustain’s initial composition as they invited 
participants to attend the series of meetings that led to Sustain’s formation. As a funder 
holding the purse strings for food and farming initiatives, Metcalf had some influence 
over busy actors (both grantees and advisors) to convince them that engaging in such 
exploratory discussions was worthwhile.  
 
In addition to exercising influence over who attended, Metcalf also had the financial 
capacity to host the initial meetings. The Foundation clearly invested resources to 
convene these meetings in terms of arranging for meeting space, food, and in the case of 
the third meeting, the services of an external facilitator. In addition, Foundation staff time 
was allocated to organizing, designing agendas, participating, and following up (e.g. with 
meeting notes) on each meeting. 
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I asked one Metcalf representative during an interview, “Would such a network have 
eventually formed in Ontario if Metcalf hadn’t convened its grantees in 2007-2008?” 
(O6). The individual suspected it would not; as noted above, previous attempts to work 
together had been unsuccessful:  
People are so busy… for any organization to take the lead would have been 
very difficult because it's not their day job. We know the value of backbone 
organizations; someone needs to be the champion… I think it takes something 
like a foundation, a neutral entity… a non-player on the landscape. For one 
organization doing the work to initiate it… I think you get into turf wars: ‘is it 
going to be your agenda or mine?’    
 
Because Metcalf is not involved in work on the ground, they are a kind of ‘non-player’ 
on the landscape. However, as a funder and convenor of work done by network members, 
Metcalf is not a strictly ‘neutral’ player. Every foundation has a social agenda and vision 
it is committed to advancing – and that affects its decisions to invest in particular 
projects. Mindful of the importance of maintaining positive relationships with their 
funders, grantees are unlikely to decline an invitation to participate. In the case of 
Sustain, early involvement may have helped generate broader buy-in and commitment to 
the concept of Sustain and a network approach.  
 
Although Sustain subsequently secured funding from other sources, including a 
provincial government foundation, Metcalf’s initial and ongoing support has been critical 
to growing, weaving and engaging the network. The Metcalf Foundation provided 
Sustain with $100,000 of start-up funding in 2008, and provided additional support each 
year to a total of nearly $900,000 by the end of 2013 (email communication November 
28, 2014). Over the years funding was allocated to network operations including 
network-building activities, specific project initiatives (e.g. a social media strategy), and 
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internships. Since inception, Metcalf’s funding has comprised approximately 25-30% of 
Sustain’s overall budget (email communication with Director July 10, 2014) which in 
2013 was $378,596 (Tides Canada, 2014 p. A20). The balance of Sustain’s funding to 
2013 mainly came from other public and private foundations such as the Ontario Trillium 
Foundation, the Greenbelt Foundation, and the Heart and Stroke Foundation.  
 
Sustain was the first network initiative in which Metcalf invested substantial resources. 
The Foundation’s motivation for doing so was driven in part by two collaborative and 
network-minded program directors on staff, one of whom had studied networks and had 
encouraged the Foundation to adopt more of a networked approach (O6), for example to 
connect project leaders in order to help them gain a better understanding of how their 
issues and proposed solutions may intersect and impact the broader system. Metcalf’s 
convening efforts in 2007 are a good example of a network approach, weaving previously 
disconnected actors together to think collectively about how to address systemic 
challenges.  
 
In 2007, network approaches were beginning to attract more attention in the North 
American foundation world, so Metcalf could be considered an early adopter. The U.S.-
based Garfield Foundation was an innovator; in 2003 they invested $2.5 million in the 
exploration of systems thinking and network approaches which led to the formation of 
the RE-AMP Energy Network (McLeod Grant, 2010), described earlier. Since that time, 
a number of other foundations have expressed greater interest in, and have started 
funding network approaches - e.g. in Canada the J.W. McConnell Family Foundation 
invested in the Allies Network which launched in 2007 (McConnell Foundation, 2014) 
  27 
and the Ontario Trillium Foundation funded TRIEC’s Personal Immigrant Networks 
Initiative (TRIEC, 2012). In the U.S., the Annie E. Casey Foundation, the Barr 
Foundation, and the David and Lucille Packard Foundation have also invested in network 
strategies and initiatives according to Taylor and Whatley (2011). There are some 
indications that foundations’ interest in networks will endure. Publications by the US-
based Grantmakers for Effective Organizations (GEO) and others have promoted the 
benefits and potential of network approaches as a way for foundations to more effectively 
support collaboration and movements (GEO, 2013, Scearce for GEO, 2011, Wei-Skillern, 
Silver, and Heitz, 2013).  
 
2.2 INDICATORS OF THE MOMENT  
During the time the Metcalf-hosted discussions were underway in 2007-2008, a number 
of factors in the broader environment reinforced that it was an opportune time for 
disconnected members of Ontario’s alternative food and agriculture movements to work 
together. Many of these factors have persisted and become more prominent since that 
time, suggesting that Sustain’s founding members were right to interpret this as a 
‘window of opportunity’ (Kingdon, 2003).  
 
Although Ontario’s food movement was active in 2007, those working on complex food 
system issues were not well connected. This was true even of Metcalf’s grantees; 
individuals working in geographic proximity on similar issues may have known each 
other and collaborated on occasion, but few worked with organizations in other sectors. 
As one AC member who participated in the initial meetings reflected during an interview 
(AC13), those working to address urban food security issues who had advocated for 
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lower food prices were unaware of the number of farmers living in poverty as they had 
not engaged in discussion with food producers. Krebs and Holley (2002), who have 
studied the evolution of network structures, might describe the network structure of 
Ontario’s larger food and farming movement at the time as ‘scattered fragments’. In 
contrast, by 2007 provincial food networks and PNOs had formed to support food 
movements in most other Canadian provinces: Newfoundland and Labrador (1998), 
Alberta (2003), British Columbia (2004), Manitoba (2006), Saskatchewan (2006), Nova 
Scotia (2006) and Prince Edward Island (2008) (Levkoe, 2014). So, in addition to the 
Sustain UK example, precedents for Canadian food networks existed. 
 
Politically there was growing receptivity to progressive, alternative ideas related to 
sustainability more broadly. Provincially, the Liberal government of Ontario established a 
provincial ‘greenbelt’ in 2005 to protect 1.8 million acres of farmland and 
environmentally sensitive forests and wetlands north of the Greater Toronto Area (GTA). 
In 2006 the Ontario government established the Greenbelt Foundation to coordinate and 
fund activities in the greenbelt. In Ontario’s largest city, Toronto, Mayor David Miller 
(2003-2010) introduced a number of environmental and sustainability initiatives – e.g. in 
2007 City Council endorsed the ‘Climate Change, Clean Air and Sustainable Energy 
Action Plan’ (City of Toronto, 2007) and in 2010 the new Toronto Green Standard that 
established green development standards for new buildings (City of Toronto, 2013). 
Toronto City Council acknowledged the connections between food production and 
greenhouse gas emissions and smog caused by the transportation of food. In 2008 the 
City adopted a local food procurement policy to increase the amount of local food served 
in city-owned facilities (City of Toronto, 2009).  
  29 
 
In 2007, the Ontario Liberal party won a second majority government under Premier 
Dalton McGuinty. At that time the government’s priorities were focused on health, 
education, jobs, and to a lesser extent green initiatives linked to economic opportunity 
(Ontario Liberal Party, 2007). Then Minister of Education, Kathleen Wynne, introduced 
the “Healthy Food for Healthy Schools Act” in 2008 which established guidelines for 
nutritional standards for food sold in schools (Ontario government, 2008b). Soon after 
that time discussions about a Green Energy Act began. Enacted in 2009 that Act aimed to 
expand the province’s production of renewable energy, protect the environment and 
create green jobs (Ontario Ministry of Energy, 2009). The Act was aligned with the 
government’s focus on economic development, one which has endured through a 
sluggish economic recovery in the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis. 
 
Ontario’s shifting economy was another factor that indicated the time was right for those 
working in food and farming to come together. Some analysts suggest the decline of 
Ontario’s traditional economic engine, the manufacturing sector, which began in 2003 
and persists in 2013, can be attributed to the rise in the Canadian dollar (Foster, 2008, 
Beltrame, 2013). Others attribute it to a decline in Canadian productivity compared to the 
U.S., as well as the broader trend whereby manufacturers in industrialized countries have 
shifted their production facilities to countries with lower production costs (Krzepkowski 
and Mintz, 2013).  
 
The ‘middle’ of Ontario’s food system was particularly hard hit during this decline, as 
manufacturing plant closures eroded the province’s food production and processing 
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capacity. Select closures include: Hershey’s chocolate in Smiths Falls (2007), followed 
soon after by CanGro Foods’ fruit and vegetable canning plant in St. Davids (the last fruit 
canning plant in Ontario, Walkom, 2008), and a Campbell’s Soup plant in Listowel 
(2008) (Hall, 2013). This trend has continued with the closure of two Bick’s pickles 
plants in Dunnville and Delhi (2010), an E.D. Smith salad dressing plant in Seaforth 
(2013), and most recently, a Heinz ketchup plant in Leamington (2013) (ibid). Some of 
these closures may be NAFTA-related; Sparling and LeGrow (2014) point out that after 
Hershey closed two Canadian plants, it shifted production to a new plant in Mexico.  
 
Despite the food production and processing closures, Ontario’s agri-food exports grew, 
hitting “a record high of nearly $10 billion in 2011”. The Minister of Economic 
Development and Innovation acknowledged the value of this stating, “The food 
processing industry is helping drive economic growth and provide good jobs across 
Ontario for families” (OMAFRA, 2012).  The ‘alternative’ organic sector contributed to 
this with a robust growth rate of approximately 20% each year for more than a decade 
(Miller, 2008). Today Ontario’s “agri-food industry contributes $33 billion to the 
provincial economy… provides 700,000 jobs and pays $7 billion in wages” (Vote ON 
food and farming, 2014).  
 
Sales at Ontario’s 154 farmers markets grew steadily during the 1998-2008 period, 
contributing estimated economic impacts of between $641 million and $1.9 billion 
annually (Experience Renewal Solutions, 2009). Government recognized an economic 
bright spot as the recession hit, and in the 2008 Ontario budget (Ontario government, 
2008a, p. 20), the province committed to invest $56 million over four years for the ‘Pick 
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Ontario Freshness’ strategy and the ‘Ontario Farmers’ Markets Initiative’, to encourage 
Ontarians to buy locally. These programs helped cultivate public interest in local food by 
bringing more farmers and eaters together in conversation at farmers markets.  
 
Comparatively, Canada’s overall economy fared less well. The national economic 
downturn that began in 2008 led to a prolonged period of limited economic growth 
characterized by job losses and growing rates of poverty and food insecurity in urban and 
rural areas of Canada. Food Banks Canada reported that Canadian food bank usage rates 
in 2013 (833,098 people, more than a third of whom are children, used a Canadian food 
bank) remained 23% higher than pre-2008 (Food Banks Canada, 2013). They attributed 
this to poverty-related challenges such as low wages (12% of households using food 
banks are employed), layoffs, and lack of affordable housing which forces many to forgo 
food for rent. These proximate social issues, along with the food manufacturing plant 
closures, may have helped put food and agriculture on governments’ agendas.  
 
Simultaneously, public awareness of, and interest in, food and agriculture issues was 
being fed by a growing number of television programs, books, and documentaries. Since 
the TV channel Foodnetwork.ca was founded in 2000, Canadians have consumed a huge 
assortment of TV and internet-based programs focused on food preparation, food 
production and restaurants. These programs blend education and entertainment and have 
cultivated a celebrity chef culture. Non-fiction writers have authored best-sellers to 
educate eaters about food and agriculture issues - e.g. Eric Schlosser’s Fast Food Nation 
(2005); Alisa Smith and J.B. MacKinnon’s The 100-Mile Diet (2007), Michael Pollan’s 
The Omnivore’s Dilemma (2007), and Barbara Kingsolver’s Animal, Vegetable, Miracle 
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(2008). These books helped produce audiences for food- and farm-focused documentary 
films such as Fast Food Nation (2007) and Food, Inc. (2009) which were popular in 
Canada as well as the U.S.. 
 
As Metcalf and its grantees were beginning to appreciate the interconnectedness between 
food and other social issues in 2007, print and television journalists were shining 
spotlights on issues related to food and agriculture, and their work helped members of the 
public, myself included, to connect the dots. Today, articles in local and national 
newspapers regularly link food and agriculture issues to issues of poverty (e.g. hunger 
and farmer livelihoods), health (e.g. obesity rates, chronic diseases, and food safety), 
environment (e.g. agriculture and climate change, water usage and pollution on farms, 
pesticides and their impacts on bee populations) and social justice (e.g. migrant labour 
and food access). Government policy makers were likely monitoring how food and 
agriculture issues were being framed in the media, along with the growing public 
awareness.  
 
Ontario’s food and farming policy space is crowded, dominated by large associations 
representing mainly conventional agriculture actors. Many of these associations were 
created by government and have a long history of working with government (e.g. Ontario 
Federation of Agriculture (OFA), Ontario Fruit and Vegetable Growers Association 
(OFVGA) and Beef Farmers of Ontario (BFO – until 2013 called the Ontario Cattlemen’s 
Association). Sustain entered this space as a new voice advocating for system change in 
alignment with the shifting public discourse on food and farming issues. I asked one 
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Metcalf representative how Sustain was received by policy makers, and it appeared the 
time was ripe for an organization like Sustain to enter the conversation.  
 
I got the sense in talking, particularly with OMAFRA (Ontario Ministry of 
Agriculture and Rural Affairs), that for several years they were astonished and 
intrigued that this new set of primarily urban actors were actually interested in 
agricultural policy and wanted input… I think they sort of struggled to 
understand – Who are you? What do you want? What relationship do you have 
to our agriculture Ministry? How do we reflect policy to take into account this 
emergent set of issues, and interests and actors? And I think the existence of 
Sustain went a long way to answer a lot of those questions for OMAFRA. 
Suddenly there was an organization that they could deal with, who carried a 
set of ideas and recommendations on behalf of a range of organizations who 
stood behind it. That put the Ministry in a place where they could look to and 
say OK, ‘that’s their constituency’.  ~ Interview, Metcalf’s President and CEO.  
 
My investigation into Sustain’s origins indicates Sustain’s formation was the result of, 
and influenced by two key factors. First – the Metcalf Foundation was a ‘catalyst’ that 
recognized the linkages between food, farming and other social and environmental issues 
and the potential that might be achieved by bringing key actors together. The 
Foundation’s continued financial support has been critical to the work that Sustain has 
undertaken to date, as described in Chapters 5 and 6. Second, Metcalf and Sustain’s 
founding members were aware of the growing interest around food and farming within 
government and the general public, and took advantage of this to engage in and advance 
the policy conversation. This case study suggests they were right to ride the wave of 
public interest and seize the moment – ‘kairos’ was at play.  
 
Chapter 3, Literature Review, provides an overview of the literature I used to help me 
better understand how cross-sectoral policy coalitions might be designed to develop the 
legitimacy required to influence public policy.   
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CHAPTER 3 LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
This chapter presents insights gained and questions raised based on a review of literature 
from researchers in management studies, sociology, and public policy. I also refer to grey 
literature or papers published by practitioners in the field that live coalition challenges on 
a daily basis. This literature identifies factors driving the formation of policy coalitions; 
insights about coalition structures, strategies and processes and the concepts of legitimacy 
and policy influence as they relate to policy coalitions. This literature informed my 
research question and the areas I inquired into as the basis for the case study of Sustain. 
 
 
 
3.1 WHAT’S DRIVING THE FORMATION OF POLICY COALITIONS 
 
Fully understanding the scope and nature of today’s complex and interconnected social 
and environmental problems often requires considering the broader system from diverse 
perspectives. Researchers indicate that those attempting to solve such complex problems 
in the public and non-profit sectors may benefit from cross-sectoral dialogue, ‘collective 
action’ and intervention at the level of public policy (Provan and Kenis, 2008, p. 231 
cites Agranoff and McGuire, 2003; Imperial, 2005; Lemieux-Charles, Chambers, 
Cockerill, Jaglal, Brazil, Cohen, LeClair, Dalziel and Shulman, 2005; Provan, Isett, and 
Milward, 2004; Provan and Milward, 1995). 
 
Making sense of problems and developing effective policy solutions to shift systems in 
productive ways demands diverse skills and knowledge which generally do not reside in 
a single organization or sector. Coalitions that engage diverse actors from different 
sectors in dialogue and collective action may be better positioned to understand complex 
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problems, identify viable solutions and influence public policy. It is partly for this reason 
that more CSOs have formed policy-focused coalitions in recent years.   
 
Organizations form or join policy coalitions and networks for a variety of other reasons – 
e.g. to acquire legitimacy, resources, systemic capacity, and serve clients better (Provan 
and Kenis, 2008, Cooper and Shumate, 2012). Van Dyke and McCammon (2010) cite 
studies that indicate, “coalitions are most likely to form when movement participants not 
only share interests, but also encounter threats to their common interests and expected 
gains” (p. 320). The advocacy ‘chill’ described in Chapter 1 may be an example of such a 
threat. Mizrahi and Rosenthal’s (2001) study of 41 social change coalitions in the United 
States notes ‘common interests and a desire to affect a larger agenda’ was the most 
frequently cited reason coalition leaders identified related to coalition formation.  
 
Academics and practitioners acknowledge there is no recipe for solving complex social 
problems (Westley, Zimmerman, Quinn Patton, 2006). Bryson, Crosby, and Stone (2006) 
note that cross-sector collaborations that bridge the public, private and non-profit sectors 
are sometimes formed in response to the failure of a single sector to solve public 
problems. The formation of cross-sectoral collaborations or coalitions in the areas of 
poverty (e.g. Campaign 2000, see Westley, Zimmerman, Quinn Patton, 2006), forestry 
(e.g. Great Bear Rainforest campaign, see Tjornbo, Westley, Riddell, 2010) and food 
(e.g. Sustain and other PNOs, see Levkoe 2014) in Canada indicates there is a growing 
recognition of the need to collaborate and work across sectors and silos to achieve 
systems change. This suggests that form should follow function – if a coalition thinks 
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collaboration is an important function, a coalition’s structures should be designed to 
encourage and support collaboration.  
 
Practitioners regularly acknowledge the challenges related to inter-organizational 
collaboration. Collaborating across sectors introduces additional complexity since each 
sector has different resources, values, language and perspectives on problems and 
solutions (Selsky and Parker, 2005). Bryson, Crosby, and Stone (2006) reinforce that 
cross-sectoral collaborations are challenging to create and sustain and observe that few 
research studies of such collaborations examine all of “the relationships among the initial 
conditions, processes, structures, governance, contingencies and constraints, outcomes, 
and accountabilities of collaborations” (p. 52).  
 
This literature reinforces that various factors are driving the formation of non-
governmental policy coalitions in Canada today. Key factors include a recognition by 
CSOs of the need to collaborate across sectors to understand and craft solutions to 
complex problems; to leverage limited resources, skills and knowledge; and to speak with 
a stronger voice and shift systems by influencing public policy.  
 
In the next section, I highlight literature that relates to the choices policy coalitions make 
about structures.   
 
3.2 STRUCTURES 
Researchers that have studied collaborations, social networks and public policy suggest 
that a coalition’s structure affects its ability to work effectively together and with others 
  37 
outside the coalition (Miller, Razon-Abad, Covey and Brown, 1994, Mizrahi and 
Rosenthal, 2001, Provan and Kenis, 2008). Dötterweich (2006) reports that community 
partnerships benefit from a clearly documented organizational structure outlining 
relationships, roles, and responsibilities. Others indicate the strategic purpose of a 
network sometimes informs its structure (Agranoff and McGuire, 2003, Bryson, Crosby, 
Stone, 2006); for example, the structures of policy and strategy-making networks differ 
from resource-exchange and project-based networks. This echoes the enduring 
organizational design theory articulated by Chandler (1962, 1977) that ‘structure follows 
strategy’.  
 
The literature I reviewed suggests that key structural elements of policy coalitions 
include: a broad, informed membership with a diverse range of skills, knowledge and 
resources; networks of relationships with sufficient trust to work productively together; a 
governance structure with defined roles, responsibilities and relationships; a leadership 
model that coalition members consider legitimate; and staff with skills and knowledge to 
engage members and support policy development and promotion. I explore literature 
related to each of these structural elements below. 
 
3.2.1 Membership 
A coalition’s membership has implications for a coalition’s ability to perform required 
tasks and cultivate the legitimacy to have influence. Hays, Hays, DeVille, and Mulhall 
(2000) indicate that a broad-based, multi-sectoral coalition “can more effectively reach 
and represent a larger constituency” (p. 375). Foster-Fishman, Berkowitz, Lounsbury, 
Jacobson, and Allen (2001) conclude, based on an extensive review of literature on 
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community coalitions that, “coalitions with a diverse membership are more likely to have 
access to the range of skills/knowledge needed for collaborative capacity…” (p. 249). 
Further, “…to increase the likelihood that coalition efforts will inform policy making and 
lead to long term systems change, coalitions need to develop relationships with key 
community leaders and policy makers” (p. 253). This suggests coalition members’ 
networks may be an asset to the coalition.  
 
Key considerations in terms of membership composition involve deciding on the 
perspectives required and the size of the coalition’s ‘tent’. Creating a ‘big tent’ (Cohen, 
Larijani, Aboelata, Mikkelsen, 2004) with room for multiple, diverse stakeholders has the 
benefit of engaging different perspectives, values, skills and resources; by collaborating 
on different levels, diverse stakeholders may be able to generate new insights, ideas and 
innovations. Ospina and Saz-Carranza (2010) note that achieving collaborative advantage 
“depends on the ability of each member organization to bring different resources to the 
network” (p. 409).  
 
Prins (2010) cites Huxam’s 1996 conclusion that “diversity is an essential condition for 
collaborative advantage” (p. 300). Hays, Hays, DeVille, and Mulhall (2000) indicate that 
the “ability to change policy was positively related to member diversity and the number 
of sectors represented…” (p. 376). The active participation of diverse stakeholders can 
enhance a group’s sensitivity and ability to respond to changes in the external 
environment (Simo, 2009). This can assist policy coalitions in monitoring and responding 
strategically to ‘policy windows’ (Kingdon, 2003, Pal, 2006) and system events such as 
changes in governing conditions or public opinion (Birkland, 2005).  
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Not surprisingly, diversity also presents challenges for coalitions. “When actors from 
different sectors focus on the same issue, they are likely to think about it differently, to be 
motivated by different goals, and to use different approaches” (Selsky and Parker, 2005, 
p. 851). In his examination of four provincial food networks, Levkoe (2014) observes that 
each spent considerable “time and energy negotiating with, and responding to their 
constituents” (p. 160).  
 
When a coalition is being established, questions of how much diversity to engage and 
who to involve become strategic choices. Wood and Gray’s research on inter-
organizational collaboration (1991) concludes that including all interested parties is rarely 
realistic or necessary; when determining who to engage, coalitions must balance the 
tensions of inclusivity and efficiency (Provan and Kenis, 2008). This suggests that, as a 
coalition engages more numbers and diversity, consulting and negotiating with members 
may become more onerous. 
 
Prins (2010) refers to the determination of who is internal (i.e. members) and who is 
external, and how each should be engaged as ‘boundary management’. Typically a 
coalition’s convenor (i.e. the individual or organization that brings the group together – 
see page 54), draws on their networks when recruiting members and this influences who 
is in the tent. We saw an example of this with the Metcalf Foundation in Chapter 2. 
Wood and Gray (1991) suggest a convenor may consider engaging: those stakeholders 
who are most interested; those who are the most powerful and influential; the majority 
within a problem domain; and/or the best organized networks. Some caution that 
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organizations that are not engaged can undermine a group’s overall legitimacy (Wood 
and Gray, 1991, Pasquero, 1991).  
 
There appear to be substantial benefits to bringing different sectors together as members 
of a coalition. Bason (2010) notes that government/non-profit collaborations can be 
mutually beneficial since government can learn from organizations that have successfully 
implemented social innovations in communities, while social innovators can benefit from 
government’s capacity and experience taking solutions to scale. Non-profit/business 
collaborations are increasingly seen by non-profits as a necessary tactic and by businesses 
as a key component of business strategy with mutual benefits (Eweje and Palakshappa, 
2009 cite Murphy and Bendell’s 1999 work). Austin (2000), however, reports that non-
profit/business collaborations introduce additional collaborative challenges: organizations 
with different performance measures, competitive dynamics, cultures, decision-making 
styles, etc. For cross-sector collaborations to deliver public value, their members need to 
appreciate and find ways to leverage each sector’s strengths as well as find ways to 
overcome or compensate for the weaknesses of different sectors (Bryson, Crosby, Stone, 
2006). In the conclusion of their literature review, Bryson, Crosby and Stone note that 
those engaging in cross-sectoral collaboration should go into it recognizing that “success 
will be very difficult to achieve”. It can also be hard to measure (Eweje and Palakshappa, 
2009).  
 
In my experience working with coalitions and collaborative groups, individual 
participants – both leaders and members – often impact a collaboration’s success. 
Determining who should represent participating stakeholders or sectors needs to be given 
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careful consideration; at the same time, it can be unrealistic to expect an individual to 
‘represent’ a sector which may itself be diverse, competitive and lack a single voice 
(Cairns and Harris, 2011). Individuals who participate as representatives of an association 
with a particular viewpoint, for example, may be uncomfortable shifting their viewpoint 
in a public forum (Roberts and Bradley, 1991). They note that exceptions to this are 
‘policy entrepreneurs’ who come from outside a system and have the ability to challenge 
existing frameworks and consider more radical changes.  
 
“Coalitions rely extensively on the extent to which their members have the capacity to 
perform needed tasks and work collaboratively together (Foster-Fishman, Berkowitz, 
Lounsbury, Jacobson, Allen, 2001, p. 243 they reference Knoke and Wood, 1981). 
Individuals who work in coalitions need to have a variety of skills such as 
“communication, negotiation, conflict-resolution” (Cairns and Harris 2011); interpersonal 
and administrative skills related to collaboration; and social psychological skills - the 
ability to modify mind-sets and habits (Pasquero 1991). Collaboration also requires those 
involved have the capacity to look beyond the competitive relationships that exist related 
to funding, staff and other limited resources (Cooper and Shumate 2012).  
 
Policy coalition work demands specific technical skills related to policy development, 
analysis and advocacy. This includes problem framing (e.g. in alignment with 
government priorities), problem solving, strategy development, knowing when and how 
to negotiate/compromise, outreach and organizing, media and government relations 
(Moore 2005). The ability to gather, analyze and synthesize data – e.g. to support the 
monitoring and evaluation of policies that are implemented – are also important skills.  
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The literature related to membership suggests that a coalition’s membership composition 
is important from three key perspectives. First, members provide the energy, knowledge 
and skills a coalition requires to achieve its objectives – i.e. its capacity. Secondly, 
individual members impact a coalition’s culture, and through their personal and 
professional networks members extend a coalition’s reach into the broader community. 
Thirdly, the size of the ‘tent’ and the diversity of the members a convenor invites to 
participate represent strategic choices that affect a coalition’s ability to understand the 
broader environment, collaborate productively, and influence policy.  
 
Each of these membership factors may contribute to, or detract from, a coalition’s 
legitimacy. I investigated these aspects of Sustain’s membership as I gathered data and 
reviewed organizational materials. In Chapter 5 I describe Sustain’s membership 
composition and growth, along with processes the Alliance uses to connect members and 
engage their knowledge and expertise. In Chapter 7 I analyze how these structures and 
related processes affected Sustain’s legitimacy.  
 
3.2.2 Networks 
Theory about social networks (from sociology) and policy networks (from public policy) 
both inform my research. Here I focus on the former. I explore literature related to policy 
networks and policy development and promotion later in this chapter. 
 
Networks are often characterized as fluid, flexible and adaptable structures (Huxham and 
Vangen, 2005, Katcher, 2010, McLeod Grant, 2010) and are seen as having the potential 
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to deliver distinct benefits compared to other organizational forms (Plastrik and Taylor, 
2010). These benefits, or ‘network effects’, include “great power to innovate, disturb, 
ignite, and dramatically change systems” (ibid, p. 24). Some attribute this to networks’ 
ability to self-organize and respond to emergence (McLeod Grant, 2010). Networks are 
also recognized for their power to rapidly spread information and ideas (Milgram, 1967, 
Moore and Westley, 2011). Plastrik and Taylor (2010) suggest non-profit networks 
wanting to achieve network effects pursue strategies to cultivate rapid growth and 
diffusion, ‘small-world’ reach (Milgram, 1967), adaptive capacity, and resilience.  
 
These network effects may depend upon whether a network is ‘healthy’. Plastrik and 
Taylor (2009) developed a “Network Health Scorecard” that can be used to evaluate a 
network’s health across various dimensions. Scorecard dimensions include the network’s 
purpose, capacity, operational processes (e.g. internal communications, engagement, 
accountability mechanisms and decision-making) and performance. Scearce (2011) too 
reinforces it is critical to assess network health and notes, “early stage and regular 
evaluation can also be a way to find things to celebrate and thereby increase momentum 
and commitment” (p. 24). I discuss and analyze Sustain’s network health in Chapter 7. 
 
From a structural perspective, a network’s boundaries can be difficult to define as the 
edges are often ‘unbounded’ and fuzzy (Cooper and Shumate, 2012, Scearce, 2011). 
Members of informal and social networks are members by virtue of their connections to 
other network members and may not be aware of their membership. But as Levkoe 
(2014) notes, “Shared beliefs and a sense of belongingness are central to determining the 
boundaries of a social movement…” (p. 127). Membership in a coalition may be clearer 
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as boundaries are sometimes defined through a memorandum of understanding or similar 
agreement. Coalitions are a kind of network since ‘members’ generally form connections 
or linkages with others coalition members. Coalition members are also part of other 
social and professional networks that extend beyond and/or exist outside of a coalition; as 
noted previously, these extended networks may be of value to the coalition.  
 
Takahashi and Smutney (2002) conclude that informal relationships among individuals in 
partner agencies are key to bringing organizations together. Although some studies have 
identified “a previous history of working relationship as a condition for coalition 
formation”, coalition leaders Mizrahi and Rosenthal (2001) interviewed did not identify 
this as a factor for coalition success.  
 
Sociologists have applied network theory to the analysis of social networks since work 
done at Harvard’s sociology department in the 1960-1970s (Prell, 2012). Social network 
analysts believe network structure matters, and much of the literature describes different 
structures or models and considers their impacts (Borgatti, Mehra, Brass, Labianca, 2009, 
Diani, 2003, Krebs and Holley, 2002). Granovetter’s (1973) ‘strength of weak ties’ 
theory examines how network structure affects the flow of information, and concludes 
‘bridging’ ties between individuals in different networks are critical to information 
exchange between networks. He suggests that advocacy groups that fail to expand 
beyond their core members may fail to accomplish their goals. Others suggest that 
although ‘weak ties’ may generate innovation, “the adoption of innovation requires 
strong bonds and trust” (Moore and Westley, 2011, p. 5).   
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Burt (1992) introduces the concept of ‘structural holes’ in ego networks. In ‘ego-
centered’ networks there is a central ‘node’ (i.e. one network member, group or 
organization) to which all other nodes are connected to, as spokes to the hub of a wheel. 
‘Structural holes’ represent an absence of ties between the nodes located on the outside of 
the wheel. A ‘strongly bound’ network has few ‘structural holes’, and is better able to 
“communicate and coordinate so as to act as one” (Borgatti, Mehra, Brass, Labianca, 
2009).  
 
The ‘centrality’ dimension of network structures has been another important focus of 
study. Actors in a network that are better connected to other network members have 
greater centrality and potentially greater influence (Cook, Emerson, Gillmore, 1983, 
Kahler, 2009, Moore and Westley, 2011). According to Cooper and Shumate (2012), 
“organizations with the greatest centrality in collaboration networks receive greater 
benefits than those with less network centrality. Benefits may come in the form of 
prestige (Taylor and Doerfel, 2003), access to information (Gulati, 1995), and visibility” 
(p. 643). I suspect such an imbalance of benefits may manifest in distrust and detract 
from internal legitimacy.  
 
Segmentation is another dimension of network structure (Diani, 2003). This relates to the 
number of steps between network ‘nodes’, where more steps can be barriers to 
communication between members. Diani suggests higher segmentation may reflect 
ideological differences, or differences in interest in an issue. This suggests to me that 
more diverse, and cross-sectoral networks are likely to be more segmented and that a 
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network organization needs to invest energy to establish connections between members 
and create opportunities to build mutual understanding.  
 
Diani (2003) identifies four types of movement or network structures based on their 
degrees of centrality and segmentation. Diani’s ‘movement cliques’ are highly 
decentralized (i.e. no single actor controls exchanges among members), and reticulated 
with all nodes adjacent. ‘Policephalous’ movements are centralized and somewhat 
segmented; the distance between some members is long. In such a structure, some actors 
are better connected than others and “able to control relational flows”. Diani’s 
‘star/wheel’ structure is characterized by high centralization and low segmentation. In 
this model the central ‘hub’ acts as a coordinator, and controls exchanges among other 
actors. Those on the outside, connected like spokes to a hub, are often more involved 
with others outside the network; they rely on the central hub to gain access to others in 
the network. This equates to a Burt’s ‘ego-centered’ network structure discussed above. 
Finally there is a ‘segmented, decentralized structure’, which Diani suggests is difficult to 
characterize as a network since actors generally act alone or with a small number of 
others on specific issues and may reject efforts at coordination.  
 
Krebs and Holley (2002) suggest network structures evolve through phases, with the help 
of network ‘weavers’, to become more adaptive and resilient. Some of the phases they 
define reflect Diani’s structures above, however I find their nomenclature more visually 
evocative. Phase one is ‘scattered fragments’; in this phase, actors may work with a few 
others, but their collaborative work is often done in isolation from other groups. This 
phase reflects characteristics of Diani’s ‘segmented, decentralized structure’. Krebs and 
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Holley suggest that a leader (an individual or organization) acting as a ‘weaver’ can 
foster new connections between actors in scattered fragments and evolve the network 
structure into a ‘single hub and spoke’ model, similar to Diani’s ‘star/wheel’. They 
caution that this structure should not be maintained over the long term since it 
concentrates power and vulnerability in one node, the hub. In a healthy network, weavers 
establish connections between members represented by the ‘spokes’, and facilitate 
collaboration within small groups. They recommend the initial weaver gradually mentor 
and encourage others to weave, since multiple weavers can help evolve the network 
toward a third phase, a ‘multi-hub small-world’. In this phase, a weaver might connect to 
each hub; in general, ties within each hub are stronger than those between hubs. This 
appears to reflect Diani’s ‘policephalous’ structure. Krebs and Holley indicate this 
structure assists a network to grow in scale and reach and facilitates information flow. 
Their final phase and end goal is the ‘core/periphery’ model which has at its core 
members who are well connected to each other, many of whom are weavers. Members on 
the more porous periphery of the network are less well connected to the core. They may 
be newer members; members who represent bridges to less well connected communities; 
or members with unique resources that operate outside the core community.  
  
Cases that Takahashi and Smutney (2002) examine illustrate that structures may need to 
evolve throughout the course of a collaborative’so journey to align with a change in focus 
or to streamline functions to increase productivity. Mizrahi and Rosenthal (2001) observe 
                                                 
o Although grammatically an adjective, ‘collaborative’ is frequently used as noun instead of a 
‘collaboration’ or a ‘collaborative group’. I encountered this usage in the literature I reviewed (I have also 
observed it is increasingly common in verbal discussions) and so I use it here as it is used in the source 
material I reviewed. In the literature it is often used to describe a collaboration or alliance that has a defined 
identity (e.g. when the collaborative group has a name), rather than referring to groups that are less 
formally defined.  
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that adjustments to structures, membership and goals are often a product of “adapting and 
adjusting to internal and external changes… [and that] those dynamics seem to be 
indications of resilience, creativity and fortitude” (p. 75). This suggests it is important for 
a collaborative or coalition to monitor and reflect on its experience. 
 
Prins (2010) notes that as more structure is introduced collaboratives should strive to 
balance structure (e.g. defined roles and groups) and flexibility (e.g. to engage new 
members). This reflects a tendency toward institutionalization (or stability) that occurs as 
organizations and networks mature. McGuire and Agranoff (2007) observe,  
 
…there is lingering evidence that bureaucratic management remains 
important. We know that some networks are “better” than others, but are still 
learning why; that too much process can stultify collaborative operations, but 
are still learning how; and that networks work in some situations and not in 
others, but are still learning when. ~ 2007, p. 1. 
 
Levkoe (2014) references Staggenborg’s (2011) findings concerning social movement 
organizations (SMO) that are more and less formalized.  
 
…formalized SMOs with hierarchical decision-making structures and 
codified membership criteria have typically been more successful in 
accessing established political channels, at being recognized as a legitimate 
representative of a movement, and for sustaining ongoing interactions with 
diverse constituencies. Less formalized SMOs - managed by volunteers with 
few formal procedures or policies - tend to be more successful at tactical 
innovation since they are able to mobilize quickly and adapt to emerging 
situations” ~ Levkoe, 2014, pp.154-155.  
 
 
Provan and Kenis (2008) identify three tensions that they think networks need to respond 
to: flexibility versus stability, efficiency versus inclusiveness, and internal versus external 
legitimacy. They identified a need to build and test theory related to network-level 
activities, structures and outcomes. The authors describe three forms of governance that 
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engage these tensions in different ways (discussed in more detail in Governance section 
below).  
 
Malinsky and Lubelsky (2011) might characterize these kinds of tensions as paradoxes or 
contradictions, something they observe is common in networks. In the networks they 
studied, “Framing these paradoxes as pairs of complementary tendencies rather than as 
either/or choices proved to be helpful” (ibid, p. 29). They suggest networks frame their 
questions using ‘both/and’; I think this might be a useful way to respond to the tensions 
above, knowing that each dimension offers something positive.  
 
This literature indicates a network’s structure is a reflection of the relationships that exist 
among network members, with a network’s ‘boundary’ formally or informally defining 
those individuals and groups that are part of a network. Network ‘weavers’ are 
individuals or groups within a network that help shape and in some cases evolve a 
network’s membership and structure by deliberately connecting members with one 
another. Informed by this, I paid attention to the nature of the relationships and 
connections within Sustain’s network and attempted to identify who played a weaver role 
in the network and the strategies and processes they used to weave a network with the 
knowledge, expertise and legitimacy to influence public policy. 
 
The literature also suggests a network’s structure affects its ability to achieve desirable 
network effects such as the rapid spread of ideas and response to changing conditions. 
Researchers define several network dimensions and related structures. Some suggest 
these structures are evolutionary in nature, and that a network may choose to evolve its 
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structure toward a particular form. As networks and organizations mature, they tend to 
‘institutionalize’, introducing more formal structures (e.g. for membership) and processes 
(e.g. for participation). Such formalization can produce tension as it detracts from the 
flexibility and adaptability that contributes to a network’s ability to achieve desirable 
network effects.  
 
This suggests that in gathering my data, I should consider Sustain’s network dimensions 
and structural form. I looked for evidence of whether the Alliance’s network structure 
affected information flow and members’ ability to communicate and collaborate. I also 
looked for evidence of whether the network’s structure evolved and whether Sustain 
experienced any of the network tensions identified above.  
 
3.2.3 Governance 
The growing number of networks and collaborations has led to an evolution in thinking 
about governance. Takahashi and Smutney (2002) cite Lowndes and Skelcher’s 1998 
definition of governance as: “the purposive means of guiding and steering a society or 
community”… comprised of “a particular set of organizational arrangements.” Renz 
(2006) reinforces that in networks, no single body has the authority or power to direct, 
and boards are no longer the primary home of governance. According to Provan and 
Kenis (2008), researchers have given the topic of network governance limited attention 
despite the fact that is it an important mechanism for developing internal legitimacy. 
They note, “…governance is necessary to ensure that participants engage in collective 
and mutually supportive action, that conflict is addressed, and that network resources are 
acquired and utilized efficiently and effectively” (ibid, p. 231).  
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According to Simo (2009), agreeing on governance is “one of the first steps that should 
be taken in establishing” cross-sector collaborations. Establishing agreements at the 
outset around a rationale for the establishment of a collaborative, its expected duration, 
and membership criteria is considered important, since lack of clarity around roles and 
accountabilities can lead to confusion and frustration (Cairns and Harris, 2011). As the 
number of network members grows, the number of potential relationships increases 
exponentially. Under such conditions, governance becomes extremely complex. 
Geographic distance further exacerbates governance complexity according to Provan and 
Kenis (2008). 
 
Bryson, Crosby and Stone (2006) note that initial agreements around how to work 
together, and to what end, may be informal or formal, with the later facilitating 
accountability. Keeping agreements informal initially, and designing with adaptability/ 
evolution in mind, is helpful since agreements can be difficult to alter after they are in 
place (Takahashi and Smutney 2002 reference Harrison and Weiss’ 1998 work). A work 
group or task force structure can “serve to organize collaborative work, clarify member 
responsibilities, and create the task focus needed to achieve targeted goals” (Foster-
Fishman, Berkowitz, Lounsbury, Jacobson, Allen, 2001, p. 254).  
 
“Coalition organizations need structures that allow for input from different types of 
members and that avoid competition with member organizations for leadership and 
resources” (Van Dyke and McCammon, 2010, p. 323). Surman’s (2006) “constellation 
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governance model” represents a governing approach and structure that acknowledges and 
responds to these considerations.  
 
Provan and Kenis (2008) articulate a theory outlining three forms of governance: ‘shared 
governance’, ‘lead organization’, and ‘network administrative organization’ (NAO). In 
shared governance, a network is governed completely by its members/participants; there 
is no distinct administrative entity and governance is decentralized. In a lead organization 
governed network, one member of the network often takes responsibility for some or all 
governance activities. This form is more centralized, with most “network-level activities 
and key decisions coordinated through and by a single member”. A NAO is characterized 
by a separate, non-member administrative unit (an individual or separately staffed 
organization) which governs the network and its activities. This administrative body is 
responsible for coordinating and sustaining the network. This unit is somewhat similar to 
the ‘backbone support organization’ Kania and Kramer (2011) indicate is helpful in 
supporting ‘collective impact’ initiatives. Surman’s “constellation governance model” 
has an equivalent, she recommends a neutral secretariat be engaged to coordinate a 
network’s work.  
 
“In networks, the primary tension regarding efficiency is between the need for 
administrative efficiency in network governance and the need for member involvement, 
through inclusive decision making” (Provan and Kenis, 2008, p. 242). Although shared 
self-governance may appeal to network participants as it enables them to retain control, 
the authors conclude that this form of governance is best suited to small networks of 
organizations. As a network grows, this form becomes inefficient, and participants may 
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ignore network issues or spend excessive energy on coordination. The authors also 
observe that some networks make a strategic choice to evolve their governance model in 
response to changing conditions, but that an evolution does not always occur. As a 
network attracts new members, demands on governance grow. They conclude that the 
choice of governance form, and the management of tensions within it, affects a network’s 
overall effectiveness.  
 
The literature on governance structures and related processes suggests it is important to 
examine the Alliance’s overarching objectives, how they were established, and the roles 
and responsibilities assigned to, or assumed by, individuals and groups. In other words, 
how did Sustain organize the Network and leverage available resources to achieve its 
objectives? Did it adopt a particular form of governance and did that evolve over time? 
Did Sustain encounter the tension of efficiency versus inclusivity? How did Sustain’s 
governance structures and processes impact the Alliance’s internal and external 
legitimacy? 
 
3.2.4 Leadership 
Various terms are applied to key leadership roles within a collaboration or coalition, such 
as: ‘facilitator’, ‘convenor’, ‘director’, ‘sponsor’, and ‘champion’. As is true in an 
organization, an individual’s leadership approach and personal effectiveness has 
implications for the success of a coalition. “Where community bonds are less strong, 
leadership is likely to be more important in creating bridges and framing issues so that 
diverse groups can be brought together” (Van Dyke and McCammon, 2010, p. 326). A 
number of examples profiled in the literature illustrate that clarity among individual 
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leadership roles is important – for the individual serving in the role, and for those who 
interact with them (Roberts and Bradley, 1991). I found helpful distinctions made in the 
literature between two important leadership roles: that of the initial ‘convenor’ and the 
ongoing ‘director’.  
 
The convenor: this individual, who may or may not represent a lead organization, plays a 
unique role as the initiator of a collaboration. This role is at times referred to as a 
‘champion’ or ‘facilitator’. Gray (1989) notes the convenor must, “identify and bring all 
the legitimate stakeholders to the table” (p. 71). Takahashi and Smutney (2002) refer to 
individuals who assume this role as a ‘collaborative entrepreneur’. Collaborative 
entrepreneurs tend to draw on their networks of relationships when initiating a 
collaborative project (Takahashi and Smutney, 2002) and so this has implications for who 
is invited into the ‘tent’. This individual may or may not lead and manage the 
collaboration after it is established by continuing in an ongoing leadership role such as 
director (see below). 
 
Bryson, Crosby and Stone (2006) note that convenors tend to be “boundary-spanning 
leaders with credibility in multiple arenas” (p. 46); and that they often hold positions of 
power and influence in the community. Like members they need to have a range of skills; 
Gray (1989) indicates convenors must be able to: see the potential value and purpose of 
collaborating, identify relevant stakeholders, persuade people to participate, and establish 
appropriate processes. Convenors must also be seen by others as legitimate and as having 
an unbiased approach to issues. 
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Cooper and Shumate (2012) explore the differences between coalitions convened by the 
community or ‘grassroots’ coalitions, and those formed by actors outside the community, 
or what they termed ‘donor-driven’ (i.e. funder-driven) coalitions. They observe that 
coalitions established by the community tend to rely on persuasion to bring a coalition 
together and this means the coalitions are often larger but lack financial resources. In 
contrast, when donors or funders convene a coalition, they are able to mandate 
collaboration and select the organizations involved (i.e. members don’t choose to work 
together), thanks in part to an unequal power relationship. Not surprisingly, they 
conclude that ‘donor-driven’ coalitions are comparatively better resourced than 
‘grassroots’ coalitions.  
 
The director: although formal and informal leadership is exercised within coalitions, 
formal leaders often go by the title of ‘director’ or alternatively ‘coordinator’. Bryson, 
Crosby and Stone (2006) distinguish between directors who are ‘sponsors’ – i.e. those 
who often have access to resources they can use to support the network; and directors 
who act as ‘champions’ – i.e. those who help advance the collaboration on a process 
level. They reinforce that the cultivation of informal leadership throughout the network is 
important, since overarching direction may be limited. Surman and Surman (2008) 
support this, noting that a ‘partnership director’ (a defined leadership role in the 
constellation governance model) must focus on moving the process forward and nurturing 
leaders in partner organizations. Kania and Kramer (2011), in describing cross-sectoral 
“collective impact initiatives” p, specify the need for a coordinating staff member (from a 
                                                 
p Kania and Kramer describe these kinds of initiatives as long-term commitments by a group of important 
actors from different sectors to a common agenda for solving a specific social problem. 
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separate backbone organization) charged with project management, data management and 
facilitation. As is true for convenors, directors should have a diverse skill-set. 
 
Mizrahi and Rosenthal (2001) study the complexity of coalition building from the 
perspective of individual leaders. These leaders ranked competent leadership as the second 
most important element of success (the authors acknowledged there may have been some 
bias in this). The authors subsequently identify leadership competencies, values and 
attributes that affect a leader’s effectiveness. The top-ranked attributes include: credibility, 
trustworthiness and articulateness. Additional attributes there is significant agreement on: 
educated, good strategic/political skills, organized, facilitation skills, visionary.  
 
Organizational studies have traditionally focused on individual leaders, but as Reinelt 
(2010) observes, “While leadership in organizations is positional, individual, top-down, 
and directive; leadership in networks is relational, collective, bottom-up, and emergent.” 
Leach and Mazur (2013) would agree, they reinforce there is no single leader in a 
movement network, rather, leadership is distributed. This hints at the concept of collective 
or shared leadership that was evident in the case study of the US-based national energy 
network, RE-AMP (McLeod Grant, 2010). There, leadership was exercised by various 
individuals (e.g. staff, consultants, members, facilitators) and, “This shared leadership 
created resilience and greater effectiveness, as the network could push forward on multiple 
fronts simultaneously” (ibid, p. 2).  
 
Ospina and Saz-Carranza (2010) indicate that leaders in networks need to focus 
simultaneously on two types of work: “inward work, among network members… and 
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outward work between the network and external actors”. Both of these forms of work 
likely have implications for a group’s legitimacy.  
 
The literature reinforces the important roles coalition ‘convenors’ and skilled ‘directors’ 
play in a coalition’s success. These leaders not only shape a coalition’s initial 
composition, but implement processes to attract, engage and retain members, which as 
we saw earlier is linked to a coalition’s capacity and legitimacy. Leadership in networks 
tends to be distributed between formal (positional) and informal (relational) leaders in the 
network, and between members and, in the case of network organizations, staff. Based on 
this, I inquired into where leadership resides and is exercised at Sustain to determine 
whether it is shared and how it impacts internal and external legitimacy.  
 
We saw in Chapter 2 that the Metcalf Foundation convened members of its network in 
discussions which led to the formation of Sustain. In doing so, it played the role of 
catalyst and ‘convenor’ as it is described above, which means Sustain is, at least in some 
respects, a ‘donor-driven’ coalition. Members of the initial group Metcalf convened are 
often referred to as Sustain’s ‘founding members’; in 2013 most remained actively 
involved as AC and SC members where they continue to exercise leadership alongside 
Sustain’s Director.  
 
3.2.5 Staff 
Because it can be difficult to fund policy and advocacy work, many coalitions rely 
heavily on members and other experts in the field lending their time and energy in a 
voluntary capacity. While some coalitions operate without staff, in my experience, 
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largely volunteer-based groups often struggle to do what needs to be done and maintain 
momentum. There appears to be a growing recognition of the value of paid staff. Kania 
and Kramer (2011) indicate that a “backbone support organization” (i.e. a separate 
organization with skilled staff charged with network coordination) is a key condition of 
successful collective impact initiatives. 
 
Dötterweich (2006) notes that coordinators of community development partnerships 
“played a critical role in keeping members connected and informed” and that the stability 
and competency of the coordinator was a factor in their success. In Provan and Kenis’ 
(2008) NAO model, staff engage network members on an ongoing basis to build 
commitment to the network’s goals and resolve conflict. McEvily and Zaheer (2004) 
suggest that a key role of such network facilitators is to build and maintain trust among 
members. Foster-Fishman, Berkowitz, Lounsbury, Jacobson and Allen (2001) state, 
“…coalitions need formalized processes and procedures that clarify staff and member 
roles and responsibilities and provide clear guidelines for all of the processes involved in 
collaborative work (e.g. decision-making, conflict resolution, interagency agreements)” 
(p. 254). Their review of literature identifies substantial research about how successful 
coalitions engage in continuous learning and adaptation, “seeking and responding to 
feedback and evaluation data” (ibid, p. 255 - they cite Armbruster, Gale, Brady and 
Thompson, 1999; Barton, Watkins and Jarjoura, 1997; Bitter 1977; Coe 1988; Gray 
1985). I think staff likely have a role to play in cultivating a culture of evaluation, 
continuous learning and adaptation.    
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Policy development and advocacy work, which is a central part of the work done by 
policy coalitions requires a range of skills and expertise. Skills include problem framing 
(in alignment with government priorities), problem solving, strategy development, 
knowing when and how to negotiate/compromise, outreach and organizing, media and 
government relations (Moore, 2005). The ability to gather, analyze and synthesize data – 
e.g. to support the monitoring and evaluation of policies that are implemented – are also 
important skills. This work is technical and labour intensive. While individual members 
and their organizations may have some of the required skills and expertise, many lack the 
time required to undertake this work. As a result, some coalitions hire staff to support 
members in doing this work and to solicit and synthesize contributions from members.  
 
This literature suggests staff play an important role in supporting, nurturing and evolving 
networks and coalitions. To do so staff require skills in areas such as communication, 
coordination, facilitation, and negotiation. In a policy coalition, technical skills related to 
policy development and analysis are also critical as coalitions can rarely rely strictly on 
members for this work. Since networks and coalitions often have limited resources, 
determining which skills to employ (on staff) vs. which to borrow from members (as 
volunteers) appears to be another strategic choice. This literature suggests I inquire into 
Sustain’s staff structure and how choices made about staff impacted the Alliance’s ability 
to develop and promote policy solutions and cultivate internal and external legitimacy. 
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3.3 STRATEGIES AND PROCESSSES 
The choices a coalition makes about strategies informs what work is prioritized, while 
related processes define how that work is undertaken. As with structures, the literature 
suggests a coalition’s strategies and processes impact its internal and external legitimacy.   
 
For a policy coalition or network to work productively across sectors to develop and 
influence policy reform it needs to design strategies and processes to engage members 
and foster active participation and collaboration. The coalition must also develop 
processes to guide work done by members and staff. This is particularly true for the areas 
of policy development, analysis and promotion. In this section, I examine literature 
related to strategy formation, collaboration, member engagement, and policy 
development and promotion.  
 
3.3.1 Strategy formation 
At its essence, strategy involves making choices about organizational mission and goals 
and how best to use limited resources. The discipline of strategic management emerged in 
the 1980s and extensive research has been done since that time, often focused on a 
prescriptive and linear approach to strategy formation in single organizations. Such an 
approach to strategy formation is often referred to as intentional and ‘deliberate’.  
 
While deliberate approaches to strategy formation have been adopted by non-profit 
organizations interested in incorporating more “business-like” models into their 
operations, Mintzberg (1987, 1994) criticizes this approach, arguing that strategy is a 
dynamic system/process characterized by ‘emergent strategies’, which are a ‘response to 
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patterns recognized in a set of actions’. Kania, Kramer and Russell (2014) indicate that, 
“Emergent strategy accepts that a realized strategy emerges over time as the initial 
intentions collide with, and accommodate to, a changing reality…. They suggest it 
requires “a constant process of “sensing” the environment to ensure that resources are 
applied where opportunities are greatest” (p. 29). Bryson, Crosby, and Stone (2006) 
conclude that “cross-sector collaborations are more likely to succeed when they combine 
deliberate and emergent strategy” (p. 46).  
 
Astley and Fombrun (1983) acknowledge that organizations and their broader 
environment, including other actors in that environment are interconnected. They 
articulate the concept of ‘collective strategy’, which they define as “the joint formulation 
of policy and implementation of action by the members of interorganizational 
collectivities” (p. 528). By recognizing mutual interdependence and acting collectively, 
organizations can move beyond responding to the broader environment to shaping the 
environment and creating opportunities and resources. Kania and Kramer’s (2011) 
collective impact concept reflects these ideas.  
 
Huxham and Macdonald (1992) examine strategy as a collaborative process and they 
introduce the concepts of “collaborative advantage” and “meta-strategy”. Collaborative 
advantage is “concerned with developing synergy between organizations towards the 
achievement of common goals” (ibid, p. 50). These are goals that individual 
organizations typically could not achieve alone; Kania and Kramer’s (2011) “common 
agenda” and measures echo this. Huxham and Macdonald (1992) argue that achieving 
such an advantage requires the development of “meta-strategy”, or strategy for the 
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collaboration. This strategy focuses on the aims of the collaborative as a whole and 
identifies what needs to be done through collaboration.  
 
Guo and Acar (2005) observe there has been an increase in the number of non-profit 
organizations forming same sector and cross-sectoral alliances. They, and Osborne and 
Murray (2000), attribute this largely to pressures from government and other funders that 
are interested in reducing perceived duplication of services and, in the case of 
government, reducing the number of contracts they engage in. Collaboration among non-
profit organizations is challenging in an environment where organizations, and 
particularly those in the same sector, regularly compete for limited sources of funds and 
other resources such as skilled staff and volunteers. This competition forces organizations 
to distinguish their work from others, and so although complementarities exist, a culture 
of competition sometimes obscures those. Osborne and Murray (2000) note that 
organizations that choose to collaborate in response to pressures from funders may 
benefit, "…such collaboration can provide legitimacy and leverage in developing 
relationships with their key external stake-holders” (p. 16). The four Canadian social 
service agencies they studied were able, “…to maintain, and indeed to promote, both 
their common and distinctive values in the face of such institutional pressure. It also 
provided them with the potential for greater influence and leverage on their institutional 
environment (ibid, p. 16). 
 
When collaborating across sectors – for example when non-profit and for-profit 
organizations collaborate – competition for funding is less direct and opportunities for 
strategic cooperation may be easier to ‘see’. For example, Rondinelli and London (2003) 
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report that corporations feeling pressures from stakeholders to improve their reputation 
for corporate environmental responsibility recognize non-profit organizations may offer 
information and knowledge about how to do business differently. Despite the potential, 
the authors note that these relationships too are characterized by tension and mutual 
distrust. Rondinelli and London conclude it is important "to establish trust early in the 
collaborative process and to reinforce it throughout the collaboration" (ibid, p. 74). The 
different values in the non-profit and for-profit sectors may inhibit collaboration, 
something I explore in more detail in the section on collaboration below. 
 
The strategy literature suggests I should consider the processes Sustain used to develop 
strategy; whether the Alliance’s strategy was deliberate, emergent or a combination of 
both; and whether and how these strategies informed structures and operational processes 
and impact legitimacy. The concept of collective or meta-strategy also appears worth 
investigation whether driven by strategic intent or external pressures.    
 
3.3.2 Collaboration 
Gray’s (1989) classic text, Collaborating, frames collaboration as a mechanism for 
solving shared problems. Collaborative work can be particularly challenging for cross-
sectoral groups since members have different cultures and values, access to resources, 
and sometimes competing interests. Gray examines the experience of different groups 
that came together to define problems and implement solutions and outlines key steps in 
the collaborative process related to problem setting, direction setting, and 
implementation.  
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Gray indicates initial agreement on problem definition helps participants recognize their 
interest in the problem. Bryson, Crosby and Stone (2006) reference Logsdon’s 1991 work 
which concludes recognized self-interest and acknowledged interdependence are 
necessary preconditions for collaboration. Austin (2000), in examining non-profit and 
businesses collaborations suggests that both sides came to recognize the importance of 
crafting mutually beneficial, win-win arrangements or “mutual gain” (Bryson, Crosby, 
Stone, 2006). A focus on mutual gain does not appear to be as prominent in same sector 
collaborations.  
 
Gray (1989) also suggests that participants in a collaborative process or coalition need to 
find common ground they can agree on early in the process. Common ground is often 
defined through agreements about problem definition, a common agenda or shared 
vision, goals, outcomes and language (Kania and Kramer, 2011). Developing a shared 
vision with all community partners (Dötterweich, 2006, Foster-Fishman, Berkowitz, 
Lounsbury, Jacobson, Allen, 2001) and articulating it in language that all can support, 
can help keep participants focused on a common goal and remind them why they are 
involved. “In cross-movement coalitions, where participants may come from different 
backgrounds and have different goals, the creation of a common identity, in part through 
framing, is particularly important.” (Van Dyke and McCammon, 2010, p. 325). 
 
Language is a critical part of finding common ground. Kania and Kramer (2011) note it 
takes time to create a common vocabulary; however, reaching agreement on terminology 
definitions is important as words can elicit different interpretations, images and reactions 
from those in different sectors. Strategic discussions among a leadership team comprised 
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of broad thinkers can help groups frame an issue so that it is inclusive of different sectors 
and interests (Cohen, Larijani, Aboelata, Mikkelsen, 2004, Mintrom and Vergari, 1996). 
Effective framing can help keep partners with different interests engaged in the 
conversation (Loewen and Makhoul, 2009). Malinsky and Lubelsky’s (2011) ‘both/and’ 
framing (described on page 49) appears to offer one way to bridge different interests.  
 
Key advantages of collaboration include: knowledge transfer and the creation of new 
knowledge; acquisition and sharing of critical resources; and the acquisition of power and 
influence (Hardy, Phillips, Lawrence, 2003). Sherif (2001) reinforces the importance of 
creating ‘super ordinate’ goals that one group cannot reach alone. Pasquero (1991) notes 
that it is ‘perceptions’ of positive benefits and interdependence that are important, and 
that introducing the ‘principle of shared responsibility’ can be a powerful way to sustain 
commitment. Coalition leaders Mizrahi and Rosenthal (2001) interviewed ranked 
commitment to the collaborative’s goal/cause/issue as the most important element of 
success. Provan and Kenis (2008) arrive at a different conclusion, “…networks can still 
be quite effective with only moderate levels of goal consensus” (p. 238).  
 
If cross-sector collaborations are to deliver public value, members need to appreciate and 
find ways to leverage each sector’s strengths as well as find ways to overcome or 
compensate for weaknesses (Bryson, Crosby, Stone, 2006). Wood and Gray’s (1991) 
study of collaboratives reinforces that, “…participating stakeholders must explicitly agree 
on the rules and norms that will govern their interactive process” (p. 148).   
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Takahashi and Smutney (2002) point out that those engaging in collaboration must 
overcome a variety of challenges related to turf, organizational norms, power 
differentials, autonomy and accountability, all of which can contribute to conflict. They 
suggest that conflict may be an inherent characteristic of collaboratives/networks that 
bring together organizations with diverse mandates and perspectives. Collaboratives need 
to find ways to equalize power (Bryson, Crosby, Stone, 2006) and apply strategies for 
conflict resolution and consensus building (Kania and Kramer, 2011, Roberts, 2010, 
Takahashi and Smutney, 2002). Gray (1989) notes that dialogue can be used to help 
conflicting parties: “explore differences, clarify areas of disagreement and search for 
common ground without the expectation that binding agreements will emerge” (p. 180). 
Takahashi and Smutney (2002) note that formal agreements (often required by funding 
agencies), can be used to define power relationships.  
 
Dötterweich (2006) observes that successful community development partnerships 
practice participatory leadership and decision-making by establishing and documenting 
(e.g. in memoranda of understanding, partnership agreements, or by-laws) clear and 
transparent mechanisms for decision making and roles. “The decision-making structures 
for coalitions often involve a complex system of shared decision making across a wide 
number of groups” such as staff, committees, membership, funders (Wolff, 2001, p. 178). 
This reinforces the importance of clarifying roles and responsibilities. 
 
Many researchers reference trust as an enabler or condition of successful collaboration 
(Bryson, Crosby, Stone, 2006, Huxham and Vangen, 2005, Gray, 1989, Guo and Acar, 
2005).  Himmelman (1996) notes that successful partnerships can build trust and resolve 
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turf issues by clarifying expectations, responsibilities, and benefits; and ensuring 
communication and decision making processes are clear. All of this hints at the potential 
value of institutionalization. Trust is also built through positive experiences in joint work 
and repeated interactions (Schlager, 1995). Dötterweich (2006) notes that getting to know 
each partner’s expertise, resources and limitations helps build trust; this suggests 
collaboratives may benefit from investing time to engage in dialogue to learn about each 
other.  
 
Although trust is built at the level of the individual (Austin, 2000, Takahashi and Smutney, 
2002), open communications contribute to the development of inter-organizational trust. 
Austin (2000) points out that multiple channels of communication between organizations 
are important enablers of collaboration; these channels can be formal and informal, and 
should facilitate frequent, efficient, effective communications. While geographic proximity 
allows for more opportunity for face-to-face communications which helps enhance trust 
and solidify relationships (Takahashi and Smutney, 2002), web-based communication tools 
can be useful when members are geographically dispersed (Kania and Kramer, 2011).   
 
Because organizations’ capacities often vary significantly, the nature of resources they 
can contribute also varies. Despite this, Mizrahi and Rosenthal (2001) report that 
members’ contributions are critical to coalition success and that “the more resources 
members gave and received, the more they stayed committed…” (p. 73). Participating in 
a collaborative initiative may require that an organization be prepared to transfer 
expertise, technologies and innovations (Pasquero, 1991). Creating ‘credible 
commitments’ (Hageman, Zuckerman, Alexander, Bogue, 1998) can help organizations 
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recognize that all partners are bringing something to the table and minimize perceptions 
that some are along for a “free ride” (Olson, 1965).  
 
The literature on collaboration reinforces the importance of collaborative groups finding 
common ground in order to be able to solve shared problems. It highlights challenges 
cross-sectoral groups may encounter as well as benefits that can be achieved by 
leveraging and sharing members’ distinct knowledge, skills and resources. The literature 
also reinforces the importance of clarity around roles, shared decision-making processes 
and trust-building. In gathering data, I inquired into these areas in order to better 
understand the processes Sustain uses to create connections and foster cross-sectoral 
collaboration.  
 
3.3.3 Member engagement 
Engaging diverse policy coalition members effectively requires an understanding of why 
members are interested in investing their time, energy and other resources. Convenors 
and network ‘weavers’ (Holley, 2010) need to understand members’ motivations so they 
can encourage them to participate in activities aligned with their interests and maintain 
their investments. Convenors also “…establish links between network members and 
foster the development of strong, trust-based relationships” (Svendsen and Laberge, 
2005, p. 97); we saw above that these are key foundations for collaboration.  
 
Motivation for organizations to engage in collaborative processes appears to stem from a 
combination of self-interest (e.g. gaining access to information, knowledge and 
resources) and collective interests (e.g. having a stronger voice on system issues, power 
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and safety in numbers). Wood and Gray (1991) state that, “…the need and the potential 
for stakeholders to derive benefit are what makes collaboration possible”. Even when 
stakeholders have few shared interests, they may be sufficiently motivated to participate 
by the prospect of being able to meet some of their own interests through a collaboration 
(Westley and Vredenburg, 1991).  Identifying and reminding members of joint successes 
they have contributed to appear to be important in maintaining engagement. 
 
Policy coalitions or networks can engage members actively in collaborative initiatives 
such as priority setting, policy development and analysis. The PNOs Levkoe (2014) 
studied established various on- and off-line spaces in which they convened and engaged 
members. In such forums, members can engage in dialogue, environmental scanning (e.g. 
the identification of system gaps and barriers) and sense-making (Weick, 1995), which 
helps “build shared understanding, knowledge, vocabulary and mental models from 
which sustainable solutions may be generated and supported” (Svendsen and Laberge, 
2005, p. 93). 
 
Active participation in a diverse network enables community members who may have 
disparate interests to engage in collective action (Steuart, 1976, cited by Hays, Hays, 
DeVille, Mulhall, 2000). Foster-Fishman, Berkowitz, Lounsbury, Jacobson and Allen’s 
(2001) review of literature concludes that establishing structures that engage and include 
diverse members with different capacities is “critical to maintaining effective diversity” 
(p. 250). It is not clear from the literature I reviewed how a policy coalition can determine 
whether it has engaged an appropriate amount of diversity.  
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Clearly defining outcomes can help participants assess whether their investment in 
collaborative work is justified (Loewen and Makhoul, 2009). A well-designed evaluation 
system can help a collaborative gain recognition for outcome results. Finding ways to 
describe complex outcomes in a clear way can enhance recognition (ibid) which in turn 
can reinforce members’ commitment and encourage continued engagement.   
 
Achieving results and delivering value through a collaborative or network approach takes 
time, and progress is often incremental. Agreeing on indicators to measure, or a shared 
measurement system, is a critical success factor in collective impact initiatives according 
to Kania and Kramer (2011). I think this might help build buy-in among members. In 
describing business-non-profit collaborations that create ‘shared value’, Porter and 
Kramer (2011) note that “successful collaboration will be data driven, well connected to 
the goals of all stakeholders, linked to defined outcomes and tracked with clear metrics” 
(p. 16). 
 
Achieving and publicizing ‘small wins’ along the way was identified as helpful to 
sustaining commitment to, and participation in, a coalition over the long-term (Bryson, 
Crosby, Stone, 2006, Mizrahi and Rosenthal, 2001). Revisiting visions, goals and 
outcomes at annual reflection sessions can also be helpful in maintaining engagement 
(Dötterweich, 2006). Austin (2000) reports that to sustain non-profit-business 
collaborations’ success over the long term it is important to continually search for ways 
to renew the value delivered through collaboration.  
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The literature on member engagement reinforces the important role convenors and 
network weavers play in connecting diverse members to opportunities in which they can 
participate to advance their own, and the coalition’s, goals. Convenors and weavers also 
clearly play critical roles in establishing spaces in which members can engage, learn and 
collaborate with other members. Their effectiveness in engaging members appears to 
impact members’ willingness to remain actively involved. This literature encouraged me 
to investigate how Sustain’s weavers engaged members in different spaces and initiatives 
and how and where members participated.  
 
3.3.4 Policy development and promotion  
As noted in the introduction, CSOs are increasingly working together in policy coalitions 
or networks to develop and promote policy reform. Carlsson (2000) indicates that such 
"Networks are formed on the basis of some "problem" to be solved…” (p. 514) and that 
unless actors agree there is a problem, no collective action occurs. Further, because most 
problem areas are complex and require different actors to find a solution, “…the 
mobilization of actors is one of the crucial activities in the process of establishing 
networks" (ibid, p. 515).  
 
Börzel (1997) offers a broad definition of a ‘policy network’ that seems a reasonable 
description of my case study subject: "a set of relatively stable relationships which are of 
non-hierarchical and interdependent nature linking a variety of actors, who share 
common interests with regard to a policy and who exchange resources to pursue the 
shared interests acknowledging that co-operation is the best way to achieve common 
goals” (1997, p. 1). Carlsson (2000), questions whether common interest is necessary. 
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"Networks can be strongly integrated and the level of coordination may be significant, 
but at the same time individual participants in these networks might have quite disparate 
interests. Their interests might be compatible or complementary but not necessarily 
common...  This is typical for policy networks” (ibid, p. 510). I find this an important 
distinction as it appears to acknowledge the potential for policy networks to engage 
diverse actors. 
 
The public-policy literature I reviewed provides additional interpretations of what a 
‘policy network’ refers to. Dowding (1995) and Börzel (1997) indicate policy networks 
began as a metaphor to acknowledge the different public and private actors involved in 
policymaking and the relationships between groups. They indicate others consider it 
useful tool for studying the policymaking process. Carlsson (2003) notes that "The 
processes of policymaking in society are multifarious, and no single theory captures this 
complexity." (p. 507); and that, “the network theory of policymaking has not yet been 
developed” (p. 516, italics in original). He indicates the term ‘policy network’ is a broad 
category “with a great number of subcategories” such as 'policy communities', 'issue 
networks' (Heclo, 1978) and ‘advocacy coalitions’ (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993) 
(p.504).  
 
Carlsson (2003) references Jordan’s (1990) description of a ‘policy community’ that 
“exists where there are effective shared ‘community’ of views on the problem” (p. 327). 
This suggests the potential for a large community to engage. Heclo (1978) describes 
‘issue networks’ as, "Shared-knowledge group[s] having to do with some aspect (or, as 
defined by the network, some problem) of public policy" (p. 103). This suggests quite a 
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focused ‘group’. Carlsson reinforces issue networks tend to have limited formal 
coordination. In contrast, Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993) describe ‘advocacy 
coalitions’ as, "people from a variety of positions (elected and agency officials, interest 
group leaders, researchers, etc.) who share a particular belief system – that is, a set of 
basic values, causal assumptions, and problem perceptions – and who show a nontrivial 
degree of coordinated activity over time” (p. 103).  
 
Each of these subcategories partially characterizes my case study subject and others like 
them. For that reason, throughout this paper, I mainly use the term ‘policy coalition’, as a 
metaphor which blends the terms ‘policy network’ and ‘advocacy coalition’. I offer a 
broad definition: a group that engages in coordinated, collective action to influence 
policy decisions and raise awareness of issues with government. This reinforces that such 
groups consist of non-governmental actors, unlike an ‘advocacy coalition’, and that the 
group has a level of coordination that is not present in Heclo’s ‘issue networks’.  
 
Policy coalitions have a variety of strategic choices to make concerning the processes 
they use to identify, develop and promote, or advocate for, their policy solutions. Moore 
(2005) reinforces that those working in a policy coalition must be prepared to invest time 
and energy over the long term to achieve influence. Coalitions often use an annual 
conference or meeting to identify priorities for policy work in consultation with members 
(Edgar, 2002). 
 
Policy theorists inspired by Easton’s (1965) ‘systems’ model, which acknowledges that 
the policy process operates within, and is affected by, the broader environment, have 
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developed models illustrating stages of policymaking (Sabatier and Smith, 1993). These 
‘textbook models’ have been criticized for framing policymaking as a linear process 
(Birkland, 2005, Sabatier and Smith, 1993), when most agree that the process is 
inherently messy and that the stages are not discrete. For policy coalitions, the stages 
model may be useful as it highlights points in the process where those outside 
government may be able to exert influence, e.g. by influencing what is on the agenda, 
offering policy alternatives, or monitoring and evaluating policy once it is implemented.  
 
Kingdon’s (2003) study of public policy making in the U.S. led to the development of an 
agenda setting framework. He defines the political ‘agenda’ as “the list of subjects or 
problems to which government officials and those around them are paying serious 
attention” (ibid, p. 3). Carter (2011) suggests, “the philosophy of the party in power has a 
major impact affecting which policy issues get on the agenda (i.e. who is listened to), the 
analysis of the issues, and approaches to solving them” (p. 428).  
 
Kingdon (2003) indicates that groups outside government may be more influential after 
an issue is on the government’s agenda. Carter (2011) notes that once an issue is on the 
agenda, coalitions can contribute to policy design. Kingdon’s research concludes that 
interest groups such as CSOs are well positioned to generate policy alternatives. He 
reinforces that advocates should have alternatives developed, ready to share with decision 
makers once an issue moves onto the government’s agenda.  
 
Kingdon (2003) states that ‘policy windows’ or ‘windows of opportunity’ open when a 
new problem is recognized by government or there is a change in political administration 
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(p. 168). Some ‘windows’ open on schedule, as in the case of the expiration of legislation 
or the scheduled renewal of a program, while others are unpredictable. A diverse group of 
members who are continuously scanning the environment can assist in the identification 
or recognition of policy windows. Such windows tend to close quickly… so being 
prepared and mobilizing members to take advantage of the open window is critical. 
Kingdon (ibid) describes the roles of ‘policy entrepreneurs’ (Walker, 1974, Mintrom, 
1997): how they watch for and take advantage of ‘windows of opportunities’ to link 
solutions they’ve developed to newly acknowledged problems. 
 
Gormley and Cymrot (2006) distinguish between the use of ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ 
strategies to influence public policy. ‘Insider’ strategies involve advocating directly to 
government, while ‘outsider’ strategies attempt to engage a broader audience in order to 
shift public opinion. They suggest outsider strategies tended to be employed to expand 
the ‘scope of conflict’ to include other stakeholders, or to build public will. This might 
become increasingly relevant in an environment where some governments are adopting a 
‘consumer’ approach to politics (Lenihan, 2012, Delacourt, 2013), mining public opinion 
data and crafting policies to appeal strategically to the interests of subsets of voters. 
Bourgeois (in Wyatt and Bourgeois, 2010), commenting on the influence of email notes, 
“public policy-making is more responsive to the “public” than it ever has been” (p. 553). 
 
While some CSOs employ a combination of these two strategies, others opt for one or the 
other. The availability of resources, in the form of skills, knowledge, financial and social 
capital (Burt, 1992, Coleman, 1988, Jacobs, 1961, Putnam, 2000), is one factor that 
impacts a CSO’s choice of ‘insider’ or ‘outsider’ strategy. Comparatively better 
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resourced corporate interests often adopt an ‘inside’ approach and consequently dominate 
some policy discussions (Birkland, 2005).  
 
The government’s policy making culture and their openness to external participation in 
the policy process also informs CSOs’ decisions about whether to employ inside or 
outside strategies. Gormley and Cymrot (2006) report groups tend to use ‘insider’ 
strategies more frequently when they perceive decision makers to be open – e.g. if there 
are opportunities to present to committees. Another factor concerns a coalition’s social 
and political capital – i.e. whether members have access to, and/or productive 
relationships with, policy makers. Opportunities for participation may exist throughout 
the policy making process from agenda setting, to solution generation, to decision 
making, and evaluation.  
 
“Participatory governance” (Heinelt, 2010) acknowledges that individuals affected by 
issues may be in a position to offer solutions. Governments committed to participatory 
governance create various spaces, platforms and processes to engage citizens and invite 
participation in policy development – e.g. through the use of committees, social contracts, 
and other participatory processes. MacRae and Abergel (eds.), (2012) note that in Canada 
“…treasury board edicts and other directives have for some time been pushing civil 
servants to consult more widely” to find more innovative solutions (p. 3).  
 
Groups that embrace an ‘insider’ strategy need to familiarize themselves with 
government’s priorities and values. Effective lobbying, or government relations, involves 
tracking and developing relationships with key actors and “understanding the key 
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institutions and spaces, and how they affect decision-making” (Jones, 2011, p. 9). Moore 
(2005), a seasoned Canadian lobbyist, notes that advocates must invest time to 
understand decision-makers’ interests and values as well as the policy-making process. 
Wyatt and Bourgeois (2011) would likely agree as they report voluntary sector 
organizations in Canada have limited understanding of the public policy process.  
 
Moore (2005) observes that very little of the written material that exists “deals with the 
dynamics of advocacy. There’s a distinct lack of research, analysis and teaching materials 
related to public policy advocacy (i.e. lobbying) in Canada, particularly involving non-
profits and charities” (p. 49). Moore has started sharing his advocacy expertise with 
CSOs and has established an advocacy school (advocacyschool.org). He articulates a 
process that he refers to as ‘strategic inquiry’ based on his experience as a business 
lobbyist. Moore (2010) describes strategic inquiry as “a process of informal but 
methodical inquiry into the political and public-policy environment surrounding an issue 
prior to – and, in the course of – an advocacy initiative” (p. 15). Makhoul (2011) 
illustrates Moore’s process in a case study of a coalition of caregiving organizations. In it 
she notes the ‘strategic inquiry’ process “…is used to conceptualize an issue in a broad 
context, understand the motivation of government and learn its language” (ibid, p. 4).  
 
In Health and Sustainability in the Canadian Food System (2012), editors MacRae and 
Abergel conclude that there is room for improvement in CSOs’ advocacy strategy. For 
example, “opportunities to play an effective and collaborative inside-outside advocacy 
game, where certain CSOs act as external critics while others work with the state and 
agribusinesses, have not been optimized” (ibid, p. 274). Criticisms of CSO approaches 
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include pitching policy proposals at the wrong level of government and failing to submit 
proposals in a format that is useful to policy makers (whether politicians, bureaucrats or 
civil servants). Some of this may reflect the fact that CSOs don’t understand where policy 
decisions are made, and/or that CSOs have not matched their tactics to individual 
decision-makers. The editors conclude that CSOs “need to turn their attention more to the 
details of creating solutions, and devise new ways to collaborate with unusual partners… 
[and that] CSOs need to develop the capacity to contribute to detailed implementation 
plans, often in concert with key actors…” (ibid, p. 278).  
 
In an earlier paper, MacRae (2009) reinforces a changing policy making context in 
Canada has opened up new opportunities to influence food policy development in 
Canada. He suggests that because Parliament is less likely to engage in fulsome 
discussion of complex policy issues, CSOs may have greater potential to influence 
program design by focusing their advocacy efforts at a sub-regulatory level. 
 
Once government relations and advocacy strategies have been selected Gormley and 
Cymrot (2006) suggest they tend to remain stable, in part because an organization has 
invested in the development of expertise and capacity to implement its selected strategies. 
Mintzberg (1987, 1994) might question the wisdom of this approach; he reinforces that 
strategies need to be dynamic and flexible in order to be responsive to changes in the 
environment and the degree of progress being made. This suggests that to maximize 
influence CSOs should assess incremental progress, continually monitor the policy 
making environment, and consider adapting their strategies and tactics. 
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If as the literature suggests, opportunities to contribute to policy development exist 
throughout the policy process, determining where to engage, and how, appear to 
represent strategic choices for policy coalitions. Putting processes in place to identify and 
respond to emerging windows of opportunity appears important. Another strategic choice 
relates to whether to focus efforts ‘inside’, working with government, ‘outside’ building 
public will, or to employ a combination of both strategies. This particular choice seems to 
be informed by the resources available and the political climate of the day. Coalitions that 
opt to work ‘inside’, with government, must build relationships in order to understand 
government and policy makers’ priorities. Based on this literature, I determined to pay 
attention to the processes Sustain uses to develop and promote policy solutions to 
determine whether the Alliance emphasizes inside or outside strategies and what 
informed this choice. 
 
 
3.4 LEGITIMACY 
 
Legitimacy is a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an 
entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed 
system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions.... Legitimacy is a perception 
or assumption in that it represents a reaction of observers to the organization 
as they see it; thus, legitimacy is possessed objectively, yet created subjectively.  
~ Suchman, 1995, p. 574.  
 
Legitimacy refers to the status and credibility of the network and network 
activities as perceived both by member firms and outside constituents like 
funders and customers.  ~ Human and Provan, 2000, p. 328. 
 
…we believe that building legitimacy comes first and is critical to the capacity 
of a network to attract needed resources from both internal and external 
sources. ~ Human and Provan, 2000, p. 363. 
 
 
“Institutional theorists argue that legitimacy building is the driving force behind decisions 
on organizational strategies and structures” (Human and Provan, 2000, p. 328 cites 
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Meyer and Rowan, 1977, DiMaggio and Powell, 1983, Zucker, 1987). Human and 
Provan (2000) conducted a comparative study of two for-profit, same-sector networks; 
both networks had separate administrative entities (an NAO) supporting their work (see 
page 52). They indicate that prior to their work, there were no explanations of how 
networks establish and maintain legitimacy.   
 
Human and Provan (2000) and McEvily and Zaheer (2004) acknowledge that legitimacy 
needs to be built ‘inside’ with members, and ‘outside’ with those a network or coalition 
wants to influence. Human and Provan (2000) conclude that legitimacy can be built using 
an ‘inside-out’ or an ‘outside-in’ strategic orientation – i.e. first focusing internally to 
cultivate legitimacy among member firms, or vice versa. They attribute this framing of 
legitimacy strategies to Edstrom, Hogbert and Norback (1984). The approach each of the 
networks they studied adopted was influenced by key stakeholders. One of the two 
networks initially opted for an ‘inside-out’ approach, by first building legitimacy 
internally. Although this strategy was resource intensive and detracted somewhat from 
external work, the connections established between members and commitment ultimately 
enhanced the network’s sustainability. The other network opted for an outside-in 
approach. Each strategy was effective in cultivating a legitimacy base in the early stages 
of the two networks, however, “Internal legitimacy issues led to the demise of one of the 
networks” (Human and Provan, 2000, p. 328). They conclude that long-term network 
sustainability requires the engagement of both strategies, or a ‘dual legitimacy-building 
strategy’ (ibid, p. 361). They acknowledge that adopting a dual strategy may be 
unrealistic until a solid legitimacy base is established, either internally or externally.  
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Human and Provan (ibid) distinguish between three dimensions of network legitimacy 
“network as form”, “network as entity” and “network as interaction”. ‘Network as form’ 
refers to building legitimacy around the concept of working as a network as opposed to in 
a more traditional organizational form. ‘Network as entity’ refers to building the 
legitimacy of the network by establishing a distinct identity for the network. They suggest 
this could be built in part by “adopting familiar organizational structures” such as a paid 
director and staff. ‘Network as interaction’ involves building a case for the individual and 
collective benefits of cooperating in a network, something that was challenging for both 
networks they studied to convince network members of. The legitimacy of ‘network as 
interaction’ was cultivated through the use of an insider strategy in one of the two 
networks.  
 
Human and Provan (ibid) identify some examples of ‘legitimacy set-backs’ where actions 
taken by a NAO (see page 52) caused members concern and detracted from internal 
legitimacy. They reinforce that it is important to monitor the evolution of legitimacy 
during the early growth and that, “legitimacy building is not a task that is ever actually 
completed” (ibid, p. 352, they cited Suchman, 1995 and Deephouse, 1996).  
 
Their research affirmed for me the importance of policy coalitions building legitimacy 
internally and externally. I explore each of these in more detail below. In researching 
network governance, Provan and Kenis (2008) conclude networks need to balance the 
tensions that exist between internal and external legitimacy. They suggest that because a 
NAO provides a single point of contact, it “could also enhance the legitimacy of the 
network as a whole” (ibid, p. 241).  
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3.4.1 Internal legitimacy 
As discussed previously, inviting the right mix of members to participate in the coalition 
is an important strategic choice. Ideally, a coalition wants to establish a network that 
engages and fosters productive relationships with key stakeholders such as community 
leaders and other networks (Foster-Fishman, Berkowitz, Lounsbury, Jacobson, Allen, 
2001). Convincing the right individuals and organizations to participate is partially 
dependent on whether the stakeholders consider the coalition’s convenor to be credible 
and legitimate.  
 
Power is sometimes identified as a prerequisite for forming a collaborative, but it can also 
be expanded by the work of the collaborative. Mizrahi and Rosenthal (2001) state, “As a 
coalition amasses power, it becomes a place where organizations want to be – which in 
turn, contributes to its power base and its legitimacy” (71). This suggests that who is 
involved as coalition members contributes to a group’s legitimacy. As noted previously, 
some researchers caution that organizations that are not engaged can inhibit a 
collaborative’s overall legitimacy (Wood and Gray, 1991, Pasquero, 1991).  
 
Influencing policy tends to be a slow process, so coalitions need to make a long-term 
commitment if they hope to have an impact. Mizrahi and Rosenthal’s (2001) study of 41 
social change coalitions concludes that a group’s longevity increases the likelihood that a 
group is able to “amass the power to influence the social change target and achieve their 
goals” (p. 73). Provan and Kenis’ (2008) research on network governance supports this 
view, “stability is critical to maintaining legitimacy, both inside and outside the network” 
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(p. 244). Over time, such stability can enable a network to find internal efficiencies and 
develop responses to external stakeholders that are more consistent. Formal structures can 
be used to enhance a group’s stability, but networks need to build some flexibility into 
these structures so they don’t stifle adaptability and other desirable network effects.   
 
3.4.2 External legitimacy 
In the external environment, the concepts of credibility and legitimacy appear closely 
linked. Sharing information and research with government appears to be one way to 
establish constructive relationships with policy makers while at the same time enhancing 
a coalition’s credibility and legitimacy (see also policy influence below). Miller, Razon-
Abad, Covey and Brown (1994) conclude that inside allies are crucial to enhancing the 
legitimacy of coalitions inside government and achieving policy change.  
 
Howlett and Ramesh (2003) stress that knowledge is one of the most important resources 
for advocates, particularly when such information is not widely available. CSOs often 
possess relevant information and in-depth knowledge required to inform the details of 
policy and program design; in contrast, governments today may have limited capacity to 
do such work (MacRae, 2009). Coalitions with specialized knowledge are well positioned 
to play a ‘knowledge broker’ role which involves helping reframe and/or bridge issues to 
make them more accessible or lessen resistance (Hargadon, 1998, 2002, Moore and 
Westley, 2011 cite Litfin, 1994). Communicating knowledge to policy makers, in a 
timely way and in an appropriate format, are critical capacities for a policy-focused 
coalition. 
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CSOs’ perceived credibility among policy-makers can significantly affect their ability to 
influence. CSOs can strengthen their case for change and enhance their credibility by 
conducting quality research and sharing findings with decision-makers. An evaluation of 
Oxfam’s advocacy campaign on climate change concluded that one of their research 
papers “was credited with having shaped the debate on climate financing” (Cugelman and 
Otero, 2010, p. 4). On the flip side, “Nothing undermines civil society advocacy more 
than the revelation that the facts used are not solid.” (Malena (ed.), 2009, p. 276 quotes 
Keller-Herzog). 
 
The literature on legitimacy reinforces that legitimacy is perceived by internal and 
external stakeholders and that it is important for networks or coalitions to actively build 
legitimacy. Policy coalitions and networks face a strategic choice as to whether to first 
focus energy and processes on cultivating legitimacy internally or externally, although 
some researchers suggest both strategies are ultimately necessary. 
 
Internal legitimacy appears critical to a coalition’s ability to attract and retain an 
appropriate mix of members to undertake and resource its work. Externally, legitimacy is 
important in order for a coalition to be seen as having something valuable to offer the 
policy development process. Quality research and communications appear to be 
important coalition capacities. This literature suggests I should examine the strategies and 
processes Sustain uses to cultivate legitimacy of various forms: internal, external, and 
network as ‘entity’, ‘form’ and ‘interaction’. I should also watch for evidence of how 
stakeholders assess the Alliance’s legitimacy. 
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3.5 POLICY INFLUENCE  
A policy coalition or network’s influence can be assessed at different points in time in 
their journey and from a number of different perspectives. Moore (2005), in a report 
prepared for the Muttart Foundation, defines various forms of influence. These include: 
“motivating government to initiate/modify/sustain/continue/terminate/limit something by 
way of law, regulation, policy, program or other expenditure” (ibid, p. 5); being ‘at the 
table’ for consultations; being acknowledged by media, government and other 
organizations as a ‘player’; successfully gaining funding or a mandate from government; 
influencing the definition of criteria; and increasing decision-makers’ understanding.  
 
Political culture affects “how policy problems are perceived” and the degree to which 
policymakers are receptive to and rely on research (Stone, Maxwell, Keating, 2001). 
There has been a growing interest in evidence-based policy making in some countries 
like the United Kingdom (Mulgan, 2009) and the Netherlands (Edgar, 2002); however in 
Canada the commitment to this approach appears limited (Wyatt and Bourgeois, 2010). 
This may be due in part to a reduction in government’s capacity to conduct research in-
house (Gregg, 2012). Actions taken by Canada’s Federal government over the last few 
years related to crime and climate change also suggest the government is not particularly 
interested in rational arguments and evidence-informed policy development (Gregg, 
2012). In contrast, in the 2014 speech from the throne, the government of Ontario 
expressed its commitment to an evidence-based approach to policy making (Ontario 
government, 2014b).  
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Research is one form of information or evidence that influences public policy decisions, 
along with books, media, anecdotes, experience and propaganda (Lomas 2000a, Shields 
and Evans, 2008). It potentially has an influential role at multiple stages of the policy 
lifecycle – from the articulation of issues, to the identification of solutions, and the 
evaluation of the impact of policies implemented (Carden, 2004, Flicker, 2008). Shields 
and Evans (2008) offer a narrower and less optimistic view, “in the absence of a policy 
window, research rarely has much influence on policy decision-making” (p. 7). In 
addition, although technically based on a systematic review of all research, research 
findings that reinforce research users’ policy perspectives are more likely to get attention 
(Stone, Maxwell, Keating, 2001). For any research to have influence, it must be 
accessible, reach policy makers at the right time, be presented in an appropriate format, 
and be rigorous (Lomas, 2000a, b, Shields and Evans, 2008, Stone, Maxwell, Keating, 
2001). Some indicate that research is most influential when policy makers have some up-
front involvement or investment in the development of the research (Black, 2001, Lomas, 
2000b). In other cases, policy makers may reach for research to help them legitimate their 
policy positions (Stone, Maxwell, Keating, 2001) or to inform decisions about which 
programs to fund (Orszag, 2009).  
 
Kingdon (2003) suggests that moving an issue onto or up the government’s agenda 
requires a convergence or ‘coupling’ of three independent and related ‘streams’: when a 
problem is recognized, a policy solution is available, and the political climate makes it a 
good time for action. Although many coalitions begin trying to get policy makers to make 
their issue a priority, as noted earlier, Kingdon concludes that CSOs may be better 
positioned to have influence after an issue moves onto the government’s agenda. He also 
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suggests that interest groups’ power comes in part from their ability to mobilize support – 
through letter writing, media campaigns, or sending a delegation to talk to decision 
makers. This reinforces the importance of active participation by a coalition’s members 
and constituents.  
 
As noted earlier, coalitions often form out of a desire to give greater voice to issues 
members are concerned about, and members have a role to play in speaking up. In trying 
to influence government, or build public will, flexible messaging can be helpful. 
Makhoul (2011) in describing the approach of one successful Canadian advocacy 
coalition notes, “Instead of trying to get all partners to agree to a standard position, 
messages are structured in a way that allows partners to promote those elements that 
resonate with their constituents” (p. 4). The coalition she profiles developed a menu of 
messages for partners to choose from. This approach may be particularly helpful when 
participating in unlikely alliances (Campbell and Balbach, 2009). Oxfam UK worked 
with private sector partners on their climate change campaign and found it beneficial that 
those partners were able to express different, but complementary views on the same issue 
(Cugelman and Otero, 2010).  
 
Although there are various forms and levels of influence as described above, at the end of 
the day, policy coalitions and networks measure their success based on whether or not 
policies are enacted that reflect their concerns and whether the implementation of policies 
actually has the intended effect on their issue. Van Dyke and McCammon’s (2010) study 
of strategic alliances, coalitions and social movements suggest that more research is 
needed to “assess the outcomes of coalition work”. 
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There appears to be no recipe for effective influence as approaches that have worked in a 
particular situation are difficult to replicate or transfer (Jones, 2011). This reinforces the 
importance of CSOs assessing incremental progress, paying attention to the policy 
making environment, and regularly adapting strategies and tactics to maximize their 
influence. 
 
This literature reinforces that influencing policy takes time and that influence can be 
assessed in various ways. Some researchers suggest that the political climate and 
ideology of government affects a coalition’s ability to exercise influence. Other 
researchers suggest that coalitions can be more influential at particular points in the 
policy process such as after an issue moves onto the government’s agenda.  
 
Timely, quality research appears to be an important tool for coalitions wanting to develop 
relationships with and influence policy makers. Coalition members appear to have a key 
role to play in interpreting and amplifying key messages in their communities. This 
literature led me to inquire into the processes Sustain uses to produce and leverage 
research and how members amplify the Alliance’s policy solutions. I also inquired into 
the policy issues that Sustain and its members tried to influence in an attempt to assess 
the Alliance’s success. 
 
In the next Chapter, Methodology, I describe the methodological approaches I employed 
to investigate the areas outlined in this chapter and answer my broader research question.  
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CHAPTER 4 METHODOLOGY  
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION TO CONSTRUCTS AND MODEL 
Based on a review of relevant, interdisciplinary literature, it appears a “model” can be 
constructed illustrating the interrelationships between a number of theoretical constructs: 
a coalition’s “choices” related to its structures, strategies and processes; a “legitimacy” 
construct which pertains to perceptions of the coalition and which is informed, in part, by 
a coalition’s “choices”; and an “influence” construct which is affected by both a 
coalition’s choices and its perceived legitimacy.  
 
These constructs appear to be related in a somewhat “causal” chain (bearing in mind that 
this study is not a positivist attempt to confirm or disprove hypotheses based on statistical 
correlation). A visual representation of the relationships between these constructs is 
illustrated in Figure 4.1.  
 
Figure 4.1 Theoretical constructs and working model 
 
The literature review, combined with my experience consulting to cross-sectoral policy- 
focused coalitions and networks, led me to formulate the above as a working model 
which subsequently guided my data collection and analysis. The model suggests that 
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choices concerning coalition structures, strategies and processes are interconnected and 
affect the degree to which a policy coalition or network is perceived to have legitimacy. 
Together, coalition choices and legitimacy affect a policy coalition’s ability to influence 
public policy decisions, and ultimately address the broader systemic issues the coalition 
is trying to change.  
 
Coalition choices - structures, strategies and processes: Based on the literature in Chapter 
3, I understand these three areas of ‘choices’ are interconnected as I suggest with the 
infinity symbol in Figure 4.1. Researchers indicate ‘structure’ affects a coalition’s ability 
to work effectively together (Miller, Razon-Abad, Covey, Brown, 1994, Mizrahi and 
Rosenthal, 2001, Provan and Kenis, 2008). Structural options abound and coalitions must 
make choices about key structural elements such as membership (e.g. number and degree 
of diversity); network structure (from centralized to highly segmented (Diani, 2003)); 
governance structures (with defined roles, responsibilities and relationships and structures 
for input (Provan and Kenis, 2008, Van Dyke and McCammon, 2010)); and leadership and 
staff (with relevant skills and credibility (Bryson, Crosby and Stone, 2010, Kania and 
Kramer, 2011)). These structures or ‘forms’ need to be designed to enable a coalition’s 
work and the functions defined by a coalition’s strategies (Chandler, 1962, 1977).  
 
A coalition’s mission and goals are at the core of a coalition’s strategy and reflect choices 
a coalition makes about how best to use its limited resourced (including members, staff 
and finances). A coalition subsequently needs to develop strategies for achieving its 
mission and goals. In addition to informing a coalition’s structural choices, these more 
tactical strategies (e.g. for strengthening the coalition) inform how work is done and so in 
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turn they inform choices about operational “processes”. Strategies can be developed 
intentionally or deliberately and also emerge, and be adapted, in response to changes in the 
broader environment (Mintzberg, 1987, Kania, Kramer and Russell, 2014).  
 
The literature indicates coalitions often develop strategies and related processes to 
facilitate effective collaboration (Bryson, Crosby, Stone, 2006, Gray, 1989), enable active 
member engagement (Dötterweich, 2006, Levkoe, 2014, Svendsen and Laberge, 2005), 
develop strategy (Mintzberg, 1987, 1994, Astley and Fombrun, 1983, Huxham and 
Macdonald, 1992), and develop and promote policy solutions (Gormley and Cymrot, 
2006). In the case of policy promotion, some researchers reinforce that the availability of 
skills, knowledge, social and financial capital (possessed by members and staff that are 
key elements of a coalition’s ‘structure’) often informs the strategies and processes 
adopted (Burt, 1992, Coleman, 1988, Jacobs, 1961, Putnam, 2000).  
 
Because coalitions adapt their strategies in response to changing conditions, a coalition 
may also need to evolve its structures and processes to align with and support the new 
strategy. In the case of a policy coalition, if, as the literature suggests, legitimacy is an 
important factor in having influence (see below), it is important for a coalition to consider 
how its choices related to structures, strategies and processes might impact its legitimacy, 
internally and externally.  
 
Legitimacy: “Institutional theorists argue that legitimacy building is the driving force 
behind decisions on organizational strategies and structures” (Human and Provan, 2000, 
p. 328 cite Meyer and Rowan, 1977, DiMaggio and Powell, 1983, Zucker, 1987). 
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According to Suchman (1995) legitimacy is continuously assessed by internal (i.e. 
coalition members) and external (i.e. those a coalition wants to influence, and funders) 
stakeholders who have different norms, values and beliefs. Human and Provan (2000) 
report that networks must build legitimacy internally and externally in order to succeed 
and sustain themselves. Some coalitions opt to cultivate legitimacy inside the coalition 
first, while others begin by focusing externally; Human and Provan (ibid) conclude that a 
dual legitimacy-building strategy is ultimately required. 
 
Internal legitimacy appears particularly important as it is necessary for a coalition to 
attract and retain members with needed skills, knowledge and other resources. I think 
internal stakeholders assess a coalition’s legitimacy largely based on their experience of, 
and confidence in, a coalition’s structures, strategies and processes.  
 
In the case of external stakeholders, some are the policy makers a coalition wants to 
influence. I think policy makers’ perceptions of a coalition’s structures, strategies and 
processes factor into their assessment of a coalition’s legitimacy. It is unlikely these are 
the only factors that influence their perceptions. Their perceptions of a coalition’s 
legitimacy may be affected by external factors such as the political climate and public 
opinion, however I focus less on external factors since they are largely outside a 
coalition’s control. I do, however, look for evidence of other external factors affecting a 
coalition’s legitimacy.  
 
Policy influence: The literature I reviewed indicates that policy reform is often slow and 
incremental and may depend on a convergence of three ‘streams’: problem recognition, 
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the availability of a solution, and a receptive political climate (Kingdon, 2003). Policy 
coalitions can adopt various strategies and processes to influence policy change, such as 
conducting and disseminating research (Carden, 2004, Flicker, 2008), developing 
relationships with policy makers and “inquiring” to better understand government 
priorities and the political and public policy environment (Moore, 2010), or working 
‘outside’ government to build public will (Gormley and Cymrot, 2006). It is impossible 
to anticipate in advance which mix of strategies and processes will be most effective, 
however each time a coalition interacts with policy makers, policy makers have an 
opportunity to assess a coalition’s legitimacy.  
 
Coalitions can assess their own influence in a variety of ways – e.g. if an issue a coalition 
has advocated for moves onto the government’s agenda and is identified as a priority, or 
if a policy is enacted that reflects a coalition’s proposed solution(s) (Moore, 2005, 
Kingdon, 2003). I think both outcomes are unlikely if a coalition fails to acquire 
legitimacy in the eyes of policy makers.  
 
The ‘model’ described above consists of a number of interconnected constructs: coalition 
choices related to structures, strategies and processes; legitimacy; and policy influence. 
The model informed my research question: How does a non-governmental, cross-
sectoral policy coalition’s choices related to structures, strategies, and processes 
affect its ability to cultivate legitimacy and influence public policy?  
 
As noted previously, this is a general and multifaceted question, and I appreciate that it 
may not be possible to fully answer this question using a single case study. In the 
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remainder of this chapter I describe why I selected a qualitative, interdisciplinary case 
study research approach to begin to answer such a general question. I also outline my 
rationale for focusing on Sustain Ontario, the Alliance for Healthy Food and Farming as 
the subject of my case study. I describe the data I gathered and methods I used to gather 
it. I conclude by outlining how I analyzed this data to interpret Sustain’s story and draw 
conclusions.  
 
4.1.1 Why a case study approach 
Based on the interdisciplinary literature I reviewed, better understanding the inter-
relationships between the constructs depicted in the model above did not appear to lend 
itself to a large scale statistical study or survey. Instead, I selected a case study approach 
as it enables me to draw on multiple sources and forms of evidence to begin answering 
this question, including interviews with those actively involved (Flyvbjerg, 2006, Ragin 
and Becker, 1992, Stake, 1995, Yin, 2009). Yin (2009) suggests the case study method is 
appropriate when trying to explain “…“how” or “why” some social phenomenon works” 
(p. 4) and that it is helpful in understanding “…a real phenomenon in-depth” (p. 18).  
Additionally, a case study “benefits from the prior development of theoretical 
propositions to guide data collection and analysis” (ibid, p. 18), hence my model. 
 
Adopting a case study approach I produced ‘a case record’ (Stenhouse, 1978) or narrative 
of Sustain as an example of a cross-sectoral coalition attempting to influence provincial 
food policy in Ontario, Canada. Another reason I opted to develop a case study was that, 
in reviewing the literature, I uncovered few documented examples of such groups, despite 
the fact they appear to be growing in number. Previous studies focus on various aspects 
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of a coalition’s work and the role of coalitions in the policy process (Kingdon, 2003, 
Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993); however the design and interplay of their structures, 
strategies and processes appears to have received less attention. Based on my experience 
working with such groups, each coalition’s structural design, strategies and processes 
reflect the coalition’s unique internal and external conditions. Furthermore, a coalition’s 
approach to policy change is neither straight-forward, nor linear, and those involved often 
have different perspectives on how a coalition should undertake its work. In addition, 
members bring different skills and resources, including ‘social’ (Coleman, 1988, Jacobs, 
1961, Putnam, 2000, Salisbury, 1969) and political capital, and these impact a coalition’s 
capacity and approach.  
 
This study is in some respects an ‘intrinsic’ case, which Stake (2000) suggests is 
undertaken in order for a researcher to better understand the particular case. I wanted to 
focus on Sustain’s experience because I too am concerned about the food system issues 
the Alliance is trying to address through policy reform. In other respects, Sustain 
represents an ‘instrumental’ case, which Stake (ibid) indicates will help us understand 
something else, in this case the interconnected constructs and my overall model. I 
consider Sustain a case of a new policy coalition finding its way, structuring a cross-
sectoral network with the capacity and legitimacy to influence food and agricultural 
policy.  
 
I selected the Alliance because I thought Sustain would assist me in answering my 
research question (Stake, 1995). I gathered data about the coalition’s structures, 
strategies, processes, issues and context (Yin, 2009) and interpreted these to create “thick 
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descriptions” (Geertz, 1973, Denzin and Lincoln, 2000). This approach enables me to 
describe the denseness and complexity of Sustain’s formative years, from 2009-2013, 
allowing readers to “to make different interpretations and draw diverse conclusions 
regarding the question of what the case is a case of” (Flyvberg, 2006, p. 238).  
 
While some have questioned the value of a single case, such an approach offers an 
opportunity to examine a particular situation and develop an in-depth understanding of 
that case. Flyvberg (2006) points out that, “the strategic choice of case may greatly add to 
the generalizability of a case study” (p. 226). Sustain is a strategic choice in that, as is 
common in policy coalitions, the Alliance engages members from different sectors who 
have different perspectives on problems and possible solutions, in this case related to the 
food system. Sustain is a provincial Alliance and, as noted below, similar groups exist in 
other Canadian provinces. I anticipate this case will be helpful in commenting on, or 
extending theory, while also being instructive to practitioners (particularly those working 
on food policy) who look to others’ experience when designing a coalition and/or social 
change efforts.   
 
4.1.2 Why food 
As noted in Chapter 1, cross-sectoral coalitions established to influence public policy in 
Canada are emerging in a variety of policy areas. I decided to focus on a coalition 
concerned with the health of food systems and food policy because food is an issue that is 
at the centre of many of today’s interconnected social challenges: hunger, poverty, health, 
farm sustainability, and environmental degradation. These interconnected issues demand 
creative, integrated solutions within food systems that are themselves complex. While it 
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may appear that food policy coalitions deal with more complexity compared to coalitions 
focused on other issues, I think similar arguments might be made by those attempting to 
resolve issues like homelessness, climate change and poverty, all of which require 
solutions on multiple levels of society. And so, although the specific issues Sustain is 
attempting to resolve may not be of interest to policy coalitions focused on other issues, 
the Alliance’s approach to engaging diverse stakeholders from multiple sectors and 
dealing with complex and interconnected issues may be.  
 
Media stories focused on food issues highlight how those working on the issues, and 
citizens, increasingly recognize the need for systemic change on the ground, within 
institutions, and at the level of public policy. Achieving systemic change requires the 
participation of various industries, individuals and government, all of whom have 
different concerns and interests related to food systems. The food production and 
distribution system is dominated to some extent by large industrial operators alongside 
smaller scale businesses such as family farms and individual food entrepreneurs (e.g. 
food processors, restaurateurs, etc.). Various non-profit organizations also have an 
interest in the health of the food system, from the perspectives of food security, food 
sovereignty, sustainable farming, and from an environmental and economic perspective. 
Food system-related policy is developed by all levels of government and the food system 
has implications for the priorities of multiple government ministries – e.g. agriculture and 
rural affairs, health, education, environment, etc.  
 
Canada, its provinces and territories lack cohesive, joined-up or interconnected food 
policies (e.g. supply chain issues that make it difficult to get local food onto local plates) 
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and many see this as at the root of the problems in our food systems (MacRae, 2011). In 
the last 10-15 years national (e.g. Food Secure Canada) and provincial food networks 
(e.g. The British Columbia Food Systems Network, Food Matters Manitoba, Nova Scotia 
Food Security Network, and Sustain Ontario) have formed to develop food system 
solutions and many advocate for policy change (Levkoe, 2014). These and other 
coalitions attract and engage different industry, sector, and citizen interests; many of 
these provincial food networks are grassroots in nature. As noted in Chapter 2, more 
established, less diverse associations comprised of conventional food actors are active 
and influential players in Ontario’s food and agriculture policy space. One comparative 
study of provincial food networks was recently conducted (Levkoe, Bebee, Wakefield, 
Castel, and Davila, 2012), but as far as I am aware, no in-depth case study has been 
developed of the more grassroots provincial food networks in Canada.  
 
Since I am interested in the role that non-governmental, cross-sectoral coalitions can play 
in the public policy process, a case study of a food network represents an opportunity to 
examine one coalition’s choices, legitimacy and policy influence. I think those involved 
in other provincial food networks inside and outside Canada may be interested in learning 
from Sustain’s experience. 
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4.1.3 Why Sustain Ontario  
I selected Sustain as an appropriate site for my case study for a variety of reasons. Firstly 
because the Alliance is attempting to influence provincial food policy by convening 
groups and individuals from a number of sectors (i.e. farm, food, health, and 
environment) and engaging their knowledge and expertise to develop and promote 
integrated policy solutions. Secondly, Sustain’s provincial focus is large enough to 
encompass a range of food systems issues, and bounded enough to contain a case study 
(Stake, 1995). Thirdly, I thought Sustain’s efforts to reform provincial food policy in 
Ontario would provide the cross-sectoral and multiple-issue data I wanted to analyze to 
better understand and illustrate the role coalitions can play in public policy development.  
 
Finally, this organization is located in Toronto, where I live and work, and the Alliance’s 
first Director was receptive to Sustain participating in this research, although my research 
question was not fully formed at the time I approached her. I first learned of Sustain 
when their regular consultant was unavailable and the consulting firm I work with 
facilitated the first in-person meeting of Sustain’s AC in September 2010. At that time 
Sustain was in the early stages of structuring and weaving the network and exploring how 
to approach and focus its work. I was excited by the diversity of perspectives represented 
on the AC and Sustain’s vision for transforming Ontario’s food system.  
 
I characterize my research approach and relationship with Sustain throughout this project 
as collaborative and in some respects participatory (Kirby, Greaves, and Reid, 2006). 
When I approached Sustain’s first Director, I described my research interests and she 
agreed the project would be of interest to Sustain. I indicated that I hoped that Sustain’s 
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participation in the research would contribute to the Alliance’s learning – through the 
process of inquiry and as a result of insights generated through analysis. Sustain’s second 
Director started in early 2011 and soon after I confirmed that she was interested and 
willing to participate. Throughout the duration of my studies I informally sought input 
from, and discussed insights and questions with, the Director. I also collaborated with 
Sustain as a volunteer member of the Evaluation group; the nature of my involvement 
and contributions as part of that group are described on page 104. 
 
As a recently formed organization, Sustain represented an opportunity for me to study the 
formation (2007-2008) and early stages of development (2009-2013) of a cross-sectoral 
coalition, and the evolution of structures, strategies and processes the Alliance selected 
and implemented to influence policy. Sustain’s membership includes non-profit and for-
profit groups that have different, and at times competing, food system interests and 
values. I hoped examining Sustain’s experience would enable me to build on existing 
theories and draw conclusions that could be of use to other coalitions and networks – 
whether they are advocating for food or other complex, interconnected social issues. 
 
I explore various dimensions of Sustain’s structures – i.e. the Alliance’s membership 
composition and governance structures and how those evolved; the skills, knowledge and 
other resources the network had access to through members; the evolution of network 
relationships and engagement; as well as leadership, staffing and governance. I also 
examine choices Sustain made about strategies and processes related to engagement, 
research, policy development and promotion (i.e. government relations and advocacy). I 
describe processes Sustain uses to help the coalition find common ground and foster 
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productive relationships and leverage members’ diverse perspectives, skills and resources 
in identifying and promoting viable policy solutions.  
 
The need to establish external legitimacy shifts any policy coalition’s focus outward, to 
relationships with external stakeholders. In Sustain’s case, this means policy makers on 
the political and bureaucratic sides of government; the public; and other actors in the 
policy space. Members have a role to play in giving voice to, and amplifying, a 
coalition’s issues and solutions in different communities. I wondered how members’ 
willingness to play an active role in publicly supporting the Alliance’s policy proposals 
might affect Sustain’s external legitimacy.   
 
Since a coalition’s legitimacy is continuously re-assessed by internal and external 
stakeholders, I asked representatives from both groups how they assess Sustain’s 
legitimacy. I hoped this would help me identify which aspects of Sustain’s structures, 
strategies and processes enhance or detract from the Alliance’s legitimacy (see Chapters 
7 and 8). I also wanted to explore if Sustain adopted an ‘inside-out’ or ‘outside-in’ 
approach to building legitimacy – i.e. whether the Alliance focused first on building 
legitimacy internally with members, or externally with policy makers (Human and 
Provan, 2000). I used semi-structured interviews to gather data related to this question.   
 
To gather the rich data needed to understand how the choices Sustain made about 
structures, strategies and processes impacts its ability to influence policy, I consulted with 
various internal and external stakeholders; reviewed organizational documents; and 
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engaged in some general observation. A more detailed description of my data collection 
methodology is outlined below.  
 
Sustain opted to form an alliance or network as a vehicle to influence policy reform. 
Since the Alliance’s capacity to influence policy depends on the network, I thought it 
would be useful to analyze the ‘health’ of the network. I adapted Plastrik and Taylor’s 
(2009) network health scorecard to analyze Sustain’s network health (see Chapter 7). 
This tool evaluates the health of a network in four dimensions: purpose, performance, 
network operations and network capacity. 
 
As noted in Chapter 3, policy influence can be assessed in various ways (Kingdon, 2003, 
Moore, 2005) – e.g. whether policy makers are willing to engage in discussion; whether a 
policy issue moves onto or up the government’s agenda; and whether a policy proposal is 
advanced in a Bill, is enacted in legislation or leads to the introduction of a program or 
other investment by government. Consultations with internal and external stakeholders 
combined with a review of existing internal and external documents provided some 
insight into Sustain’s policy influence (see Chapter 7).  
 
 
4.2 DATA COLLECTION 
Using the model of the antecedents of policy influence illustrated in Figure 4.1 as a 
guide, I set out to collect data on the constructs of interest and the relationships among 
them. As Yin (2009) suggests case study researchers should, I set out to collect multiple 
forms of evidence.  
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To obtain a rich and accurate understanding of the choices Sustain made about structures, 
strategies, and processes, and so I could communicate the nuances of the network’s 
experience through a case record, most of the data I collected and analyzed was 
qualitative. Qualitative research is ‘inherently multi-method’ (Denzin and Lincoln (eds.), 
2000), and I gathered information using several collection methods. This enabled me to 
create a ‘montage’ (ibid) of Sustain’s story as it is expressed by the coalition and 
experienced and interpreted by different stakeholders inside and outside of the Alliance. 
These multiple perspectives helped clarify meaning and assisted me in creating a “thick” 
description which enabled me to interpret the case (ibid). I periodically sought input from 
Sustain’s Director regarding how my research questions and activities could contribute to 
the network’s learning and was open to incorporating questions she thought relevant to 
explore.  
 
A qualitative research approach is useful because it encourages researchers to engage 
multiple points of view while also allowing for some flexibility in research design based 
on what is learned during the study, since “data collection and analysis go on 
simultaneously” (ibid). This permitted me to refine my questions as I came to better 
understand the case (Stake, 1995) and as themes started to emerge. 
 
Stake (1995) suggests that case study researchers should “try not to disturb ordinary 
activity of the case… if we can get the information we want by discrete observation or 
examination of records” (p. 12). And so, my data collection methods included a review of 
documentary evidence; observation (Anzul, Freidman, Garner, and McCormack-
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Steinmetz, 1991, Spradley, 1980); and semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders 
(Kvale, 1996, Oakley, 1981, Roulston, deMarrais and Lewis, 2003, Weiss, 1994). Since 
human participants were involved I completed York University’s required Human 
Participant Research Protocol and obtained written or oral consent from interviewees.  
 
I did become more actively involved through my volunteer role in the Evaluation group’s 
activities. In 2011, shortly after I confirmed Sustain’s willingness to participate in this 
research, the second Director invited me to become part of an evaluation group she was 
forming to conduct a developmental evaluation process for the Alliance. The group 
consisted of the Director, a consultant, another researcher, three interns (at different 
points in time) and myself. Although the group tried to recruit AC members the few who 
expressed interest were ultimately too busy to participate. The absence of AC members 
on this group meant we did not have member perspectives to shape the evaluation 
process. This ultimately undermined the evaluation process’ effectiveness and perceived 
legitimacy amongst AC members who felt disconnected from the process.  
 
Under the guidance of Sustain’s evaluation consultant, the group designed a 
developmental evaluation process for Sustain which included the documentation of 
Sustain’s outcomes map (see Appendix B) and logic model. Like most other members of 
the group, I had limited understanding of, and experience in, developmental evaluation. I 
think Sustain’s Director invited me to participate in part because she thought it would 
assist me in my research and possibly because she thought I might offer a useful 
perspective based on my consulting experience. Through my involvement in this group I 
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was exposed to other staff and interns and some AC members and this helped me build 
familiarity and trust.  
 
As a member of this group I assisted Sustain in gathering and analyzing information. This 
included reviewing organizational documents; contributing to the development of 
consultation tools (e.g. focus group questions, surveys and interview guides); co-
facilitating two focus groups (one with staff and one with a sub-set of AC members) and 
conducting interviews (with policy makers). This was mutually a beneficial arrangement: 
like other volunteers, I expanded Sustain’s capacity and in doing so I gained insight into 
Sustain’s choices, challenges and successes. My participation in the Evaluation group 
gave me an inside perspective on the Alliance’s culture, work, strategies and processes. 
In the interest of knowledge exchange, I periodically shared research papers, articles and 
other insights from my academic studies with the group. My participation also gave me a 
reason to attend AC meetings, something I discuss in more detail on page 117.  
 
As a result of my involvement in the Evaluation group, I became, or was perceived by 
some to be, an ‘insider’ researcher (Dwyer and Buckle, 2009). For example, I attended 
some AC meeting to present as part of the Evaluation group, and I supported an intern in 
co-facilitating a focus group with AC members. Stake (1995) might perceive such active 
involvement with Sustain to be inappropriate as it blurs the line between the research 
subject and researcher. Kirby, Greaves and Reid (2006) acknowledge this muddiness is 
not unusual and that ‘insiderness’ and ‘outsiderness’ are “not fixed or static positions… 
As collaborative researchers, we are never fully outside or inside the community” (p. 38).  
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Because the Evaluation group connected with other parts of Sustain only periodically I 
did not feel I was a member of, or genuinely part of, Sustain’s larger network. Although I 
attempted to clearly articulate my research project and involvement with Sustain when I 
invited interviewees to participate, I felt I needed to clarify and reinforce my ‘outsider’ 
status as an academic researcher during interviews with some policy makers and internal 
stakeholders. Despite these efforts, some stakeholders I interviewed seemed to consider 
me more of an ‘insider’ than an ‘outsider’ – for example some external stakeholders 
referred not to Sustain, but to ‘you’ or ‘your’ when referring to Sustain’s work.  
 
4.2.1 Documentary evidence 
The review and analysis of documentary evidence such as organizational documents and 
documents in the public domain (e.g. in media, government legislation) is an unobtrusive 
form of research since it relies on existing materials. Atkinson and Coffey (1997) note 
that “written texts provide particularly telling windows into social worlds” and that, 
“groups represent themselves, both to themselves and to others, through the documents 
they produce” (p. 97). van den Hoonaard describes Dorothy Smith’s “institutional 
ethnography” approach which involves the review and analysis of organizational 
documents such as application forms, funding proposals, terms of reference, meeting 
minutes, policy briefs, reports, newsletters and media releases (van Den Hoonaard, 2012). 
Review and analysis of such documents, as well as evaluation data, provided insight into 
Sustain’s formation, evolution, structures, strategies and processes. This data assisted me 
in understanding the processes that guided the Alliance’s work and illuminated important 
structural elements. Organizational documents provided insight into processes Sustain 
formalized, key decisions and shifts in approaches. 
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I scanned provincial election campaign materials and popular media in Ontario (e.g. 
newspapers, radio, and online discussions) to better understand the context within which 
Sustain operates, and to identify possible factors influencing provincial food policy 
discussions. I paid attention to how food and farming issues were framed and connected 
to issues such as health, the environment and social justice. I considered this important 
since policy makers are influenced by public opinion. I also scanned content related to 
provincial food policy proposals and developments, particularly related to the 
introduction and evolution of Ontario’s Local Food Act (LFA). This material helped me 
identify other organizations and groups advocating in the food policy space and to assess 
whether Sustain contributes a unique perspective. 
 
4.2.2 Semi-structured interviews 
Interviews with individuals closest to the lived experience being studied “help us to 
uncover the participant’s views” (van den Hoonaard, 2012, p. 81) and provide nuanced, 
qualitative insights into the research topic by giving us access to experiences, stories and 
narratives (Silverman, 2000). My objective in conducting interviews was to gather 
different perspectives on Sustain’s journey – e.g. concerning how the Alliance is 
structured and if or how that has evolved; and to what extent Sustain’s structures, 
strategies and processes contribute to, or detract from, the network’s legitimacy and its 
ability to develop and promote viable policy solutions. I designed the interviews to invite 
reflection on Sustain’s structures, strategies, and processes, to uncover what interviewees 
thought worked well and what might need to change. I wanted to understand whether and 
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how members participated, collaborated and contributed skills and resources; and 
whether/how they thought they benefited from their involvement.  
 
I conducted 39 semi-structured interviews: 24 with 22 internal stakeholders (i.e. staff and 
AC members), and 15 with 17 external stakeholders, 11 of whom were policy makers, 6 
of whom collaborated with Sustain (Appendix C contains a detailed list with interview 
formats and dates). Sampling on page 113 outlines how individuals were selected and the 
perspectives they represent. 15 interviews were conducted in-person in Toronto and 
Guelph, with the remainder conducted by phone, due to the geographic location of 
interviewees and/or their expressed preference. Because I wanted to record the interviews 
(with permission), for in-person interviews I suggested we meet somewhere quiet. With 
some exceptions this meant an office in the interviewee’s work-place; I conducted four 
interviews at individuals’ homes, and one in a noisy café. These environments sometimes 
gave me insight into the interviewee and/or the nature of his or her work. 
 
In total, I invited 50 individuals to participate in interviews via email invitations. In the 
interest of transparency, and in the hope that it would increase participation rates, I 
copied Sustain’s Director on all invitations. On invitations to policy makers I also copied 
Sustain’s Co-Chairs. Some individuals were immediately responsive to the invitation, 
while others required one or more prompts by email or phone. Many of the interviews 
were clustered into a period when I was off work. While this enabled me to offer 
participants a wider range of scheduling options, sometimes it meant that I didn’t have 
much time to digest and reflect between interviews. The late June to early August timing 
of the interviews may not have been ideal for some stakeholders who farm or for others 
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who take summer vacation, but I offered various dates and times during and outside of 
regular business hours. I rescheduled a few interviews to accommodate changing 
schedules.  
 
Overall I was pleased with the response and participation rates. Although all internal 
stakeholders I approached agreed to an interview, I was only able to interview eleven of 
the twenty policy makers I contacted. Three other policy makers agreed to participate in 
an interview, but despite multiple attempts I was unable to schedule a time to meet with 
them. Two did not respond to my requests; two referred me to others they thought were 
more appropriate (some of these individuals were on my original list); and two indicated 
they didn’t feel they had much to contribute. Some of those who declined or referred me 
to others had moved to different ministries, and were no longer involved in food policy 
development. I updated the Director in August 2013 and asked how she interpreted the 
nine responses. She indicated that she wasn’t surprised; some of those I invited are very 
busy senior bureaucrats who tend to be very challenging to reach. Two of those who 
indicated they had limited involvement with Sustain were at the time involved in 
significant discussions with Sustain; the Director speculated they may not have felt 
comfortable engaging in an interview while such discussions were underway.  
 
The interviews I conducted with policy makers served a dual purpose. In addition to 
being an integral part of my research, I conducted these interviews to collect data as part 
of Sustain’s developmental evaluation process. As noted previously I had been 
volunteering as part of the Evaluation group for almost two years and the timing of the 
information gathering for the evaluation process dove-tailed with my research schedule. I 
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volunteered to interview policy makers on behalf of the group for the sake of efficiency 
and to reduce duplication. The Evaluation group identified questions it hoped to answer 
about policy making and I incorporated some of these into the question guide I developed 
for policy makers. Some of the suggested questions did not lend themselves to an 
interview because answering them required quantitative data; I indicated that Sustain 
might need to find the answers another way (e.g. by mining internal data or via a survey).   
 
The Evaluation group thought I would be seen as a reasonably neutral party. I highlighted 
the dual purpose of the interviews in the email invitation and when I conducted the 
interviews I reinforced my role as an academic researcher developing a case study of 
Sustain. I informed them I would share aggregated results with Sustain and committed to 
maintaining confidentiality and anonymity. I prepared a summary of information 
gathered for the Evaluation group to discuss and interpret. I also presented highlights to 
Sustain’s AC and staff at the November 2013 AC meeting.  
 
Interviews ranged from 30-45 minutes with most policy makers, and to one hour or 
longer with internal stakeholders. I developed question guides for different stakeholders 
organized around a sequence of topics (Kvale, 1996) with a “series of pre-determined but 
open-ended questions” and also used “a variety of probes that elicit further information” 
(Ayres, 2008, p. 10). This approach enabled me to explore key topics and related 
questions.  
 
The question guide for internal stakeholders focused on their experience and perceptions 
of Sustain’s structures, processes and strategies – including policy development and 
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promotion. For external stakeholders, and especially policy makers, the questions focused 
more on the of Sustain’s policy development work, including the Alliance’s research, 
policy promotion and communications. I shared the main set of questions with 
participants in advance of the interview to give those who were interested an opportunity 
to reflect. Despite the fact that policy makers tended to be quite focused and thoughtful in 
their responses, I felt a bit stretched to cover the range of topics identified in my policy 
maker interview guide in 30 minutes. I did time checks and if the interviewee was 
amenable, and most were, the interview sometimes extended from 30 minutes to 45 or 
longer.  
 
During the interviews I encouraged individuals to reflect on and describe their 
involvement and experiences with Sustain, as well as their attitudes and feelings (Kirby, 
Greaves and Reid, 2006, van den Hoonard, 2012). The semi-structured interview format 
enabled me to probe an individual’s responses to clarify ambiguities and gain greater 
insight into what is important to them. I think this was something that would have been 
impossible to accomplish through a survey. I at times used leading questions to “check 
repeatedly the reliability of the interviewees’ answers as well as to verify the 
interviewers’ interpretations” (Kvale, 1996, p. 158). Qualitative research approaches 
acknowledge that it can be useful to modify a question guide as more insight is gained 
from the interviews (Stake, 1995); I appreciated the flexibility and sometimes adapted 
questions during interviews. This too would have been impossible in a survey.  
 
I sought, and received, consent to record interviews to ensure accurate records. When 
citing comments, I committed to maintaining anonymity to the extent that was possible, 
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and to check back with interviewees to confirm accuracy and re-confirm permission. I 
emailed draft content – direct quotes and paraphrased material in context – to all 
interviewees. Some suggested minor modifications or clarifications which were helpful. 
A small number of interviewees objected to the inclusion of some content, as they did not 
think the codes provided sufficient anonymity. To respect their desire for anonymity, I 
dropped or modified some content.  
 
When initially seeking consent, I indicated I did not expect to quote many individuals by 
name. I also indicated that if I thought that was important in particular cases, I would 
seek their permission. In developing this paper, I concluded it would be helpful to include 
the names of the three Directors as each played a prominent and public role in Sustain at 
different points in time. In this instance, anonymity was almost impossible as it would be 
easy for readers to identify each of them based on publicly available materials. After I 
explained my rationale and each Director reviewed draft content attributed to them, all 
three provided permission. I also determined it was difficult to maintain the anonymity of 
a small number of other interviewees. They too agreed to be quoted and named after 
reviewing draft content.  
 
The interview recordings allowed for re-listening (Kvale, 1996). I also took notes during 
the interviews, since note-taking helps me process and enables me to refer back to and/or 
clarify my interpretation of their response. In re-listening I paid attention to frequently 
used words, phrases and ideas that interviewees used to describe Sustain (van den 
Hoonard, 2012). This gave me some insight into the Alliance’s culture and language and 
how accessible it is to people from different sectors. After each interview I set aside time 
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to document my reflections, feelings about the interaction, how the individual responded 
to me, and other non-verbal insights related to each interview in an interview journal 
(ibid). I reflected on most interviews shortly after I conducted them, and in the process I 
sometimes identified key questions to explore with specific stakeholders. 
 
4.2.3 Sampling 
Because I am studying Sustain as an example of a cross-sectoral coalition, I restricted my 
selection of interviewees to individuals who had a direct relationship with Sustain. This 
included internal stakeholders who are part of the coalition (i.e. members, staff and 
interns) and external stakeholders who had had some direct involvement with Sustain (i.e. 
policy makers Sustain had engaged, and representatives from partner organizations). This 
was designed to ensure those I interviewed could provide a perspective based on first-
hand experience with Sustain. Since participation in these interviews was voluntary I 
hoped their relationship and/or involvement with Sustain would be sufficient to convince 
them to participate. Since each sub-set of interviewees offered a different perspective on 
Sustain, I identified interview objectives for each group.  
 
Sustain has a large number of internal stakeholders (i.e. over 400 members, 40 AC 
members including six SC members, and staff), and so I selected interviewees based on 
the following criteria. 1) I engaged stakeholders who had been involved for different 
lengths of time; some provided an historical perspective on Sustain’s evolution, while 
newer members provided insights based on a fresher perspective. 2) Because I was 
interested in investigating a cross-sectoral coalition, I interviewed individuals from 
different sectors (e.g. farm, food, health, environment; for-profit and non-profit) to better 
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understand the nature of their involvement in the network. 3) Because Sustain is a 
provincial alliance, I interviewed members located in different parts of the province in an 
attempt to uncover some of the regional interests and concerns and whether/how these are 
reflected in Sustain’s work. This also gave me some insight into the connections 
individual members developed within the Alliance. 4) Finally, because Sustain aims to 
influence public policy, I interviewed members who had been most actively involved in 
Sustain’s government relations work including the chair of the Government Relations 
Working Group (GRWG).  
 
I asked Sustain’s Director to identify policy makers Sustain had engaged, and to suggest 
AC members who met this criteria while also representing one or more of the 
perspectives in the chart below. I identified additional AC members based on my 
observations of individuals at meetings I had attended. I also asked interviewees for 
suggestions about key internal or external stakeholders they thought I should interview. I 
expanded my original list from 39 to 50 to ensure I heard from people with a range of 
perspectives. Interviewees’ ages ranged from those in their early twenties to those in their 
fifties and possibly sixties.  
 
Table 4.1 below presents my classification of non-staff “internal” stakeholders and 
illustrates how the AC members I interviewed represented different perspectives. Some 
AC members are involved in more than one issue sector and some are involved in both 
for-profit and non-profit initiatives.  
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Table 4.1: “Internal” interviewees  
 
 ISSUE SECTORS ECONOMIC 
SECTORS 
GEOGRA-
PHY  
 
ENGAGEMENT 
AC 
Members 
Farm – 
farmers, 
farm 
support 
or 
education  
Food – 
e.g. 
literacy, 
access, 
education 
Health – 
e.g. 
nutrition, 
public 
health 
Environment 
- e.g. 
sustainable 
farming, 
land 
preservation 
For-
profit 
Non-profit 
or 
Charitable 
(including 
education) 
North (N), 
East (E), 
South-West 
central (SW-
c), GTA 
Active Less 
active 
Numbers 8 10 3 6 3 14 N: 3  E: 3 
SW-c:4  
GTA: 5 
12 5 
 
 
In terms of “external” stakeholders, I interviewed ten individuals involved in provincial 
policy making since that was the Alliance’s main level of policy focus during its 
formative years. By 2013 Sustain’s spokespeople (i.e. the Co-chairs, Director and Acting 
Director) had developed relationships with provincial politicians inside and outside 
government, and bureaucrats, mainly in the Ontario Ministry of Agriculture, Food and 
Rural Affairs (OMAFRA). I refer to these individuals collectively as ‘policy makers’ 
since all are involved in the policy development process on some level. Interviewing 
individuals Sustain had connected with gave me insight into how the Alliance was 
perceived externally (including its legitimacy) and the efficacy of its government 
relations and policy reform strategies. Sustain sought out advice on government relations 
and advocacy strategies and processes from consultants. I interviewed one such 
consultant, who is also a former policy maker, in the hope of obtaining an informed 
external perspective on how the design of Sustain’s structures, strategies and processes 
impacted the Alliance’s ability to develop legitimacy and if, and in what areas, Sustain 
influenced public policy.  
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The other external stakeholders I interviewed can be described collectively as “partners”, 
with the exception of one individual who represents another policy actor in the food and 
farming space. “Partners” include a representative from Tides Canada (as we saw in 
Chapter 2, Sustain is a ‘project’ of Tides Canada); two representatives from Canadian 
Environmental Law Association (CELA), an organization Sustain partnered with on 
policy work related to the LFA (see Chapter 6); and two representatives from The 
Metcalf Foundation (a core funder). 
 
As we saw in Chapter 2, Sustain was established with significant facilitation and support 
from The Metcalf Foundation. For this reason I interviewed two representatives from 
Metcalf to better understand the Foundation’s motivation and the role it played in the 
formation of Sustain. I also wanted to understand their perspective on how Sustain’s 
structures, strategies and processes affected the Alliance’s ability to influence public 
policy and more broadly, on coalitions as a vehicle for influencing public policy.  
 
Table 4.2: “External” interviewees 
POLICY MAKERS PARTNERS POLICY 
ACTOR 
OMAFRA 
staff (current 
and former 
civil servants) 
Premier’s 
office staff 
(current and 
former) 
Politicians 
and political 
staff 
Metcalf 
Foundation 
staff  
Tides Canada 
staff 
CELA staff Agriculture 
Association 
staff 
5 2 3 2 1 2 1 
 
4.2.4 Observation 
Spradley (1980) describes ‘participant’ observation as an ethnographic technique that 
assists researchers in learning from people (Spradley, 1980). Unlike interviews, which 
rely mainly on what people say, it provides an opportunity to learn from what people 
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actually do. Anzul, Freidman, Garner, and McCormack-Steinmetz (1991) describe 
participant observation ‘as ongoing and intensive observing, listening and speaking…. 
covering a broad continuum of kinds and degrees of participating’ (p. 42). My approach 
to observation was somewhat less formal than some descriptions of participant 
observation. In this section I describe opportunities I had to observe and the roles I played 
in those contexts.  
 
As noted previously, I began volunteering on the Evaluation group in 2011 and 
subsequently started attending and observing portions of AC meetings, sometimes as part 
of the Evaluation group. During meetings I indicated I was researching Sustain and 
developing a case study. I attended part of Sustain’s second Bring Food Home conference 
in October 2011 as a public participant. In these settings in 2011-2012 I did not formally 
observe and I did not take detailed notes, in part, because my research proposal and 
Human Participants Research protocol had not yet been developed or approved. After 
receiving my ethics approval in the spring of 2013, I had only one opportunity to attend a 
meeting, the AC meeting before the Bring Food Home Conference in November. There, I 
played a more active role (described below) and did not change my approach to observe 
more formally.   
 
These opportunities to be a ‘fly on the wall’ proved valuable as an orientation to Sustain. 
The AC meetings gave me insight into the coalition’s culture, group dynamics and 
interpersonal relationships. By showing up periodically, I eventually became a familiar 
presence and got to know some AC members. As a result, I think I became what Wolcott 
(1998, cited by Anzul, Freidman, Garner, and McCormack-Steinmetz, 1991, p. 45) 
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describes as a ‘privileged observer’, someone who is known and trusted and has easy 
access to information. 
 
As part of my involvement in the Evaluation group, in addition to I attending AC 
meetings in 2011-2013 I engaged directly with staff and AC members as part of the 
information gathering process. This volunteer role gave me a kind of inside status and I 
think helped me gain access to, and more productively engage, internal stakeholders. One 
AC member I interviewed (AC11) encouraged me to share my interview findings with 
the Evaluation group so that Sustain would have access to anonymous insights shared by 
AC members. I did so broadly in the context of discussions and analysis of the data 
gathered through the evaluation process.  
 
After attending several meetings and getting to know members, I sometimes found it 
difficult to confine myself to a strictly observational role. I participated in some group 
discussions, particularly related to questions the Evaluation group had worked on if I was 
there as a representative of that group. When I had a less active role to play it was easier 
for me to pay attention to other things like the space and place (Stimson, 1986); the 
content, flow and structure of the agenda; who attended and how members participated in 
the conversation, etc.  
 
Sustain’s bi-annual AC meetings often involve more than forty people: AC members, 
staff and interns, and guests like myself. These forums enabled me to observe without 
being overly intrusive, while being transparent about my research interests. The meetings 
provided me with insights into how members and staff and members interact, illuminated 
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issues that may not have been identified through interviews, and provided insight into 
Sustain’s approach to strategy development. They also assisted me in identifying key 
actors in the network and helped me gain a better understanding of the nature of member 
engagement and Sustain’s approach to collaboration, policy development and promotion. 
As noted above, at the November 2013 AC meeting I played a more active role, 
presenting highlights from my interviews with policy makers, and co-facilitating a 
discussion on emerging priorities with another member of the Evaluation group.  
 
Sustain’s biennial Bring Food Home conference is hosted in collaboration with other 
partners and sponsors that have an interest in transforming the food system. The 2-3 day 
conferences are held in a different part of Ontario (see Chapter 5). As part of my 
participation in the Evaluation group, I was involved in discussions about the design of 
the closing conference sessions in 2011 and 2013 where Sustain engages the broader food 
movement in discussions about priorities for the coming year (discussed in more detail in 
Chapter 5). In 2013 I co-facilitated the closing session with another member of the 
Evaluation group.  
  
The qualitative information gathered from these three different methods – documentary 
evidence, interviews and observation – assisted me in understanding and describing 
Sustain’s origins, structures, strategies and processes, and how they impacted Sustain’s 
legitimacy in the form of a case study record. This record will be accessible to Sustain 
and other cross-sectoral coalitions and I hope it will prompt continued reflection and 
learning. I intend to document key findings in a format that is more accessible to the 
coalition and others. Interpreting the data related to Sustain’s work has raised additional 
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questions related to existing theory and whether and how other cross-sectoral coalitions 
can learn from their experience. I explore these in Chapter 8, Findings and Conclusion.  
 
 
4.3 DATA ANALYSIS 
As noted above, my research methodology is qualitative and includes a literature review 
supplemented by interviews with key informants, a review of organizational documents 
and observation. I use this data to document the activities and processes in 2007-2008 
that led to the formation of Sustain and the network’s formative years from 2009-2013. I 
analyze the data informed by various theoretical constructs and literature from 
management studies, public policy and administration and sociology. I describe my 
approach to analysis below. As part of this analysis I refined my theoretical constructs, as 
per a grounded theory approach.  
 
My research question incorporated theoretical constructs (see Figure 4.1, page 89) and I 
revisit these constructs in Chapter 8 to make sense of the findings (Ely, 1997). When 
analyzing the data I explore the extent to which my findings reflect or conflict with 
previous research. I identify how choices about structures, strategies and processes 
contribute to, and detract from, Sustain’s legitimacy. I identify other factors that appear to 
impact legitimacy.  
 
The three qualitative methods I used to gather data – interviews, review of documentary 
evidence, and observation – provided me with a substantial amount of raw material to 
analyze to help me understand, document and interpret this case. I was guided by 
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Spradley’s (1980) description of analysis as “a search for patterns…a systematic 
examination of something to determine its parts, the relationship among parts and the 
relationship to the whole” (p. 85). Each method and data source provides a somewhat 
different perspective on, and interpretation of, Sustain and its work.  
 
Coding is a common strategy used in several analytic approaches including ‘grounded 
theory’ (Bowen, 2006, Charmaz, 2000, Glaser and Straus, 1967), schema analysis, and 
content analysis. I used coding to help me organize and make sense of data gathered via 
different methods. While I wanted to uncover patterns and themes that emerged in the 
data, the literature that guided my information gathering suggests a number of themes 
(e.g. different processes, structures, strategies, influence tools). This reflects a classical 
content analysis approach which “assumes codes of interest have already been discovered 
and described” (Ryan and Bernard, 2000, p. 785). I used these themes as a starting point 
for a ‘code book’ (ibid). Ryan and Bertrand recommend such a book include a 
description of the code, the tag used to mark codes in texts, inclusion/exclusion criteria, 
and examples from the data (ibid). I analyzed the data gathered to identify and tag content 
illustrating different themes. 
 
Silverman (2000) references Atkinson’s 1992 comments on the uses and disadvantages of 
coding. Coding schemes are ‘a powerful conceptual grid’ which can be constraining and 
which also “…deflect attention away from uncategorized activities” (ibid, p. 825). 
Silverman points to other limitations: while categories may be useful, they are not always 
accurate or true. I was mindful of these limitations when identifying and applying codes 
and categories. 
  122 
 
A ‘grounded theory’ approach encourages researchers to search for meaning and tell a 
“story about people, social processes and situation” (ibid, p. 522). The “systematic 
analytic approach” (ibid, p. 522) involves “a continual interplay between data collection 
and analysis to produce a theory during the research process” (Bowen, 2006, p. 2). 
Although grounded theory does not specify particular data collection methods, it 
acknowledges the value of multiple methods and emphasizes the importance of making 
comparisons across data gathered from various sources (Charmaz, 2000). In grounded 
theory, codes are generated from the data itself, by analyzing text on a line-by-line basis 
and then grouping similar codes into categories and then synthesizing those into themes. 
Although I did not analyze text in this level of detail, as I analyzed my data and coded 
material I watched for content that suggested a new code, pattern or theme.   
 
Analyzing data gathered using different methods, enabled me to do some rough 
triangulation, by looking for points of convergence and contradiction (Anzul, Freidman, 
Garner, and McCormack-Steinmetz, 1991, Yin, 2009). While analyzing this data I 
identified some questions that made it necessary to return to the field to confirm 
information or to find a specific answer. As a result I conducted a second interview with 
the Director and Acting Director, interviewed a second representative from Metcalf, and 
confirmed information via email with one AC member.  
 
4.3.1 Interviews 
Interviews with stakeholders who represent diverse perspectives provide opportunities for 
analysis on two levels: ‘direct interpretation’ of particular interviews and ‘aggregation’ 
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across multiple interviews (Stake, 1995). Internal stakeholders are perhaps most 
knowledgeable about Sustain; however the perspectives of external stakeholders based on 
their varied experience interacting with representatives of the Alliance complemented the 
perspectives of internal stakeholders. In accordance with grounded theory, I “look[ed] for 
views and values as well as acts and facts” (Charmaz, 2000, p. 522).  
 
In analyzing the interview data, I reviewed notes taken during and after interviews (i.e. 
my reflective journal) and marked themes using tags. I did not develop such a detailed 
code book as was described by Ryan and Bernard above. As I re-listened and reviewed 
my notes for each interview, I tried to determine if there was an underlying theme as 
suggested by van den Hoonaard (2012). In addition to coding themes, I listened for and 
identified illustrative stories as well as unanticipated responses and perspectives that 
could be used to enrich the description of the case and assist readers in making their own 
interpretations (Spradley, 1980). Sometimes I was unsure if responses reflected solely an 
individual perspective or if it was more broadly representative. Time and budget 
limitations made it impossible to fully transcribe the 41 interviews conducted; however 
when I re-listened, I watched for content that fell outside my defined codes and themes. 
 
4.3.2 Observation and participation 
As noted above, participating in and observing AC meetings, was most helpful in 
providing insight into Sustain’s members, culture and processes. My participation in the 
Evaluation group offered an opportunity for a slightly different kind of observation. As a 
volunteer I was an active participant in this group and the experience gave me a different 
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perspective on how Sustain operates. It also gave me easy access to additional data for 
analysis. 
 
My research benefitted from the data gathered as part of the evaluation process from 
March to late October 2013. This included summaries of focus groups with AC members 
and staff (which I co-facilitated), interviews with staff (facilitated by an intern), 
interviews with policy makers (which I conducted on behalf of the group), and a 
summary of the 2013 member survey. I looked forward to an opportunity to discuss and 
analyze this data with the rest of the group. Although the group planned to meet in 
September 2013 to discuss and analyze the information gathered, the survey was still 
underway and the meeting was deferred until early November.  
 
The evaluation information gathering and analysis process was delayed and lengthy, in 
part a reflection of Sustain’s resource limitations and reliance on volunteers. Staff 
eventually synthesized and developed a preliminary analysis of the evaluation data in 
November 2013 and Evaluation group members commented on this material by email. 
Although as group members we reflected individually on the data gathered, there was 
limited opportunity to discuss and analyze insights with the rest of the group before the 
Acting Director presented highlights at the AC meeting in Windsor (McKay, 2013). The 
Director eventually produced an evaluation report in 2014.  
 
4.3.3 Organizational documents 
I reviewed organizational documents including AC meeting minutes, newsletters, 
proposals, and Terms of Reference to identify examples of structures, strategies and 
  125 
processes Sustain uses to weave connections among members, foster cross-sectoral 
collaboration and engage members in policy development and promotion. Reviewing and 
analyzing this data with codes in mind gave me insight into how the coalition describes 
itself internally and externally. I included some of Sustain’s materials, such as a 
geographic map of membership (page 144), an outcomes map (see Appendix B), and an 
election campaign postcard (pages 186-187) to assist readers in better understanding the 
Alliance’s composition, objectives and strategies.  
 
Atkinson and Coffey (1997) caution researchers that organizational documents can’t be 
relied upon to tell the full story of how an organization operates. As part of my analysis I 
looked for examples of how the coalition described itself versus how it was experienced 
and perceived by different stakeholders based on interview comments and observations. 
This enabled me to assess and confirm or disaffirm the accuracy of assertions made by 
interviewees (Silverman, 2000). Stake (1995) indicates this kind of comparison 
represents a form of ‘methodological triangulation’. 
 
In Chapter 5, Structuring and Weaving the Network, I describe Sustain’s 2009-2013 
efforts to grow a provincial food and farming network with the legitimacy to influence 
public policy.  
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CHAPTER 5 STRUCTURING AND WEAVING THE NETWORK  
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION  
By 2013 Sustain was a growing, cross-sectoral provincial alliance with more than 400 
members who aspire to transform the food system in the province of Ontario into one that 
is more sustainable ecologically, socially and economically. I examine its evolution from 
2009 to 2013 from two perspectives: as a network, and as a ‘network organization’ or 
NAO as described by Provan and Kenis (2008) (see page 52). This involves a study of 
Sustain’s organizational structure as well as two core strategies, ‘Network’ and 
‘Showcase’, and related processes the Alliance used to weave a provincial food and 
farming network.  
 
Sustain has established a niche in alternative, sustainable food and farming and their 
members represent diverse urban and rural perspectives (see Table 5.1 on page 131). 
Some members represent other networks, and through their professional and personal 
networks they connect Sustain to the broader provincial food and farming movement. I 
consider Sustain a network, among networks, within the broader provincial and national 
food movements in Canada.  
 
I also agree with Levkoe’s (2014) characterization of Sustain as a PNO, which could also 
be considered a NAO. As a PNO, Levkoe indicates Sustain is strategically positioned “as 
weavers within the provincial food movement” (ibid, p. 60). Holley (2011) suggests that 
network weavers have four roles: connector, network facilitator, network guardian and 
project coordinator. Individuals ultimately take on these roles, and at Sustain, staff, and 
particularly the Director, play all of them, alongside some members. By fulfilling the 
  127 
network weaving and related PNO roles, Sustain exemplifies many of the characteristics 
of a ‘backbone support organization’ in the context of Kania and Kramer’s (2011) 
‘collective impact initiatives’. ‘Backbone support organizations’ have staff with skills to 
coordinate, “plan, manage and support the initiative through ongoing facilitation, 
technology and communications support, data collection and reporting, and handling the 
myriad logistical and administrative details for the initiative to function smoothly” (ibid, 
p. 40).  
 
Throughout this chapter I identify examples of how Sustain’s structures, strategies and 
processes have contributed to, and detracted from, the Alliance’s internal and external 
legitimacy. I first examine Sustain’s network organization structures and describe key 
elements. Then I look at how Sustain implemented its ‘Network’ and ‘Showcase’ 
strategies, and related processes to weave a diverse network. Appendix D contains an 
overview of historical milestones in Sustain’s journey discussed in Chapters 5 and 6. 
 
5.2 STRUCTURING THE NETWORK 
Like the network itself, many of Sustain’s organizational structures, strategies, and 
processes have evolved organically; the network acknowledges these are a work in 
progress. Sustain’s most recent draft Terms of Reference reinforces this, “These Terms of 
Reference represent the needs of a particular moment in our development and will 
continue to change…” (Sustain Ontario, 2013a, March, p. 3).  
 
Director Nuaimy-Barker noted during an interview that she thinks the evolutionary nature 
of Sustain’s structure and processes had started to detract from its internal legitimacy in 
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2013. A great deal of ambiguity remains and she has been very conscious of network 
tensions: “at each step of the way it’s about figuring it out… what at this moment is 
going to work” (S3 – see Appendix C for interview codes used throughout this and the 
following chapters). Another staff member commented during an evaluation interview 
that they experienced a constant tension between remaining flexible and institutionalizing 
(Vu Nguyen, 2013).  
 
This is not uncommon, as organizations grow and mature they tend to become more 
institutionalized and, according to Kearns (2003), this can dampen their ability to respond 
and adapt. Provan and Kenis (2008) indicate the tension between flexibility and 
institutionalization is a common tension in networks. Although Sustain’s staff value the 
flexibility that permits experimentation and adaptation, according to the Director (S3), as 
Sustain matures staff are feeling pressures to, and are starting to welcome, 
institutionalization. Other members of Sustain are more cautious about 
institutionalization, as one Co-Chair noted: “Once you become very process oriented… 
the goodness will go away, it’s really organic right now… for now it works” (AC1). This 
suggests the balancing act must continue. 
  
Figure 5.1 on the next page illustrates key structural elements developed by Sustain that I 
refer to in this and subsequent chapters.  
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Figure 5.1 Model and structural elements of Sustain’s network (Sustain Ontario, 2013g, p. 8) 
 
 
Figure 5.1 illustrates that the core of Sustain’s structure consists of an AC that includes 
Co-Chairs and the SC. The AC is a sub-set of Sustain’s larger membership; its forty 
members are elected by the broader membership to provide network leadership. The AC 
elects the SC from among its members to provide administrative guidance and oversight. 
The Co-Chairs are selected to act as spokespeople for Sustain. Staff support the network 
and undertake projects in alignment with direction provided by the AC. Members and 
non-members participate in Working Groups (WGs) which are organized around issues 
of interest, supported by staff. Supporters ‘support’ Sustain in various ways; this new 
structural element was introduced and defined as part of Sustain’s new membership 
model in late 2013.  
 
  130 
Table 5.1 on the next page provides a more detailed overview of these structural 
elements: Members, Supporters Circle, AC, SC, Co-Chairs, WGs, Director, Staff and 
interns, and Tides Canada - Support Team. I developed the table to highlight the key 
characteristics of each structure so that it can serve as a quick overview and reference 
guide. Included in the table are defined roles and responsibilities that Sustain has 
documented and a brief overview of how those involved in each structure engage as part 
of the Alliance. 
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Table 5.1 Overview of Sustain’s network organizational structures 
Structures 
in 2013 
Composition Defined roles and responsibilities Frequency and form of engagement 
Members 452 members (as of late 2013) 
 
Sectoral profile (Sustain Ontario 
2013a) 
- 19% Farming and farmer 
training 
- 19% Goods, service and retail 
- 11% Education 
- 9% Food and farm NGOs 
- 7% Local economy support 
- 6% Health and nutrition 
- 5% Urban agriculture and 
architecture 
- 5% Distribution 
- 4% Justice, anti-hunger, legal 
aide 
- 15% Other 
Geographic distribution: see map 
on page 144. 
Members “support working towards 
a food system that is healthy, 
ecological, equitable and financially 
viable” (Sustain Ontario, 2013b, p. 
4). 
 
Vote annually on the membership of 
the AC, SC and CCs. “Members 
must appear on the Sustain Ontario 
website and will receive the Sustain 
Ontario e-news” (ibid, p. 7).  
 
A new membership model 
introduced in late 2013 defines and 
clarifies more expansive 
expectations for members. Current 
and interested member will be 
required to register annually as a 
‘member’ or ‘supporter’ (see page 
147). 
Until late 2013, becoming a member 
involved simply submitting organizational 
information on Sustain’s website.  
 
Receive weekly newsletter: “Good Food 
Bites”. 
 
Sustain’s broader membership is not highly 
engaged, although some participate in WGs; 
respond to calls for action (e.g. to support 
Sustain’s advocacy campaigns); and attend 
webinars and/or the Bring Food Home 
conference. 
Members can, and do, self-nominate to the 
AC. 
Supporters 
Circle 
(NEW 
element 
introduced 
as part of 
membership 
model in 
late 2013) 
 
 
 
Supporters may be groups or 
individuals that are not eligible 
for membership under the new 
model.  
“Like Members, Supporters are 
assumed to endorse all Sustain 
Ontario policy and advocacy 
initiatives but will be given the 
opportunity to opt out” (Sustain 
Ontario, 2013d). 
“Supporters can help to create a healthy 
food and farming system by: 
- Publicly showing support for Sustain 
Ontario and its initiatives 
- lending their time, energy, skills, and 
perspectives to the work of the Alliance 
- supporting Sustain Ontario Members 
directly” (ibid). 
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Structures 
in 2013 
Composition Defined roles and responsibilities Frequency and form of engagement 
Advisory 
Council 
(AC) 
The AC consists of a maximum 
of 40 members/sector leaders.  
 
Members self-nominate as AC 
members. A committee reviews 
nominations and prepares a 
shortlist for members to vote on.   
 
This group illustrates the 
diversity of interests and 
geographies involved in Sustain.  
The AC provides leadership by 
working “to strategically support the 
cohesion and collective interest of 
the network. This means providing a 
clear vision and ongoing strategic 
analysis to guide the work… 
Members of the Advisory Council 
can “trigger” or lead working groups 
within the collaborative network.” 
(ibid, p. 4) 
Meets in person semi-annually for 
approximately 2 days (budget permitting). 
Between meetings the AC engages in 
discussion via email and teleconference. 
Some AC members attend external 
meetings with staff.  
Individual members often lend their 
expertise related to specific projects (e.g. 
policy development, conference planning) 
and on emerging policy questions. 
Co-chairs  Two members are elected by the 
AC as Co-Chairs of the AC.  
 
In recognition of the time 
required, Sustain converted this 
to a paid role in spring 2011 
(budget permitting). 
The Co-Chairs of the AC “work 
with the Director to determine 
strategic programmatic directions, to 
liaise with the SC and AC, build 
membership and to act as spokes 
people for Sustain Ontario” (ibid, p. 
5). 
 
As spokespeople the Co-Chairs regularly 
accompany the Director to meetings with 
external stakeholders and also engage with 
policy makers independently. 
 
Although they are Co-Chairs of the AC, 
they do not play a conventional chairing 
role during AC meeting.  
 
The Co-Chairs participate in SC meetings, 
however they are not members of the SC. 
Steering 
Committee 
(SC) 
The AC selects and elects 4-7 AC 
members to represent the AC on 
the SC.  
 
For the first 4 years, this group 
consisted of founding members 
(i.e. a sub-set of the Metcalf 
grantees and others who formed 
Sustain); in 2013 three members 
changed.  
 
The SC provides “administrative 
support and strategic direction to the 
Director… responsible for making 
decisions regarding the work, 
direction and development of the 
Sustain Ontario, maintaining 
primary responsibility to the broad 
spectrum of projects and activities 
and ensuring the on-going health of 
Sustain Ontario ” (ibid, p. 9). 
The SC meets monthly, normally via 
teleconference. 
 
Between meetings the SC responds to 
emerging issues by email/phone.  
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Structures 
in 2013 
Composition Defined roles and responsibilities Frequency and form of engagement 
Working 
Groups 
(WG) 
The number of active WGs 
varies: Sustain’s Almanac 2008-
2013 identifies 14, however a 
much smaller number are active 
at any point in time (~3-4).  
 
Groups consist of members 
(often one or more AC members) 
and non-members (often 
practitioners in the field). 
 
WGs are ‘self-organizing’: new 
groups are initiated by members 
and non-members who reach out 
to Sustain.  
 
 
WGs “…identify and work on 
strategic activities that harness 
converging “mutual self-interest” as 
well as the expertise, time, and 
energy of groups of people within 
the network” (ibid, p. 4).   
 
 
The level of engagement varies by WG: 
some meet regularly, others only meet to 
respond to an emerging issue. 
 
WG members are often geographically 
dispersed, and so many connect primarily 
via teleconference or web-meeting. 
 
Although initially envisioned as self-
directed, staff and/or interns have supported 
most WGs in connecting and organizing. 
Director One paid position. 
 
“The Director’s role is to coordinate 
Sustain Ontario activities, execute 
activities where appropriate, and 
ensure administrative issues are in 
order” (ibid, p. 5).   
The Director (Acting Director in 2013) is a 
full-time role.  
 
The Director attends to internal 
administration and network health as well as 
external and government relations informed 
by AC direction. 
Staff and 
interns 
In 2013 Sustain employed four 
additional staff and engaged 14 
interns in total, many of whom 
were university students. 
 
 
“Other staff and interns support the 
Director in executing the activities 
of the alliance to build on existing 
energy, disseminate information, 
convene members and build 
membership, strengthen 
membership, and document 
successes and challenges” (ibid, p. 
5).   
One full-time Program Manager 
 
Three part-time staff:  
- Events Coordinator 
- Communications Coordinator 
- Coordinator of the WG: Ontario Edible 
Education Network 
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Structures 
in 2013 
Composition Defined roles and responsibilities Frequency and form of engagement 
Interns are assigned to specific projects and 
typically work part-time (e.g. 10 hours/ 
week) for periods of four months or longer.  
Tides 
Canada – 
support 
team 
Sustain is structured as a 
‘project’ of Tides Canada. 
 
Tides Canada Initiatives’ support 
team consists of their Project 
Coordinator and other staff with 
expertise in various 
administrative functions.   
 
“The Tides Canada support team 
provides Sustain Ontario with 
support in all areas of operations 
including finances, grant 
administration, human resources, 
and risk management.”  
 
“The Tides Canada Board has full 
governing, legal, and fiduciary 
responsibility for Sustain Ontario” 
(ibid, p. 5).  
Tides Canada’s Project Coordinator 
communicates frequently with Sustain’s 
Director and staff via email, phone and in-
person. 
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5.2.1 Structuring the network organization 
Sustain’s network organizational structure was informed in part by requirements defined 
in the Alliance’s contractual agreement with Tides Canada – i.e. establishing the SC and 
identifying a project coordinator/ Director. The structure was consciously modelled after 
the “constellation governance model” articulated by Tonya Surman (Surman, 2006, 
Surman and Surman, 2008) as “a framework to serve and inform partnerships, coalitions, 
networks and movements” (2006,  p.1). The “constellation governance model” has been 
used by other networks including the Canadian Partnership for Children’s Health and the 
Environment; the Ontario Non-profit Network (ONN); and Sustain U.K.. Sustain did not 
adopt the constellation model in its entirety, but adapted some structural elements and 
concepts: WGs as ‘constellations’ and the SC as the equivalent of a ‘stewardship group’. 
Sustain’s staff, particularly its Director, fulfill many of the core ‘secretariat’ functions 
described in the model – e.g. catalyzing and supporting collaboration by leading the 
process, responding to needs, and building capacity (ibid).  
 
Sustain’s first Director reflected during an interview that the Alliance’s structure evolved 
more or less as she expected and that the different elements of the “constellation model” 
are in some ways more functional than anticipated. It took time for staff and members to 
understand the roles and inter-relationships between Sustain’s structural elements. Since 
staff and AC members come and go, orientating new members to these structures and 
how Sustain works has been important. Sustain’s most recent Draft Stakeholder Terms of 
Reference (Sustain Ontario, 2013a) contains more detailed descriptions of key structures 
and related roles and relationships; this is one example of how Sustain has started to 
institutionalize. Educating all about Sustain’s network organizational structure helped to 
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build internal legitimacy of ‘network as entity’ as described by Human and Provan 
(2000) in Chapter 3. 
 
5.2.2 Decentralized leadership and decision-making 
Figure 5.1 on page 129 does not illustrate where leadership resides at Sustain and in 
2013, leadership and decision-making responsibility and processes remained unclear to 
many members and staff. As in other networks, Sustain has attempted to decentralize and 
share leadership (McLeod Grant, 2010, Reinelt, 2010), and this makes the Alliance’s 
leadership more difficult to define. Levkoe (2014) comments on the absence of clear 
leadership in the PNOs he studied.   
 
During interviews, I initially adopted a traditional view of leadership by suggesting it was 
shared between Sustain’s Director and Co-Chairs, all of whom act as spokespeople for 
Sustain. Although some “internal” interviewees agreed with this characterization (AC16, 
AC17), others questioned this framing. Three AC members indicated that the Co-Chair 
role was never designed to be a leadership role, although some thought it had evolved in 
that direction (AC9, AC11, AC13). The Director commented that the SC only started to 
take on a more active leadership role during the transition to an Acting Director in March 
2013 (S3).  
 
Sustain’s 40-member AC embodies the diversity of the network, and the Director 
indicated its members are the ‘true leadership’ of Sustain, although staff also exercise 
leadership based on AC input (S3). The AC is one way Sustain has attempted to 
decentralize leadership. The AC role was designed to encourage sector leaders to exercise 
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leadership within the Alliance by providing strategic direction as a group and individually 
at the level of WGs, which AC members are encouraged to initiate and lead. Based on 
interviews, some AC members take this direction-setting role quite seriously (AC9, 
AC13, AC14), however reaching agreement on priorities and decisions during bi-annual 
AC meetings has been challenging for the large, diverse group. While many AC members 
are involved in WGs, only a few are led by AC members; some are led by other members 
or lack a designated leader. According to staff, in WGs with unclear leadership, staff and 
interns have played a more active leadership and support role than the constellation 
model suggests (S3, S4). 
 
The evolution of the SC’s role over the years has generated some internal confusion and 
mistrust. In an early funding proposal, the SC’s role was defined in accordance with 
Tides Canada requirements as “providing strategic direction to the staff in areas of 
governance, financial sustainability, and initiative development” (Baker, L. 2010). At the 
April 2011 AC meeting, the AC identified the need for more clarity around the SC’s role 
(Sustain Ontario, 2011b). In 2013, the SC’s defined role focuses more on providing 
administrative support and strategic direction to the Director; the group is responsible for 
making decisions about the work, directions and development of Sustain (Sustain 
Ontario, 2013a). The SC is in more frequent contact with staff and two AC members 
indicated during interviews that they believed this group was making decisions that 
should be made by the AC (AC9, AC13). The Acting Director also indicated during an 
evaluation interview that he believed it was the SC’s role to set strategic direction (Vu 
Nguyen, 2013) and he engaged the SC more actively than the AC.  
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Although the Co-Chairs of Sustain’s AC are not widely referred to as leaders of Sustain 
internally, externally, the title ‘chair’ is widely considered a senior volunteer leadership 
role. Their role as spokespeople reinforces that impression, as does the role they have 
played in AC recruitment. In the Acting Director’s strategic development and evaluation 
presentation to the AC, he indicated “the Co-Chairs are the most critical position in 
Sustain Ontario… [a] vital rural-urban link, providing legitimacy to the Alliance in the 
eyes of both institutional actors and decision makers” (McKay, 2013). Two policy 
makers representing a bureaucratic and political perspective indicated explicitly and 
indirectly that they assess an organization’s legitimacy in part based on those who 
represent or speak for it (PM1, PM8). The current Co-Chairs are from rural communities 
and are seen as “having skin in the game” which two policy makers I interviewed 
indicated enhances Sustain’s credibility (PM1, PM9). Their respective backgrounds, 
knowledge and continuity in the role appear to have contributed positively to Sustain’s 
external legitimacy. This suggests the AC should give the selection of individuals for 
such a role careful consideration. 
 
Sustain has had three Directors since 2009, including one ‘Acting Director’ hired in 
2013. Each took a somewhat different approach to the role, and each contributed 
positively to Sustain’s evolution and maturation. Despite their different backgrounds and 
approaches, the transition between the three was remarkably smooth. I think this is partly 
attributable to the decentralization of leadership; the SC, in particular, supported each of 
the transitions.  
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Although staff are the day-to-day face of Sustain, the Director’s ‘leadership’ role is not 
clearly defined. Director Nuaimy-Barker noted that to date, she has exercised leadership 
on questions of organizational and network structure, governance, and policy 
development and advocacy with advice from the AC (S3). In an interview conducted as 
part of the evaluation process, the Director characterized staff as ‘servant leaders’ (Vu 
Nguyen, 2013). Five AC members I interviewed consider the Director to be the ‘leader’ 
of the Alliance (AC1, AC13, AC14, AC15, AC17), however one member suggested 
Sustain is, and should be, led by many (AC11). During interviews it was clear that AC 
members have different expectations of the Director and one interviewee acknowledged 
this explicitly (AC17). This is also true of SC members, according to the Acting Director 
(S5). This has likely contributed to the confusion that exists around authority and 
decision-making.  
 
In 2012 staff engaged the AC in the exploration of several decision-making scenarios so 
the group could better understand the challenges in arriving at a decision when members’ 
opinions diverge (Sustain Ontario, 2012d). The group was asked to identify principles for 
decision-making in such circumstances and these informed the draft decision-making 
process developed in 2013. When I conducted interviews in the summer of 2013, the AC 
had not yet approved a decision-making process. 
 
Staff presented a draft process to the AC in March 2013, and the group offered a number 
of suggestions for improvement. In November, an updated document, “Proposed 
decision-making structures and processes” (Sustain Ontario, 2013d) and accompanying 
slide deck, “Decision making in Sustain Ontario” (Sustain Ontario, 2013h), was shared 
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with the AC but not discussed. In this section I describe decision-making processes that 
Sustain has used to date, challenges encountered, and proposed processes.  
 
Responsibilities associated with key organizational structures (i.e. the SC, AC, and staff) 
are broadly defined in Sustain’s Terms of Reference. Some of the content hints at, but 
does not explicitly state, which groups have authority to make particular decisions. When 
I asked internal stakeholders who makes different kinds of decisions, some pointed to the 
Director and Project Manager, and others to the SC or AC. The lack of clarity and 
confusion around decision-making has caused some mistrust. Several internal 
stakeholders I interviewed indicated they were unclear about who was actually making 
decisions, even when some thought they understood who was supposed to make 
particular decisions (AC9, AC10, AC11). This was a source of frustration for several; one 
AC member reinforced that, “at some point, you have to get transparent about how 
decisions are made” (AC10). Reaching agreement on, and documenting, decision-making 
processes has been challenging. 
 
An overarching challenge related to decision-making at Sustain appears to stem from a 
commitment to using consensus as a guide, with majority voting as a back-up option. 
Consensus is a concept that is interpreted differently by many, and at Sustain, the 
meaning of consensus was discussed periodically. At AC meetings I observed in 2012-
2013, members periodically reminded the group that reaching consensus across the entire 
Alliance is not the goal, nor is it required for Sustain to take action.  
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The proposed decision-making process distributed in November 2013 contains a lengthy 
written description of steps in the consensus decision-making process. It states, “the 
objective of consensus decision-making is to implement proposals on which everyone 
agrees and everyone is included in the decision-making process” (Sustain Ontario, 2013h, 
p. 5). It reinforces the need for participation in decision-making and distinguishes 
between minor and major concerns which might block consensus. It suggests 
collaboration, compromise and capacity building as approaches for working toward 
consensus, time permitting. 
 
The proposed process acknowledges and illustrates the complexity of decision-making in 
a diverse, cross-sectoral alliance. It outlines principles, that Sustain, “aims to make 
decisions in a way that is inclusive, spurs action, builds engagement and positive 
relationships, and is nimble and adaptable” (ibid, p. 1). These hint at a common network 
tension, between the desire for inclusivity and efficient, timely action. The process also 
reinforces that, “conflict is an important and valuable part of decision-making processes” 
(ibid, p. 1). The document contains a decision-making framework for two types of 
decisions: those concerning policy and advocacy, and operations. It also contains a 
“Decision Making Matrix” that outlines examples of the types of decisions each group 
may make along with a corresponding decision-making process. Although the document 
provides greater clarity and enhances transparency, it has not been finalized and it 
remains unclear if it will work in practice.  
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5.3 WEAVING THE NETWORK 
In the remainder of this chapter, I explore two of Sustain’s core strategies, ‘Network’ and 
‘Showcase’ and related processes used to implement these and weave the network. 
 
5.4 ‘NETWORK’ STRATEGY 
Sustain’s Theory of Change articulates the following outcomes for the ‘Network’ 
strategy: “to build capacity at the ground level to implement sustainable solutions; focus 
energy and expertise on solving food system challenges; and generate the collective 
power to influence policy change” (Sustain Ontario, 2013i, p. 4). 
 
The ‘Network’ strategy is implemented using a number of weaving processes, many of 
which are led by Sustain’s staff. Weaving a network begins with attracting members – i.e. 
growing a diverse provincial network. After attracting members, a network organization 
needs to weave connections between network members. Staff at Sustain enacted the four 
weaver roles described by Holley (2011): connecting, facilitating, acting as network 
guardians, and coordinating projects.  
 
5.4.1 Growing a diverse provincial network 
Sustain’s membership initially consisted of the 21 founders, most of whom participated 
in the 2007-2008 meetings Metcalf convened. As noted in Chapter 2, many were based in 
Southern Ontario. Sustain’s first Director, Lauren Baker, was hired in June 2009. Shortly 
thereafter, she recommended the network adopt a provincial mandate and diversify 
membership by engaging small businesses and farms. Baker believed Sustain would need 
to create a big tent to gain the political traction needed to influence provincial food and 
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farming policy (AC7). The expansiveness of the tent refers to the diversity of actors from 
different geographic regions and sectors who have an interest in realizing Sustain’s 
Vision: “a food system in Ontario that is healthy, ecological, equitable and financially 
viable” (Sustain Ontario, 2013i, p.1).  
 
In 2009 Sustain’s Director, SC and AC members started promoting Sustain informally 
through their networks. In 2010 they circulated the report “Menu2020” (Baker, Campsie, 
Rabinowicz, 2010), which outlined ten good food ideas for Ontario. The report contained 
an invitation to anyone working on related issues to join Sustain’s network. 
Organizations and individuals registered to become members by signing up on Sustain’s 
website; at the time, membership criteria were not defined. Those who registered as 
members received Sustain’s e-newsletters and were invited to become more actively 
involved; they were also encouraged to support Sustain’s efforts within their 
communities.  
 
By late 2010, approximately 200 individuals and organizations had signed up as 
members. The majority were based in the GTA and south-western Ontario. Sustain’s 
second Director, Ravenna Nuaimy-Barker, succeeded Baker in early 2011. Two AC 
members and one staff member I interviewed described her as ‘a natural weaver’ and 
‘relationship builder’ (AC1, AC4, S2); in 2011 she spearheaded efforts to strategically 
expand the geographic diversity of the AC. She did this by reaching out to individuals she 
knew, or knew of, who worked in different parts of the province and asked others for 
suggestions. That year membership grew to approximately 285 (Sustain Ontario, 2013g).  
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By November 2012, Sustain had grown to approximately 380 members (ibid). Figure 5.2 
below depicts the geographic distribution of network members at that time (Sustain 
Ontario, 2013k). The map illustrates that the vast majority of members in late 2012 were 
based in Southern Ontario, with nearly half (181) in the largely urban GTA.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ontario is Canada’s second largest province geographically at more than 1,000,000km2 
(Ontario government, 2014a). Although Sustain’s membership has become more 
geographically diverse, there are few representatives from the North; impediments 
include distance and travel costs. One AC member from the North that I interviewed 
speculated that others in the North prefer to invest their energy in regional networks 
where they have pre-established connections (AC15). The map above may explain in part 
Figure 5.2: Geographic distribution of Sustain’s membership in 2012 
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why some AC members (AC10, AC15, AC17) and one former policy maker (PM9) 
questioned whether Sustain can claim to represent the broad spectrum of provincial food 
and farming interests.  
 
According to Nuaimy-Barker (S3), without any formal process or active member 
recruitment efforts, Sustain’s membership grew to 452 in 2013 (Sustain Ontario, 2013g, 
November). This growth may be a reflection of a growing interest in local, sustainable 
food and farming issues, and the profile that Sustain acquired through Bring Food Home 
conferences and work on the LFA (see Chapter 6). 
 
An online member survey Sustain conducted in 2013 (108 responses) explored members’ 
motivation for becoming involved in Sustain. The top three responses: 67% reported they 
‘wanted to be part of a recognized voice in the food and farming industry’; 65% ‘wanted 
to support public education about food and farming’; 50% ‘wanted to influence policy 
with advocacy support’ (Nicoara, 2013).  
 
Table 5.1 on page 131 contains a breakdown of members by sector. Six members 
commented during interviews that Sustain is somewhat GTA-centric and that AC 
members with urban food perspectives outnumber those with rural and farming 
perspectives (AC10, AC13, AC14, AC15, AC16, A17). Externally, policy makers on the 
bureaucratic and political sides (PM2, PM7, PM10) and another policy actor commented 
(O5) that Sustain appears stronger on the urban food side compared to the farming side. 
This is partly a legacy of the Alliance’s roots as a southern Ontario network. Policy 
makers who have traditionally dealt with more conventional agricultural organizations 
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may not consider alternative, sustainable farming groups to be ‘real farmers’. As one 
former policy maker from OMAFRA observed, “they do have some people with 
agricultural legitimacy… It’s very important… if they’re going to be recognized as a 
legitimate organization representing agricultural interests…” (PM9).  
 
5.4.2 Introducing a membership model 
Network boundaries are often described as porous (Katcher, 2010), however when 
network organizations have ‘members’, boundaries become more defined and less 
porous. More than once Director Nuaimy-Barker posed the question during an evaluation 
discussion, “is there an us”? It gradually became clear that the answer was “yes” – a 
network “looking at the four goals articulated in the vision statement” (Sustain Ontario, 
2012, p. 3). Nuaimy-Barker expanded on this during an interview, “we’re all parts of the 
food system… players who are active in the food and farming system who want that 
system to change… to become more sustainable on all fronts” (S3). 
 
As Sustain’s membership grew, AC members explored membership-related questions 
during meetings: “Should we have individual members?”, “How do we define who is in 
and who is out?”, and “What does it mean to be a member?” (Sustain Ontario, 2012a). 
These questions hint at another network tension, related to inclusion and exclusion, or 
boundary setting. I explore other network tensions identified by Provan and Kenis (2008) 
(e.g. flexibility and stability, and internal and external legitimacy) in Chapter 7, Case 
Discussion and Analysis.  
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In 2012 the Alliance’s staff, SC and AC began to explore the merits of introducing a 
formal membership model. Membership models are complex to design and administer; 
for Sustain, designing a suitable model consumed significant energy over a period of 
more than one year. Objectives for introducing a formal model included strengthening 
engagement and relationships with members, more clearly articulating who Sustain 
represents, and increasing financial sustainability (S3).   
 
In late 2013 Sustain was just starting to roll out its new membership policy and model 
which includes two categories of membership: ‘members’ – groups and organizations; 
and ‘supporters’ – “groups and individuals that want help advance the work of the 
Alliance, but that do not meet the criteria for Membership” (Sustain Ontario, 2013e, p. 4). 
Members will be asked to renew annually. The policy defines member eligibility, role 
and responsibilities; and encourages members to make modest annual contributions to 
Sustain on a sliding scale based on their annual organizational budget. Non-profit groups 
and organizations, food enterprises (e.g. food processing businesses or retailers and 
farms), and public sector agencies are eligible to apply to become members with voting 
rights.  
 
In contrast, ‘supporters’ have no voting privileges. Supporters that want to make a 
financial contribution are encouraged to donate to one of Sustain’s members. The 
intention of this is to help Alliance members access financial resources and reduce 
perceptions that Sustain is competing with its members for funding, something that 
associations and network organizations are sometimes criticized for.   
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Several years into Sustain’s journey, access to funding is becoming more challenging. As 
noted in Chapter 2, the Alliance’s primary funding comes in the form of foundation 
grants, generally tied to projects. For the first time in 2014, the Bring Food Home 
conference generated some revenue. Although the new membership fees, which range 
from $50-$1000 based on an organization’s budget, are not expected to generate 
significant revenue (e.g. $10-15,000 annually), Sustain hopes this discretionary funding 
will enhance its sustainability. One internal stakeholder expressed concern that the 
introduction of membership ‘fees’ may exclude some potential members and negatively 
impact the overall network diversity (AC15); another suggested some narrowing of 
diversity might be beneficial (AC17). 
 
Introducing annual membership fees required Sustain to more clearly articulate its value 
proposition. The Alliance’s website articulates the benefits of membership as: “being part 
of a province-wide Ontario voice for support of food and farming systems that are 
healthy, equitable, ecological and financially viable”; “joining others working in the food, 
health and agriculture sectors to let our governments and other organizations know what 
we think it will take to transform Ontario’s food system” (Membership policy, 2014). As 
a recipient of membership fees, Sustain will be expected to provide tangible value and 
more actively engage the broader membership. This may enhance internal legitimacy in 
the form of ‘network as interaction’ (Human and Provan, 2000) by clarifying and 
reinforcing the case for involvement. Sustain’s Director commented during an interview 
(S3) on how she hopes the model will transform Sustain’s relationships with members: 
…actually having those relationships be alive will really add to the legitimacy 
of Sustain, to the conversations that we’re having, to our power in reaching 
out, and in bringing in the message… this whole process of creating a different 
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form of membership was really about making systems and expectations around 
engagement… that we would be more engaged in listening, but they would be 
more engaged in doing. 
 
 
Sustain’s most recent Terms of Reference defines members’ role as supporting Sustain’s 
vision and guiding principles (Sustain Ontario, 2013a, March). The new membership 
policy specifies three ways members are expected to support the work of the Alliance:  
“1) communicate their support of the Alliance’s work to their constituents…  
2) participate in some aspect of activities a minimum of five hours/year…  
3) members are assumed to endorse Sustain Ontario-led policy and advocacy 
initiatives, but will be given the opportunity to opt out of broad policy positions. 
All members will be notified of policy and advocacy activities for which member 
support is wanted…. Members who are unable to participate in advocacy or have 
strict advocacy limitations are able to state this restriction on their membership 
application, and will automatically be assumed to opt out of any and all policy 
and advocacy initiatives unless indicated otherwise for specific initiatives” 
(Sustain Ontario, 2013e, p. 3).  
 
This approach to endorsement is designed to enable the Alliance to be more nimble in 
communicating broad policy positions. It is not clear what mechanism is in place to 
communicate with those members who have opted out. 
 
This new model clarifies the constituency Sustain represents for external stakeholders. 
Members will be asked to renew annually and this will enable Sustain to maintain and 
communicate a more accurate profile of its membership. During interviews two policy 
makers from OMAFRA and one politician (PM1, PM4, PM8) indicated they pay 
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attention to a group’s membership composition. This suggests greater transparency in this 
area may enhance Sustain’s external legitimacy.  
 
Questions persist regarding the optimal size and diversity of Sustain’s ‘tent’ and how the 
Alliance should relate to those in proximate tents who are not members. Sustain’s guiding 
principles indicate it “bridge(s) differences and silos” (Sustain Ontario, 2013a, p. 4). One 
AC member indicated Sustain needs to reach out more widely to producers and 
organizations in the mainstream farming community, “if Sustain is going to represent 
themselves as a voice for food and farming, they need to be a voice for food and farming, 
not just some farming” (AC16). Five policy makers I interviewed from the bureaucratic 
and political sides concurred, suggesting that engaging conventional agricultural groups 
in dialogue would benefit both parties (PM1, PM2, PM3, PM4, PM7).  
 
The implementation of a formal membership model is another example of how Sustain 
has institutionalized. Sustain’s Director reflected, “We have trust and goodwill built 
between a small group of individuals that understood that they were on the same 
page...   But with increasing complexity and inclusivity… that wasn't going to be 
enough” (S3). Institutionalization in this and other areas should contribute positively to 
the Alliance’s internal and external legitimacy. The membership model should assist 
Sustain in strategically expanding its membership and its legitimacy as a provincial voice 
for alternative food and farming. From the perspective of external legitimacy, a clearer 
definition of membership roles, mutual expectations, and support for Sustain’s policy 
positions should be well received by policy makers.  
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5.4.3 Convening and connecting members 
  
Instead of allowing networks to evolve without direction, successful 
individuals, groups and organizations have found that it pays to actively 
manage your network. ~ Krebs and Holley, 2002, p. 5. 
 
Krebs and Holley (2002) note that convening and connecting are common network 
weaving processes. At Sustain, these processes are undertaken by staff and to a lesser 
extent by AC members who have helped attract new members. Sustain’s most recent 
draft Terms of Reference indicates that staff “are responsible for convening the Steering 
Committee and Advisory Council”… [and] “will seek out “spaces” where there is energy 
to move forward on important issues and link emergent leaders to others interested in 
working with them” (Sustain Ontario, 2013a, March p. 10). 
 
Within Sustain’s network(s), some connecting takes place in-person, while in other cases 
it occurs virtually since Sustain’s provincial membership is geographically dispersed. 
This virtual connectivity is something that may have been cost-prohibitive to many 
networks just ten years ago. Both options help connect and ‘bridge’ formerly 
unconnected members and facilitate the flow of information and ideas that are critical to a 
healthy network (McLeod Grant, 2010, Scearce, 2011). 83% of the 108 members who 
responded to Sustain’s 2013 member survey indicate they see Sustain’s ability “to bring 
together diverse groups to work effectively for problem-solving to be one of Sustain’s 
unique contributions to bringing about a more sustainable food and farming system” 
(Nicoara, 2013, p. 5). 
 
In addition to forging connections and increasing collective understanding, Sustain 
convenes for a variety of other purposes, to: facilitate collaboration and the exchange of 
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ideas; build capacity; engage members in dialogue and strategic thinking on issues and 
policy questions; find common ground; and set priorities. Key spaces for convening and 
connecting members and non-members in person include: AC meetings, the biennial 
Bring Food Home conference, and periodic forums (e.g. “Food, Farms, Fish and 
Finance” in 2013).  
 
Convening and connecting demands considerable skill, energy and resources (Levkoe, 
2014, he cited Li, 2007, McFarlane, 2009; also Foster-Fishman, Berkowitz, Lounsbury, 
Jacobson, and Allen, 2001). Staff convene the SC, AC, and WGs for in-person and 
virtual discussions. In their weaver roles, as connectors and network facilitators, staff 
invite members and others who are involved in issues to participate in educational 
webinars, forums and consultation processes (see Consulting with the network, page 
159). Educational events are well-attended and Sustain’s consultation processes have 
been effective in soliciting input from a range of communities. Three AC members I 
interviewed commented they value these opportunities to learn, share successes and 
challenges, and create new connections (AC5, AC9, AC15). In the 2013 member survey, 
33% of respondents reported Sustain ‘significantly’ helped them to connect with others to 
improve the outcomes of their food systems related work. 50% reported they ‘often’ or 
‘sometimes’ share ideas, innovations and resources within Sustain and its networks 
(Nicoara, 2013).  
 
In terms of levels of engagement, members of the AC and SC are the most engaged and 
staff reported during interviews that nearly all are actively involved on some level (S3, 
S4). Many AC members engage on a one-on-one basis; sometimes this is self-initiated, 
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while in other cases staff reach out to individuals with specific knowledge and expertise. 
AC members I interviewed identified various ways they had been actively involved: one 
reported accompanying staff to meetings with policy makers (AC4); others helped 
develop policy backgrounders (AC4, AC6, AC9, AC10), while others participated on 
WGs (most), or assisted with operational work (e.g. articulating internal processes, 
conference planning) (AC5, AC7, AC12, AC16).  
 
Members’ ability to engage appeared to be partly a reflection of busyness, and for some a 
question of whether they were contributing as individual volunteers, or in an official 
capacity representing an organization. One member I interviewed (AC10), indicated that 
their willingness to contribute was influenced by a sense of whether providing input 
would have an impact. This reinforces the importance of developing processes that 
members trust and consider legitimate, or in the words of the Director, to “structure the 
trust” (S3). She continued, noting that in 2013 Sustain clarified decision-making and 
electoral processes to “create processes that people trust” and “enhance internal 
legitimacy”. 
 
Sustain’s AC connects in-person at meetings and virtually via teleconference, web 
meetings, and email. The biannual AC meetings require significant up-front planning; the 
Acting Director indicated these are “taxing on Sustain Ontario’s resources financially and 
also from a staff preparation perspective” (McKay, 2013). The meetings have packed 
agendas that include updates on work done by WGs and staff; discussion of emergent 
issues and tensions inside and outside the Alliance; and identification of policy-related 
issues, opportunities and priorities. A substantial background package is circulated 
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approximately one week in advance. Two AC members indicated that sharing these, and 
other materials that Sustain wants input on, further in advance would assist AC members 
in providing more thoughtful input and give them time to engage their respective 
communities in discussions (AC11, AC16). 
 
The AC meetings I observed were facilitated by an outside consultant who has worked 
with Sustain since its early days; she also guided the Alliance’s developmental evaluation 
process (see Chapter 7). It appeared the presence of an external facilitator introduced 
neutrality; it also freed up the Director and staff to present to the AC and participate more 
actively in discussions.  
 
At AC meetings members explore different perspectives with a view to identifying 
common ground. The Acting Director observed that when he arrived in the spring of 
2013, the AC seemed to be “on the same page about major issues” (S5); one of the Co-
Chairs agreed (AC2). The group has often reinforced that Sustain doesn’t strive for 
complete agreement, but to arrive at a consensus that members support and/or can ‘live 
with’.  
 
AC discussions I observed were often messy and a failure to call the question and reach a 
decision at the end frustrated some AC members and staff. One AC member commented, 
“I feel like we’re always having these big mish-mash discussions” (AC13); another said, 
“we did all this talking, we had all these people in the room, we could have really made 
some firm direction and decisions, but we didn’t” (AC16). An intern reflected on one 
meeting during which the AC explored questions related to Sustain’s identity and 
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position-taking, noting that, at the end of the day there was “no conclusion” (S1). At 
some meetings the AC did make decisions and provide clear direction – e.g. in February 
2012 (Sustain Ontario, 2012) the AC reinforced that Sustain needs to keep its energy 
focused on policy reform as opposed to program delivery. This led to a refocusing of staff 
activities and the cancellation of Sustain’s ‘City to Country’ initiative (see page 166). 
 
Members are vocal and participate actively during meetings, despite the large number of 
participants. According to one AC member, the growth of the AC beyond the original 21, 
has “given more depth to the conversation when focused on specific issues… but it has 
also resulted in more people’s voices, although they’re there, not being effectively heard” 
(AC6). Smaller break-out groups are used to give more members an opportunity to share 
their perspectives, however this means that not all members are exposed to them. 
Although necessary with such a large group, this may curtail opportunities to deepen 
collective understanding. 
 
A ‘dotmocracy’ process, whereby participants vote on the topics that are of most interest 
to them, was sometimes used to create a shortlist of topics for discussion during AC 
meetings. One AC member I interviewed who works in the North observed that this 
process sometimes means less mainstream regional and rural issues are ignored since a 
substantial number of people need to be interested in a topic for it to make the shortlist 
(AC14).  
 
Although many members I interviewed indicated the AC works reasonably well during 
and outside of meetings, several stressed the full group could be better engaged and 
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utilized. For example, “there needs to be a clearly defined role for advocacy and how the 
AC is utilized on that” (AC4); “some people on the AC feel like they would like a little 
more direct input” (AC15); “the AC has not been given enough opportunity to identify 
policy gaps… has not been used to its capacity” (AC11). Others indicated they think the 
AC is asked to provide feedback and ‘rubber stamp’ things, rather than set direction. As 
one member noted, “sometimes I feel we come in after the fact… [staff say] ‘this is what 
we’ve been doing, and how do you feel about what we have done’… [it] feels like instead 
of us providing the direction proactively, we are reactive” (AC5). One staff member 
noted in an interview as part of the evaluation process, “we haven’t figured out a protocol 
on when to engage the full AC” (Vu Nguyen, 2013).  
 
These concerns point to some weaknesses in Sustain’s structure and processes. I think 
nomenclature has contributed to confusion – e.g. ‘Steering Committee’ suggests a 
direction setting role, one which has been assigned to the ‘Advisory Council’; while the 
terminology ‘advisory’ suggests the provision of advice, as opposed to decision-making. 
Although AC meetings are a useful forum for exchanging ideas and diverse perspectives 
to help the group better understand issues, it may be unreasonable to expect the AC to 
make decisions and set direction in such a forum. In my experience such large and 
diverse groups require a clearly defined and agreed-upon process for decision-making. 
The documentation of decision-making processes may help.  
 
Between meetings the AC discusses emerging issues via email or teleconference. Those 
with knowledge and interest in a particular issue tend to be the most vocal; for other 
members the discussion is largely educational. Email is useful for gathering input but not 
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ideal as a forum for discussion or when quick decisions are required. One member I 
interviewed suggested longer timelines and better framed questions would enhance the 
depth of analysis and volume of response from the AC (AC11). The Acting Director 
indicated during an interview that staff are still trying to determine how best to collect 
input from the AC. “We’re trying surveys now, but we’re getting so much feedback on 
survey design… there’s a risk we’ll miss our window of opportunity” (S5).  
 
Compared to AC and SC members, levels of participation among Sustain’s broader 
membership is limited according to the Director (S3). Some participate in WGs, 
webinars, consultation processes, or the biennial Bring Food Home conference. Sustain 
uses its website, blogs, weekly e-newsletters and social media to keep members and the 
general public informed of opportunities for involvement.  
 
WGs, or ‘constellations’ as Surman (2006) defines them in the “constellation governance 
model”, are important spaces within which smaller numbers of members and non-
members can connect and take action on issues of interest to them. Continuing with the 
constellation metaphor, WG constellations are a sub-structure within Sustain’s bounded 
‘universe’. In these spaces WG members exchange information and ideas, and some 
explore policy barriers and develop solutions. The WG structure was designed to 
decentralize leadership and support action by sub-groups, and to some degree they have 
done so; however the Acting Director expressed concern about relying on WGs to 
identify policy issues (S5).  
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These WG ‘constellations’ are sometimes referred to as the ‘non-consensus based 
element’ of Sustain (Bruce, 2013) since WG activities and positions are not always 
supported by the broader membership. The ‘Flocking Options’ campaign (Flocking 
options, 2014) developed by one WG to encourage the Farm Products Marketing 
Commission to offer more options for small scale farmers who don’t have quotas 
generated some scepticism and mistrust internally. Despite the fact that the final 
campaign message was eventually framed as a need to have a conversation, it was a 
divisive campaign internally. One AC member noted “it was a touchy situation with us as 
one of the organizations [Sustain was] working with had publicly stated that they wanted 
to see [our organization] pulled apart; they weren’t on the AC, I’m not sure if they were 
members [of Sustain] or not” (AC10). This campaign led one policy maker from 
OMAFRA to question Sustain’s tactics and policy acuity, “there are other ways you 
could go after the marketing board with the same result…as opposed to going after the 
300 chicken personal exemption” (PM7). This could be considered an example of a 
‘legitimacy set-back’ (Human and Provan, 2000) as described in Chapter 3.  
 
This element of Sustain’s structure illustrates a network tension that exists between self-
organization and flexibility, and direction or institutionalization (Provan and Kenis, 
2008). Sustain’s approach to WGs was experimental initially and staff supported different 
approaches in different WGs. In 2013, having gained a better understanding of what 
works and mindful of resource limitations, Sustain was considering introducing processes 
to provide WGs with more structure and guidance. The Acting Director suggested to the 
AC that “project initiation, roles and accountabilities, regular reporting and project 
evaluation need to be built into the working group and network model” (McKay, 2013, p. 
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10). This attempt to more effectively balance the tension by providing more direction is 
another example of Sustain’s shift from flexibility to institutionalization.  
 
Since Sustain has a large number of geographically dispersed members, staff have 
leveraged technology to create spaces for virtual discussions. The Alliance’s capacity to 
host teleconferences and webinars enables AC and WG members to connect in real time 
in a cost-effective way. Staff and members acknowledged this technological 
infrastructure has been critical to the network’s function, however they are not always 
accessible to members working in rural and remote parts of Ontario. Although these 
platforms are not optimal for large group discussions, two members I interviewed 
indicated they find them valuable for WGs (AC4, AC14); the value of conference calling 
was reinforced during the AC focus group (Sustain Ontario, 2013c). Other virtual 
engagement tools include online surveys, email, and Sustain’s website which, according 
to some staff and one member I interviewed, has become a major destination for news, 
events, and commentary related to sustainable local food in Ontario and beyond (S5, 
AC11).  
 
5.4.4 Consulting with the network  
 
We’re constantly looking for a process, or a way to get people’s input without 
stopping our forward movement.  ~ Acting Director interview. 
 
Levkoe (2014) notes that “…PNOs do not act unilaterally, but spend a significant amount 
of time and energy negotiating with, and responding to their constituents” (p. 160). This 
was apparent at Sustain, where staff consult with the AC on emerging and strategic issues 
during and between meetings. Periodically staff also facilitate more expansive 
consultation processes that engage the broader membership.  
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Interpreting members’ perspectives and ‘aggregating thought’, or synthesizing diverse 
perspectives, is challenging and time consuming. In designing these consultation 
processes Sustain’s staff reported they encountered the network tension that lies between 
a desire for inclusivity and good process and a need to be efficient to meet externally 
imposed deadlines (Provan and Kenis, 2008). As noted in the quote from the Acting 
Director above, Sustain hasn’t found the ideal process yet. 
 
In 2012 Sustain designed and implemented a broad-reaching consultation process to 
solicit member input on the components that should be included in an “Ontario Food and 
Nutrition Strategy” (OFNSq see also Chapter 7), and what elements Sustain should 
advocate for inclusion in the LFA. The process involved the dissemination of a draft 
strategy to members who were encouraged to engage their communities in a discussion 
about it and submit feedback on-line. Staff developed resources to support members in 
consulting with their communities; this included a facilitator guide, presentation, and 
online feedback form. Staff offered to, and did, facilitate presentations and feedback 
sessions for some groups. Substantial feedback was provided and this informed the 
refinement of the OFNS and the set of LFA recommendations Sustain submitted to 
government (S3). Although technology was employed to capture feedback efficiently, the 
analysis and synthesis required significant staff time and resources.  
 
                                                 
q Sustain is a member of the Ontario Collaborative Group in Healthy Eating and Physical Activity’s 
(OCGHEAPA) Design Team. Sustain’s Director represents the Alliance on this Team and acts as a co-lead. 
Sustain supports the Design Team in a similar way it supports other Working Groups. The Design Team 
has been developing a comprehensive food and nutrition strategy (OFNS) for the province which includes 
food production. 
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Another way Sustain consults with and engages its broader membership and members of 
the larger provincial food and farming movement is in planning, presenting at, and/or 
attending, the Bring Food Home conference. This conference, which Sustain hosts with 
support from multiple partners (including some members), was held in Waterloo in 2010, 
in Peterborough in 2011 and in Windsor in 2013. It is now hosted biennially. At the end 
of each conference, Sustain has convened a session to explore emerging issues in food 
and farming and identify priorities for Sustain and other groups to focus on. The session 
is promoted throughout the conference and anyone who is interested can attend. Despite 
being held on the last day of the conference when many participants are tired and/or 
travelling home, these sessions have attracted between 60-100 participants. Sustain is 
considering scheduling this session at an earlier stage of the conference to increase 
participation. According to the Director, in 2011 discussions during this session catalyzed 
the formation of multiple WGs (S3). 
 
5.5 ‘SHOWCASE’ STRATEGY 
One of the assumptions Sustain articulates in its 2013 Theory of Change is that “solutions 
are emerging that can be shared, adapted and scaled once networks are strengthened” 
(Sustain Ontario, 2013h, p. 7). The Alliance’s ‘Showcase’ strategy focuses on sharing 
these solutions by developing case studies and documenting successes and challenges to 
“inspire replication and lead to the development of a more common vision of what a 
sustainable food system can look like” (ibid, p. 5). I consider this strategy another aspect 
of ‘weaving’ as it assists network members in identifying and connecting with other 
groups working on similar issues. Showcasing also helps network members and policy 
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makers better understand the complexity and interconnectedness of provincial food and 
farming issues. 
 
As noted above, the conference effectively showcases a range of solutions to members of 
the broader provincial food and farming network. The well-attended conference is a 
complex and ambitious undertaking which relies heavily on volunteers. The format 
combines the showcasing of innovations (e.g. sessions and tours of local projects) with 
opportunities to engage in large and small group dialogue on issues, and to socialize. 
Many members indicated during interviews that the conference is an important venue for 
establishing and strengthening connections. As one survey respondent commented, “The 
conferences provide a hundred contacts every time I attend” (Nicoara, 2013, p. 11). A 
member from Peterborough reported during an AC focus group that hosting the 
conference in Peterborough was a valuable opportunity to showcase the region and that it 
subsequently strengthened collaboration and regional networks (Sustain Ontario, 2013c). 
This reinforces the importance of hosting the conference in different regions; a 
conference planning committee spearheaded by Sustain, along with representatives from 
co-host organizations decided on locations in 2011 and 2013. Applications to host the 
2013 conference were competitive and communities from across the province expressed 
interest. One AC member expressed frustration during the focus group that Thunder Bay 
was not selected and questioned the decision-making criteria and selection process used 
(ibid).  
 
The 2013 conference in Windsor included nearly 200 speakers (Sustain Ontario, 2013f) 
in 54 sessions, with two plenary dialogues – one with four political representatives and 
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another with five funder organizations. The conference was supported by 17 sponsors and 
attracted 350-400 participants over each of the three days, despite the fact that most had 
to travel significant distances to Windsor. Everyone pays to attend and I met many 
attendees in 2013 who indicated they had not attended previously. As noted earlier, this 
was the first year the conference generated a profit. The 2013 theme was ‘Building 
Bridges’ and there was a strong presence of First Nations communities, many from 
Northern Ontario, as well as government representatives. The Ministry of Aboriginal 
Affairs and Health sponsored the travel costs for some participants from northern 
Ontario. I think the success of the 2013 conference is another indication of Sustain’s 
growing profile and legitimacy within the broader food and farming movement.  
 
Another way Sustain ‘showcases’ solutions is through the publication and dissemination 
of reports and policy backgrounders internally to members and externally to policy 
makers. In Chapter 6, Policy Development and Influence, I explore how these materials 
have been received and how they have contributed to Sustain’s external legitimacy. As 
noted previously, the ‘Menu 2020’ report, although it was published by Metcalf, has 
come to be associated with Sustain, in part because it was co-authored by Sustain’s first 
Director (Baker, Campsie, Rabinowicz, 2010, Sustain Ontario, 2014). That, and 
subsequent solutions papers published by Metcalf, which were co-authored by some 
members of Sustain, profiled various organizations’ solutions as “good food ideas” 
(Publications, 2014). The solutions highlighted in these reports, and on Sustain’s website 
in early days, appear to share common elements: they are based in Southern Ontario and 
connected to founding members. Projects profiled online appear to have diversified since 
that time, however as we saw in Chapter 3, members that receive greater profile and 
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exposure may disproportionally benefit (Cooper and Shumate, 2012), for example, in the 
form of expanded access to funding and/or marketing opportunities. I think this is 
something any coalition needs to be mindful of as perceptions of disproportional benefit 
could erode internal legitimacy.  
 
Ontario’s sluggish economic recovery since the 2008 financial crisis means that 
government and other funders have cut back on their funding and the budgets of many 
non-profit organizations have shrunk. This has increased competition for funding; as one 
AC member noted, “everyone’s fighting over a smaller pie” (AC17). This may put 
Sustain in the position of competing with its members for funding. Prins (2010) 
reinforces that such competition inhibits collaboration. Collaboration may be further 
inhibited, if, as a result of Sustain’s ‘showcasing’ efforts some Alliance members are 
perceived to have benefitted disproportionately. Such a perceived inequity of benefits 
may erode trust and detract from internal legitimacy.  
 
In addition to hosting the Bring Food Home conference and publishing reports, Sustain 
uses technological vehicles to showcase successes and promote solutions to internal and 
external stakeholders. Vehicles include Sustain’s website (214,242 visits since 2009), e-
newsletters (1,640 subscribers in 2013), social media (>10,000 Twitter and 2750 
Facebook followers in 2013) and the ‘Growing Good Food Ideas’ video series (Sustain 
Ontario, 2013g). Technology extends Sustain’s reach significantly, although the Acting 
Director indicated it is unclear who Sustain is reaching through these vehicles (S5).  
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Sustain’s website is the core of the Alliance’s communication platform; a bilingual 
version was launched in 2011 and the site was re-designed in 2012 to assist internal and 
external stakeholders in better understanding the Alliance’s vision, work and structures 
and to encourage involvement. The site profiles members and WGs, hosts video stories 
describing members’ projects and innovations, and highlights policy campaigns and 
related research and resources. Electronic newsletters and blogs are archived on the site. 
Although most content is generated by staff and interns, members and guest bloggers 
from other organizations also contribute periodically. Because this content is public it has 
implications for Sustain’s legitimacy. The Acting Director identified quality of 
communications as a potential reputational risk for Sustain during his November 2013 
presentation to the AC (McKay, 2013).    
 
Newsletter subscribers include members and others interested in staying informed about 
what’s happening in Ontario related to sustainable, local food. Newsletters are emailed 
and link readers to more in-depth blogs and articles on Sustain’s website. According to 
staff, click-through rates (i.e. the number of readers who click on a newsletter item to 
access the full story) suggest subscribers find the newsletters valuable. Two AC members 
I interviewed noted the newsletters are a very helpful way to stay apprised of provincial 
initiatives (AC5, AC12).  
 
In 2012-2013 Sustain helped members document and share their stories by negotiating 
matching funding from OMAFRA for a 50-video series called ‘Growing Good Food 
Ideas’ (Videos, 2013). The series is hosted online and individual videos have been 
viewed 200-2000 times, the full series is also available for purchase on DVD. The videos 
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profile innovative food and farming initiatives from across Ontario; as one member 
noted, they “capture the essence of the movement” (AC1). One AC member I 
interviewed who participated in this project reported they found the videos a very useful 
marketing and education tool (AC14); those who participated in the AC focus group 
agreed (Sustain Ontario, 2013c). In April 2013, the Premier of Ontario, who was at the 
time also the Minister of OMAFRA attended the launch of the ‘Growing Good Food 
Ideas’ video series at Queen’s Park (Kucharczyk, 2013). Bill 130, the LFA, was being 
debated in the legislature around this time (Ontario, Official Report of the Debates of the 
Legislative Assembly (Hansard), April 17 and 18, 2013).  
 
One showcasing event that Sustain experimented with, but subsequently abandoned, was 
a series of eleven “City to Country” tours hosted in partnership with Toronto Food Policy 
Council, the Greater Toronto Area Agricultural Action Committee, FoodShare Toronto, 
the Foodshed Project and World Crop Research Project. The one-day ‘mobile 
conference’ bussed participants to innovative food and farming projects in and around the 
GTA. Venues included school gardens, community food programs, urban agriculture, 
processing and distribution facilities. Descriptions and video records of the educational 
tours are available as ‘virtual tours’ on Sustain’s website (City to country virtual tours, 
2012). At its February 2012 meeting the AC decided the initiative was “fun but not a 
strategic use of time, energy, funds” (Sustain Ontario, 2012b).  
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5.6 IN SUMMARY 
[Sustain is the] best opportunity going to meet different kinds of people 
engaged with food issues and bridge the divides of a huge province where 
many do their best to divide. ~ Sustain Ontario 2013 Member survey comment. 
 
Since 2009 Sustain has structured, attracted, connected and engaged a diverse provincial 
food and farming network. The Alliance successfully implemented the ‘Network’ and 
‘Showcase’ strategies and developed processes to weave and promote the network and 
ultimately building legitimacy for network as ‘entity’. The diversity of the network is an 
asset for all involved, and contributes positively to external legitimacy, something that is 
explored in more detail in Chapter 6.  
 
Whether Sustain has sufficient membership diversity is unclear. The map (Figure 5.2) on 
page 144 illustrates that the majority of Sustain’s members are based in Southern Ontario. 
Many of these members represent urban food perspectives. Although most of those I 
interviewed who work in other parts of the province or who represent a farm perspective 
indicated they feel their perspectives are heard, some external stakeholders suggested 
finding a better balance between urban food and rural farming perspectives would be 
useful. Doing so would likely enhance Sustain’s external legitimacy, particularly in the 
agricultural policy space.  
 
Sustain’s diverse network gives it unique access to good food ideas and innovations 
underway across the province. Efforts to showcase these solutions expanded connections 
within and beyond the network – many linkages and ‘bridges’ have been built. The 
connections formed among network members facilitate the rapid dissemination and 
exchange of information that will ideally seed continued adaptation and adoption of 
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solutions and innovations (Sustain’s second long-term goal or outcome, see page 13). 
Showcasing and convening has expanded awareness and collective understanding of 
provincial food system issues and this understanding informed Sustain’s policy solutions.  
 
As a provincial network, continuing to expand Sustain’s membership geographically 
beyond Southern Ontario might increase the Alliance’s legitimacy. Sustain’s vision for 
Ontario’s food system challenges the status quo, so it is unlikely conventional farming 
groups will become part of Sustain’s ‘formal’ tent. External stakeholders did, however, 
encourage Sustain to find ways to connect and engage such groups in dialogue, and 
Sustain started to do this when recommending amendments to the LFA (see Chapter 6). 
 
Sustain designed its network organization structures loosely based on Surman’s 
“constellation governance model”. The Alliance subsequently refined structures and 
introduced processes as the need for them emerged. Two factors suggest this approach 
was practical. First, the network was attempting to do something new in the province, and 
there was no recipe to guide them. A second factor relates to the network’s capacity 
limitations: Sustain relies heavily on volunteers and a small staff to convene, connect, 
examine, research and develop policy recommendations. Despite these challenges and 
limitations, the Alliance has made significant progress in structuring and weaving a 
diverse network since 2009.  
 
Only recently have the limitations of Sustain’s experimental and flexible approach 
become more apparent. This appears to be partly due to the growing number of members 
and diversity of interests in the ‘tent’. Satisfying the interests of all members has been 
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challenging. Furthermore, limitations stemming from immature or underdeveloped 
processes such as decision-making and elections have been a cause for concern for some 
members and staff. In response, Sustain has experimented and reflected on what has 
worked and has begun to institutionalize processes such as decision-making and 
formalize structures (e.g. by defining and documenting roles and responsibilities). The 
Alliance has done this in the interest of greater clarity, transparency and accountability 
(S3). As noted earlier, Sustain appreciates the need to retain some flexibility as the 
network continues to evolve. Although this increase in institutionalization may negatively 
impact network health by introducing controls which may inhibit self-organization, 
continued institutionalization and maturation is likely to enhance Sustain’s internal and 
external legitimacy. 
 
In the next Chapter, Policy Development and Influence, I explore the three externally 
focused strategies and related processes Sustain used to develop and influence policy 
reform.  
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CHAPTER 6 POLICY DEVELOPMENT AND INFLUENCE 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
During the discussions that led to the formation of Sustain, Metcalf and some founding 
members researched the barriers and challenges in the food system to better understand 
the issues, policy intersections and innovations underway. Findings were documented in 
the 2008 Metcalf-published report, “Food Connects Us All: Sustainable Local Food in 
Southern Ontario” (Metcalf, 2008a). At an AC meeting, one participant acknowledged 
that this research paper “is the basis of unity at Sustain” (Sustain Ontario 2012b). The 
report helped open the door to discussions with policy makers in the premier’s office 
underscoring the important role quality research and information can play in government 
relations and policy reform (Carden, 2004, Cugelman and Otero, 2010, Flicker, 2008, 
Lomas 2000a, Shields and Evans, 2008). Evidence-based policy is sometimes referred to 
as a ‘rational’ model because decision-makers are persuaded by the best, neutral 
information (Stone, Maxwell and Keating, 2001, Lomas, 2000a). Two policy makers I 
interviewed (one a current and one a former OMAFRA staff member) indicated they 
were committed to an evidence-based approach to policy making (PM1, PM4).  
 
Since 2009 Sustain has shared research and solutions with policy makers and in doing so 
the Alliance has developed constructive relationships, particularly with individuals at 
OMAFRA. Sustain engages in policy conversations as “one voice and many voices” 
(Sustain Ontario, 2012b); the Alliance’s spokespeople and members connect with 
government at municipal, provincial and federal levels (Nicoara, 2013). 
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In this chapter I describe Sustain’s efforts to influence policy by exploring three of the 
Alliance’s more externally focused strategies: ‘Examine and research’, ‘Government 
relations’, and ‘Policy reform’. In Chapter 7, Case Discussion and Analysis, I assess 
Sustain’s policy influence, and highlight factors that impacted the Alliance’s internal and 
external legitimacy. 
 
 
6.2 ‘EXAMINE AND RESEARCH’ STRATEGY 
One of Sustain’s core strategies articulated in the Alliance’s Theory of Change is to 
“Examine and research” in order to “identify barriers that stand in the way of the 
application of Good Food ideas and seek solutions to remove those barriers” (Sustain 
Ontario, 2013i, p. 6). This strategy includes a range of processes such as engaging in and 
supporting academic and community research partnerships; documenting barriers and 
solutions; and sharing research and information with a variety of internal and external 
stakeholders. Howlett and Ramesh (2003) reinforce the value of disseminating 
information when advocating for policy change. As noted in Chapter 3, ensuring this is 
done in a timely fashion is important (Shields and Evans, 2008).  
 
Collectively, these activities and processes position Sustain as a ‘knowledge broker’ 
(Hargadon, 1998, 2002) as described on page 83. Sustain’s efforts to “examine and 
research” support not only the Alliance’s policy reform efforts, but also inform the work 
members do on the ground, contributing to Sustain’s second long-term goal or outcome: 
“Ontario groups are adapting and adopting feasible, on-the-ground food system solutions, 
and innovations” (Sustain Ontario, 2013i, p.3). In the 2013 member survey, 61% reported 
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that “properly disseminating research and documentation of good food ideas and system 
issues” was one of the unique values Sustain contributes to bringing about a more 
sustainable food and farming system (Nicoara, 2013). Although I’m not sure all would 
agree, one long-term AC member commented during an interview, “Sustain’s most 
fundamental, practical role is to ensure information is shared throughout the province” 
(AC13). 
 
Canada’s food and farming research space is populated by well-established and better 
resourced groups such as the University of Guelph, the George Morris Centre, the 
Pembina Institute, and Nourishing Communities – a ‘sustainable food systems research 
project’ (Nourishing Communities, 2014). Although Sustain has comparatively limited 
capacity to conduct primary research, the Alliance has established relationships with 
researchers and leverages research conducted in Canada and other jurisdictions. Sustain’s 
network(s) makes it uniquely positioned to access and communicate fresh food system 
ideas and translate those ideas into policy solutions that can expand and reframe policy 
discussions.  
 
Sustain’s Acting Director indicated that because the Alliance has limited capacity to 
conduct research he worked to deepen Sustain’s relationships with members of the 
academic community (S5). In 2013, approximately 10% of Sustain’s AC members were 
actively involved in research projects and/or affiliated with academic institutions. Two 
are members of the Nourishing Communities Network, and one of the two suggested 
Sustain could better leverage its research which has a provincial and policy focus 
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(AC15). Other ways Sustain connects with the academic community is by participating in 
research partnerships and through student internships.  
 
6.2.1 Aggregating thought 
Although none of Sustain’s staff members are exclusively focused on research, staff and 
interns regularly aggregate existing research and combine it with knowledge from experts 
within and beyond Sustain’s membership. Two internal stakeholders, as well as two 
policy makers I interviewed, characterize these kinds of processes as ‘aggregating 
thought’ (AC1, S5, PM1, PM2). Sustain’s network linkages give the Alliance easy access 
to a diverse range of experts doing innovative work in sustainable food and farming that 
may be of interest to those in other parts of the province and/or working in government. 
By sharing research and information with policy makers Sustain may trigger Gouldner’s 
(1960, and Cialdini, 2008) principle of ‘reciprocity’ which indicates people are more 
willing to comply with requests from people who have given them something first. 
 
Member of Provincial Parliament (MPP) Michael Mantha acknowledged the value of 
Sustain’s research contributions during parliamentary debates on the second reading of 
the LFA in April 2013 (Mantha, 2013). Sustain’s work, which highlights innovations, 
barriers and potential policy solutions is documented and disseminated in various forms. 
The Alliance’s publications, along with relevant research conducted by other groups, are 
available online for members and the general public. Sustain also shares materials 
directly with external stakeholders including policy makers; I explore this in more detail 
in the next section on government relations.  
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Building on the positive reception of the Metcalf-published “Food Connects Us All” 
paper (Metcalf, 2008a), Sustain’s first Director spearheaded the development of a second 
context paper published in June 2010, “Menu 2020: Ten good food ideas for Ontario” 
(Baker, Campsie and Rabinowicz, 2010). Baker, who co-authored the paper, had just 
completed her PhD prior to joining Sustain and she contributed strong research and 
writing skills. The paper offered thought leadership and a vision for sustainable food and 
farming in Ontario; it highlighted key policy gaps and innovative solutions, and 
reinforced the need for integrated thinking around food and farming. “Menu 2020” 
introduced the concept of a “Farm, Food and Health Act” and perhaps for this reason it 
garnered some positive media attention (Hui, 2010). Both context papers introduced new 
ideas and perspectives to a government that historically listened almost exclusively to 
producers and processors within Ontario’s conventional agriculture system according to a 
representative from the Metcalf Foundation (O4). One of Sustain’s Co-Chairs described 
the two papers as “very conversation-leading” (AC1).  
 
In addition to these two context papers, Sustain documented and disseminated research 
and information in a variety of other forms. This includes the publication of six policy 
backgrounders which supported the Alliance’s LFA recommendations (Good food 
policies – Backgrounders, 2012); six “Policies from the Field” working papers produced 
in collaboration with Canadian Environmental Law Association (CELA) (CELA and 
Sustain Ontario, 2013); multiple webinars which are archived on Sustain’s website (e.g. 
Supply Management 101, Mobile Abattoirs, Beekeeping in Urban Ontario); fifty 
‘Growing Good Food Ideas’ videos (Videos, 2013); and innumerable blog posts.  
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6.2.2 Research and legitimacy 
Awareness of Sustain’s publications was reasonably high among staff I interviewed 
connected to the premier’s office and OMAFRA. Four interviewees (PM1, PM3, PM4, 
PM7) referred back to the two context papers, and six, including one politician (PM1, 
PM3, PM4, PM5, PM6, PM8) referred to the policy backgrounders. One policy maker 
commented that discussions with Sustain, along with the materials the Alliance produced 
helped him better understand “the opportunities… and [gain] more appreciation for the 
complexity and challenges for getting local food on the table, identifying whether food is 
local, and some of the supply chain challenges” (PM3).  
 
Policy makers I interviewed appear to pay attention to the quality of information that 
advocacy groups produce when they assess a group’s credibility and legitimacy. One 
noted that, before meeting with Sustain, “I had a positive impression of the quality of that 
[Menu2020] work” (PM1). Policy makers at OMAFRA and in the premier’s office 
described Sustain’s materials using generalizations such as ‘pretty good’, ‘very good’, 
and ‘thoughtful’ during interviews (PM1, PM3, PM4, PM7). One policy maker from 
OMAFRA suggested the inclusion of more quantifiable statistics and economic data 
around projected costs and potential return on investment would strengthen them (PM4); 
another indicated more comparative analysis is needed (PM7). 
 
One indication that Sustain has acquired some legitimacy in government is the fact that 
OMAFRA funded the ‘Growing Good Food Ideas’ video series under its “Ontario Market 
Investment Fund” program. Government contracts tend to be rigorous and organizations 
must demonstrate they have the capacity to deliver on defined outcomes. According to 
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the Acting Director (S5) and three policy makers from OMAFRA (PM5, PM6, PM7) the 
successful fulfilment of government contracts such as these enhances an organization’s 
legitimacy within government. One policy maker reinforced that building working 
relationships with government is important to build credibility, and that, “in agriculture 
there's a long tradition of agricultural organizations being contracted to provide services 
or perform developmental roles” (PM7). 
 
Levkoe (2014) references Lofland (1996) and Staggenborg’s (2011) findings that 
mobilization is the primary role of a social movement organization. In the next section I 
explore how network members used Sustain’s research and other resources to engage in 
government relations and advocacy.  
 
 
6.3 ‘GOVERNMENT RELATIONS’ STRATEGY 
Sustain’s ‘Government relations’ strategy is designed to encourage “policy-makers and 
politicians to keep food systems reform at the top of their minds, and to understand their 
priorities and the issues they are trying to address” (Sustain Ontario 2013i, p. 7). Sustain 
does this mainly by liaising with policy makers. Working with government is referred to 
as an ‘inside’ strategy (Edgar, 2002, Gormley and Cymrot, 2006). Miller, Razon-Abad, 
Covey and Brown (1994) suggest that selecting such a strategy depends on having access 
to individuals in government, something that may be easier for agencies that receive 
government funding (Edgar, 2002). This underscores the need for an organization that 
engages in government relations to establish and nurture relevant relationships. 
According to the Alliance’s Director, Sustain adopted an inside strategy in part because 
  177 
many of the issues that Sustain advocates for (e.g. government procurement of local 
food) are not necessarily broadly popular among the general public even if they are 
interested in local food (S3). 
 
As a new player in the food and farming policy space, Sustain was initially received by 
government out of a sense of curiosity according to a representative from the Metcalf 
Foundation (O4), and with some suspicion by conventional agriculture groups. As one 
agricultural association director noted, “[his members] don’t think anyone else should 
speak on food and farming issues (O5). The ideas presented in “Food Connects Us All” 
and “Menu 2020” generated interest and helped open the doors of government. 
According to one policy maker and two civil servants at OMAFRA, Sustain arrived to 
“fill a void” at a time when interest in food sources and production practices was growing 
among the general public and especially urban constituents (PM5, PM6, PM7). 
According to one AC member and a policy maker from OMAFRA, The Ministry of 
Agriculture considers its client base to be farmers, rather than the urban population, and 
in 2009 it had few connections outside the conventional agricultural community (AC1, 
PM7). “[Sustain was] well positioned to offer value to government because they connect 
to a different audience…” (PM7).  
 
Three internal stakeholders and one staff member I interviewed described Sustain’s 
approach to government relations as experimental… acting and learning in parallel (AC1, 
AC2, AC7, S3). To date, the Alliance has not formally articulated an advocacy strategy, 
focus or tactics. During interviews Sustain’s Co-Chairs characterized the approach taken 
when building relationships with government as ‘non-partisan’, ‘constructive’ and 
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‘solution-oriented’ (AC1, AC2). They endeavoured to bring all parties fresh perspectives, 
make unusual linkages between issues, and bridge urban and rural perspectives. One 
politician I interviewed reinforced the importance of talking to all parties, noting that 
unlike for-profit interest groups that meet with everyone, “The non-profit world tends to 
think they should meet with friends in government, rather than all parties. It's my 
understanding Sustain has done the hard work to build those bridges, that they talk to all 
parties” (PM8). 
 
6.3.1 Representing Sustain 
As the Alliance’s official spokespeople, Sustain’s Co-Chairs and Director are most 
actively involved in government relations, meeting with policy makers together and 
independently. In 2013, one of the Co-Chairs described the interaction with government 
as an ‘ongoing conversation’; he noted policy makers at OMAFRA have called to seek 
his perspective on how to turn good food ideas into legislation and on specific issues such 
as pollinators (AC1 and email communication May 31, 2014). 
 
Although some AC members indicated during interviews that they engage with local 
policy makers on behalf of their organizations, the Co-Chairs and Director are generally 
seen as the face and voice representing the Alliance. In the 2013 member survey, 64% of 
respondents identified “having positive working relationships with key stakeholders and 
decision makers” as one of the unique values Sustain contributes to bringing about a 
more sustainable food and farming system (Nicoara, 2013).  
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Both Co-Chairs have farming backgrounds and reside in rural communities outside the 
GTA. One is a successful grass-fed beef farmer who transitioned from a conventional 
farming model; the other is the Executive Director of a non-profit organization that 
supports the development of a sustainable rural economy in her community. In selecting 
the Co-Chairs, the AC considered that their backgrounds might help off-set perceptions 
that Sustain represents mainly urban food perspectives, since Sustain’s office and staff 
are based in Toronto (Sustain Ontario, 2011b). One former policy maker from OMAFRA 
indicated the Co-Chairs enhance Sustain’s agricultural credibility (PM9). The Co-Chairs 
have become skilled in bridging different perspectives and framing issues in a way 
government is receptive to (O4). These two individuals play the ‘knowledge broker’ role 
described on page 83. One Co-Chair indicated that, where practical, the Co-Chairs try to 
align Sustain’s proposed solutions with government priorities such as economic 
development (AC1).  
 
Cialdini (2008) identifies six ‘principles of persuasion’ or forms of influence, one of 
which includes ‘similarity and liking’. His research indicates that people are more likely 
to be influenced by people they like and who are somewhat similar to themselves. Policy 
makers at OMAFRA have historically worked with conventional farmers from rural 
communities, so they may recognize more similarity in the Co-Chairs, compared to 
Sustain’s urban-based staff. Two civil servants from OMAFRA I interviewed commented 
on the positive atmosphere and camaraderie they experienced when attending Sustain’s 
events (PM5, PM6). I interpret this as an indication of Sustain’s ‘likeability’.  
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Sustain’s spokespeople reported they attempt to accurately represent members’ common 
interests but that figuring out whose interest, i.e. Sustain broadly, many members, or all 
members, has been a challenge (S3). When a coalition promotes policy solutions to 
government it is useful to be able to describe its constituency. While Sustain can refer 
policy makers to its diverse list of members, the Alliance has not yet developed an 
efficient and effective process for vetting positions. This has made it difficult to 
communicate exactly how many members support a particular position. Director 
Nuaimy-Barker reported she found this aspect of the relationship with members 
disconcerting (S3); it was part of the motivation behind the development of the new 
membership model (see Chapter 5).  
 
6.3.2 Navigating the policy space  
Sustain’s Director and Co-Chairs initially focused their efforts at the political level, 
meeting with decision-makers in the premier’s office and with members of all four 
political parties to explore ideas articulated in the two context papers. At the February 
2012 AC meeting, the Co-Chairs provided an update on work related to the development 
of the LFA and reported that, “Sustain has developed a certain amount of legitimacy 
around Queens Park; government is starting to see Sustain as a constituency [i.e. 
representing the public interest] instead of just advocates” (Sustain Ontario, 2012b). One 
policy maker in the premier’s office echoed this assertion during an interview, noting, 
“the broad, local engagement they have… gives them the reach to give them a significant 
enough voice for us to see them as a credible advocate” (PM3). 
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Two AC members who have extensive experience in policy development and advocacy 
commented that Sustain does not yet have sufficient understanding of how and where 
policy decisions are made in government and how to influence those decisions (AC8, 
AC17). As we saw in Chapter 3, this is true of most Canadian voluntary sector 
organizations (Wyatt and Bourgeois, 2011). I think this reflects not only a lack of skill 
but also the fact that decision-making processes are complex and government is 
influenced by multiple players with diverse interests. One former policy maker, in 
attempting to describe government’s decision-making process, noted that in agriculture 
this includes the politics among commodity groups/concession road farmers, local food 
advocates, and processors. Policy decisions are further complicated by regional diversity 
considerations as well as who policy makers meet with most frequently: “there’s not a 
science to [decision making]… it’s a stew of stuff” (PM9).  
 
The decision to hire an Acting Director from OMAFRA in 2013 while the Director was 
on leave, was partly an attempt to gain a better understanding of how government works. 
One AC member, who has studied and been actively involved in food movement 
advocacy efforts, commented that Sustain’s initial approach of focusing mainly on the 
political layer is “based on old movement assumptions about what effects change” 
(AC8). He suggested that since most food and agriculture issues are not the subject of 
parliamentary discussions (the LFA was an exception), the Alliance should take a more 
tactical and long-term approach, investing time to understand and build relationships with 
bureaucrats since they typically outlast politicians. Two civil servants I interviewed at 
OMAFRA agreed, noting that ultimately civil servants are asked to assess whether policy 
ideas are good or bad (PM5, PM6).  
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Sustain’s government relations consultant presented some principles for Sustain’s future 
government relations work at the November 2012 AC meeting. He indicated that a group 
like Sustain needs to find champions inside government, and “equip bureaucrats to take 
on your cause without you” (Sustain Ontario, 2012d). There are some indications that 
three of the policy makers I interviewed might be considered ‘allies’ as they ensured 
Sustain was invited to participate in key events and relevant consultation processes (PM4, 
PM5, PM6). One of the three indicated he encouraged the Association of Municipalities 
of Ontario to include Sustain in its consultation process on the development of a resource 
guide for municipalities interested in supporting local food (PM4). Once inside 
champions or allies are identified, Moore (2011a) suggests an organization can support 
those individuals in championing a particular issue on its behalf. Regularly sharing 
information and research is one way Sustain does this.   
 
The longer-term, more bureaucratic-focused approach recommended by the AC member 
above is aligned with ‘strategic inquiry’, a government relations process practised and 
articulated by veteran Canadian lobbyist Sean Moore (Makhoul, 2011). This inquiry 
process involves investing time getting to know influential individuals’ priorities and 
values and the public policy context and decision making process, and then gradually 
deepening relationships based on this understanding. The Director reflected that, “we’ve 
been trying to implement strategic inquiry… often in conversations [with government] 
we get too quickly into offering advice, but we’ve been trying to listen” (S3). There are 
some indications that Sustain has succeeded in using this approach; according to a 
political staffer with knowledge of the file, “Sustain found a good balance of being 
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forthright about their agenda and wanting to know about our [government] agenda to see 
how constructively we could work together” (PM1). Engaging in dialogue enables 
Sustain to clarify whose perspectives it represents and the Alliance’s objectives. It 
appears Sustain still has some work to do in this area as two civil servants from 
OMAFRA and one former policy maker I interviewed commented they were somewhat 
unclear about what Sustain really wants (PM5, PM6, PM9).  
 
As the LFA concept gained momentum in 2012, Sustain expanded its government 
relations efforts beyond the premier’s office to the bureaucratic level at OMAFRA. After 
the Acting Director started in spring 2013, he helped Sustain “scale up government 
relations” according to one Co-Chair (AC2), and establish new connections with 
bureaucrats (AC7, S5). The timing was ideal; one policy maker I interviewed indicated, 
“…we are trying to build more of our relationships with groups that have kind of a policy 
development capacity” (PM4). The stronger presence of OMAFRA policy makers at the 
Bring Food Home conference in 2013 may be a reflection of these new connections.  
 
Sustain has been less successful in getting food on other ministries’ agendas, however the 
Alliance have started to develop relationships that it hopes to leverage in future (S3). This 
is largely a reflection of the Alliance’s resource limitations and the fact that other 
ministries do not yet appreciate how systemic food and farming issues relate to their 
priorities. There are some signs this is starting to change – the Ontario Ministry of Health 
and Long-term Care’s Healthy Kids Panel is a cross-ministerial initiative. The group’s 
report acknowledges the need to “change the food environment” in Ontario (Healthy Kids 
Panel, 2013). The Ontario Food and Nutrition Strategy Design Team, which Sustain co-
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leads, convened an inter-ministerial meeting in winter 2013 to brief different ministries 
on the draft OFNS and discuss each ministry’s involvement in food and nutrition 
programming (OCGHEPA, 2013). Two civil servants at OMAFRA reported they assisted 
in convening this event (PM5, PM6); this suggests they appreciate how food issues 
extend beyond the scope of their ministry. According to the primary organizer, many of 
the participants met each other for the first time and indicated they had never previously 
engaged in a focused dialogue (AC4). 
 
The Alliance’s ability to convene a broad range of stakeholders is considered an asset 
according to four policy makers I interviewed (PM1, PM4, PM7, PM8). One from 
OMAFRA indicated Sustain represents a diverse provincial constituency of “smaller 
scale and alternative food and farming actors that OMAFRA lacks connections to” 
(PM7). Other policy makers made similar comments: “It’s terrific to have a group that 
can be a bit of a one-stop shop” (PM4), and “[Sustain] allowed government to take action 
on files because they had done a lot of the brokering of different interests beforehand” 
(PM3). These examples suggest some in government consider Sustain a legitimate voice 
on issues related to local food and farming. OMAFRA also asked Sustain for input and 
assistance as part of two provincial consultation processes in 2012-2013.  
 
Soon after the LFA was adopted, two representatives from OMAFRA consulted with 
Sustain’s AC on the topic of provincial designations and opportunities for local food 
promotion at the November 2013 AC meeting in Windsor. This was part of a larger 
provincial consultation process the government undertook with ‘local food champions 
and thought leaders’. The OMAFRA representatives described the AC consultation as an 
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incredible opportunity, however, based on my observations, the AC did not appear to 
have prepared a strategic response in advance. I do not know how much advance notice 
members received. While the depth of experience and diversity of perspectives in the 
room was evident, it was a fragmented discussion and more concerns were raised than 
possibilities and solutions. This illustrates the challenge Sustain experiences aggregating 
thought and crafting constructive policy solutions that reflect and respect members’ 
diverse interests. In this instance, Sustain appears to have missed an opportunity to 
present a more constructive and strategic collective response and it may have detracted 
somewhat from external legitimacy.  
 
6.3.3 Election campaigns  
Sustain’s first Director formed a Municipal Elections WG in 2010 to inform activities 
and processes leading up to that year’s municipal elections. This group evolved into the 
GRWG and it has been instrumental in shaping and influencing Sustain’s advocacy and 
government relations efforts. Sustain’s 2010 campaign messaging focused on “Putting 
healthy, local, sustainable food on the municipal plate” (Baker, 2010b). Members were 
encouraged to ask local candidates to include farm and food issues in their election 
platforms. A “Municipal Elections Toolkit” developed in partnership with nine member 
organizations highlighted reasons farming and food should be an election priority, as well 
as challenges and opportunities related to the economy, food security and health (Ontario 
elections 2010 toolkit: Putting healthy, local, sustainable food on the municipal plate, 
2010). Sustain advocated for five priorities: Healthy food for all; Viable, sustainable 
farming; Economic development, infrastructure and tourism; Community gardening and 
urban agriculture; and Municipal decision making and governance. The toolkit contained 
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suggestions for planning meetings with candidates and key questions to pose; ideas for 
public events to raise awareness; a declaration for candidates to sign should they get 
elected; and a basic report card. Members around the province engaged in various 
activities including roundtables, panels, candidate debates and education sessions (Baker, 
2010c). 
 
In the lead-up to the 2011 provincial election, the GRWG met regularly to share 
intelligence about what was happening in different parts of the province and design 
campaign tactics. For the provincial election the group refined the 2010 municipal strategy 
and toolkit, building on lessons learned. They articulated key messages around reasons to 
“Vote ON Food and Farming” and questions for members to pose to candidates (see 
postcard below). Director Nuaimy-Barker noted the 2011 election materials reflected 
consensus positions that were widely vetted and supported by members (S3). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.1 Vote ON Food & Farming postcard – front (Vote ON Food & Farming, 2011 
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The 2011 campaign had stronger branding, including attractive design and an online 
presence thanks to a separate Vote ON Food and Farming website (http://voteonfood.ca/) 
that aimed to generate a dialogue and get food and farming onto every party’s platform. 
The website has been maintained post-election as the issues have endured. Content 
includes a blog, educational resources, video messages, and a form letter for individuals 
to tailor and send to their Member of Provincial Parliament (MPP). Staff hosted webinars 
to orient members to the Vote ON materials and messages.  
 
Sustain also surveyed the province’s four parties during the campaign and reviewed their 
policy platforms. The results were incorporated into a report card outlining each party’s 
policy positions (Sustain Ontario, 2011a). This activity, which could be construed as 
‘political’ was one area in which Tides Canada provided guidance to ensure that 
Figure 6.1 Vote ON Food & Farming postcard – back (Vote ON Food & Farming, 2011)  
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Sustain’s activities and processes were non-partisan, in compliance with CRA’s Policy 
Statement on Political Activities for charities (CPS-022) (S3). 
 
Prior to both elections, Sustain educated members on advocacy and government relations. 
In addition to orienting members to the contents of the election toolkits, the Alliance 
hosted webinars including one on public policy advocacy with Sean Moore in 2010 
(Moore, 2010) and another on pre-election strategies in 2011 (Moore, 2011b). Three AC 
members I interviewed indicated that they used the Vote ON materials to engage their 
local politicians in discussions, one for the first time (AC5, AC12, AC14). As part of the 
2011 campaign 11,000 postcards and 2,000 buttons were distributed and Sustain’s 
voteonfood.ca website received approximately 4000 visits; 610 pledges were made in 101 
ridings; and 441 emails were sent in 86 ridings (Sustain Ontario, 2012b).  
 
Sustain’s Director and Co-Chairs met with members of all parties in advance of the 2011 
election to promote the concept of a provincial ‘Farm, Food and Health Act’. It is unclear 
how many members engaged candidates locally, however a political staffer with 
knowledge of the file and one politician I interviewed commented that Sustain’s efforts 
helped put local food on the government’s agenda (PM1, PM2). One speculated that “the 
inclusion of the LFA in the Liberal party’s 2011 election platform was probably a direct 
result of engagement with Sustain” (PM1).  
 
Between election campaigns, it is unclear how frequently members communicate with 
local politicians and policy makers; however 65% of members who responded to the 
2013 member survey indicated their organizations “communicate sustainable food and 
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farming policy solutions to policy makers and decision-makers” (Nicoara, 2013). One 
AC member commented that thanks to his involvement with Sustain and the resources 
developed, in 2012 he was able to share a broader provincial perspective on the LFA Bill 
with his MPP than he had done previously. The discussion was productive and he 
reported Sustain’s policy materials were well received (AC14). His MPP subsequently 
raised some of the issues they discussed in parliamentary discussion, praising Sustain’s 
research and information gathering efforts (Mantha, 2013).  
 
Since the 2011 election, the GRWG continued meeting to discuss strategic opportunities 
related to the LFA. The group shared regional intelligence and strategic insights and 
supported the Director and Co-Chairs’ government relations efforts by helping frame key 
messages (AC7). By 2013 the GRWG was more staff driven although it consisted of 
approximately seven members from different sectors. While the group continued thinking 
strategically about emerging policy opportunities, it was not well-informed about policy 
work underway in other WGs as there was no defined process in place to facilitate 
information exchange between WGs (Sustain Ontario, 2013c). This has resulted in a 
disconnect between WGs and Sustain that stems partly from how Sustain has 
implemented the ‘constellation governance model’. Since not all WGs have an AC 
representative, their primary linkage and accountability to Sustain occurs at the staff 
level. The Chair of the GRWG reported that the group’s next piece of work involves 
developing a government relations strategy in preparation for an anticipated 2014 
provincial election (AC7). This suggests Sustain is becoming more intentional and 
deliberate (Mintzberg, 1987, 1994) in its approach to strategy development, at least in 
this area.  
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6.4 ‘POLICY REFORM’ STRATEGY 
As noted previously, the enactment of new laws, regulations and policies that reflect 
Sustain’s vision is one of Sustain’s two long-term goals. Sustain’s ‘Policy reform’ 
strategy states Sustain will create opportunities for dialogue about food policy (see 
Chapter 5); develop policy papers and positions; and engage in advocacy. In this section I 
focus mainly on processes Sustain has used to develop positions and policy papers since 
advocacy was addressed in the section on government relations.  
 
Sustain’s approach to policy development remains a work in progress. To develop 
integrated solutions to complex food system issues, Sustain engages individuals with 
diverse perspectives in discussion; considers research; identifies proven solutions; and 
aggregates thought. The Alliance promotes a diversity of good food ideas rather than 
advocating for the replication of any single solution. The Acting Director reinforced 
during an interview that Sustain needs to develop “workable solutions”, considering what 
is achievable for government and other actors (S5).   
 
Policy development at Sustain is a collaborative effort involving staff, interns, AC 
members and others. Only a few AC members have extensive experience in policy 
development and promotion. One policy maker observed that in food projects, “people 
are under so much pressure to deliver results to funders there’s little time… [for] meeting 
with politicians let alone thinking how do you scale this up from a community initiative 
to public policy” (PM8). Although Sustain does not have a staff member exclusively 
dedicated to this important function, each of the three Directors indicated they were 
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actively involved in policy development (S3, S5, AC7). The Alliance augments its policy 
development capacity by creating internships for graduate students studying public policy 
and administration. Policy development is also undertaken at the WG level with support 
from staff and interns. One AC member expressed concern about Sustain’s capacity in 
this area, “I worry about policy development and how strong that is… there isn’t one 
person firmly in place focused on that” (AC16).  
 
Sustain’s policy development and promotion work gives the Alliance an opportunity to 
engage policy makers in discussion and enhances its legitimacy in the policy space. 
Despite the aforementioned capacity limitations, Sustain’s contributions to date have 
given others confidence in the Alliance. One political representative noted, “Sustain has 
the capacity, skills and expertise to take what’s being done from an advocacy angle and 
put it into draft policy proposals… A lot of organizations don’t have the capacity to do it” 
(PM2).  
 
The founding group’s early discussions and subsequent discussions at the AC level 
(Sustain Ontario, 2010) generated strategies for policy development and promotion which 
included staying at a broad level, promoting a diversity of solutions, and focusing on big 
picture policy issues where the diverse network might find points of cohesion. The Vote 
ON postcard on pages 186-187 reflects this approach. Sustain uses AC meetings to 
identify policy priorities, but the large group format and diversity of perspectives makes 
it challenging to develop a short list.  
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The “Menu2020” report highlights ten good food ideas and policy-related issues and 
these informed Sustain’s initial policy development efforts. During an interview, the 
Director indicated that the report was not a consensus document and did not capture all 
the nuances around the identified issues (S3). Since that time, Sustain has referred to the 
policy recommendations it promotes as ‘good food ideas’. This positive branding may 
have helped distinguish the Alliance’s ideas from others and make them memorable or 
‘sticky’ (Heath and Heath, 2007). During a 2012 AC meeting participants suggested that 
Sustain should go “through a process to revise good food ideas to connect at a higher 
level of expertise and analysis” (Sustain Ontario, 2012a); based on the information 
gathered, it doesn’t appear the Alliance followed through on this suggestion.  
 
Over the last few years Sustain has been opportunistic in pursuing incremental change by 
focusing on provincial policy-related issues that have traction and that are connected to 
defined opportunities such as scheduled regulatory reviews and consultation processes 
(S3). One example of a regulatory review process that Sustain contributed to was the 
Provincial Policy Statement (PPS) review discussions. The PPS, which is reviewed every 
five years, provides direction to the province on questions of land use planning and 
development. Staff from Sustain attended workshops, educated members about the 
process, and provided input to a senior policy advisor on a 2012 draft (Young and Yang, 
2012). Sustain’s staff and several member organizations made formal submissions 
requesting changes. In April 2013, Sustain submitted a joint letter outlining concerns 
about proposed revisions with 15 other environmental and agricultural groups. The letter 
was sent to the premier, the Minister of Municipal Affairs and Housing and the minster of 
Natural Resources (Singh, 2013a). 
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One intern and two staff members commented that to date, Sustain’s approach to policy 
development has been largely ‘ad hoc’ and reactive, driven by emerging external 
opportunities (S2, S3, S4). At this stage in Sustain’s development, as relative newcomers 
in the policy space, focusing on such ‘windows of opportunity’ (Kingdon, 2003), seems 
to have been an effective tactic. The AC raised the question of whether Sustain should be 
more deliberate and focus on one issue rather than taking a piecemeal approach (Sustain 
Ontario, 2012a). I did not find any evidence that the Alliance adapted its approach in 
response to the AC’s question. 
 
The approach above reflects an ‘emergent’ approach to strategy, something that 
researchers such as Mintzberg (1987, 1994) suggest is important in an environment that is 
constantly changing. Sustain’s broad network of members are well-positioned to identify 
shifts and opportunities so remaining open to what emerges may continue to be an 
important aspect of Sustain’s approach to policy development. Sustain’s Director and 
Acting Director both indicated during interviews that Sustain’s approach lacks a more 
integrated and deliberate policy development strategy, such as an overarching map 
outlining which food and agriculture issues to intervene in over the short, medium and 
long term in order to transform the provincial food system (S5, S3).  
 
The Ontario Food and Nutrition Strategy (OFNS) Design Team/WG pre-dates Sustain. 
Originally the group consisted primarily of health sector organizations (such as the Heart 
& Stroke Foundation and Cancer Care Ontario) interested in developing a provincial 
strategy to improve the health and nutrition of Ontarians. The Team invited Sustain’s 
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Director to participate, and shortly after, Sustain assumed a kind of secretariat role for the 
group. The Design Team has evolved into a form of WG (Sustain at times refers to it as 
such) although it maintains a distinct identity. 
 
With the group’s encouragement, Sustain’s Director invited other members to participate 
and this expanded the group’s diversity and collective understanding of the 
interconnectedness of nutrition and broader food system issues. The Design Team 
attempted to map out the diverse provincial food system issues requiring intervention, 
beyond nutrition as the ‘Ontario Food and Nutrition Strategy’ (OFNS). Although the 
group solicited input on the strategy from Sustain’s broader membership (Sustain 
facilitated this consultation), buy-in has been limited. It is unclear if the Design Team 
will be able to articulate a strategy that Sustain’s members will be willing to support, or 
whether the OFNS might be used to focus Sustain’s work and the work of its members.  
 
In late 2013 the Design Team/WG was considering adopting Kania and Kramer’s (2011) 
‘collective impact’ approach. The authors define collective impact as: “the commitment 
of a group of important actors from different sectors to a common agenda for solving a 
specific social problem” (ibid: 36). Successful collective impact initiatives have five 
conditions: a common agenda; shared measurement systems; mutually reinforcing 
activities; continuous communication; and a backbone support organization. As noted in 
Chapter 5, as a PNO Sustain fulfills many of the functions of a backbone organization, 
particularly when supporting WGs.  
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6.4.1 Taking positions 
Some long-term AC members have argued that to grow a large enough ‘tent’ for the 
Alliance, Sustain should hold no positions (S5). Rather than advocating for a particular 
position, some suggest Sustain should research and document issues to help others better 
understand the impacts of different options. During an interview as part of the evaluation 
process, the Director indicated, “Sustain can’t really take positions on things, but 
sometimes it feels like that’s the way to do things. Who gets to say what, when, where, 
why and how is a really big challenge” (Vu Nguyen, 2013). The Acting Director 
questioned this approach saying, “I don’t know how you’re going to be an effective 
advocacy group without holding positions” (S5).  
 
The AC discussed the question of position-taking at the February, 2012 AC meeting and 
concluded, “we are a mixed model – constellations and consensus. Where there is 
agreement we take a position; where there is disagreement we create space for 
conversation and for groups to self-organize” (Sustain Ontario, 2012a). The “Our work” 
section of Sustain’s website profiles WGs (some of which focus on policy issues such as 
meat regulations), as well as policy issues and campaigns that Sustain and other groups 
have advocated for. Up to 2013, Sustain promoted some broad policy recommendations 
which were widely supported, but shied away from formally articulating highly specific 
positions. 
 
According to staff, Sustain lacks a clear and rigorous process for analyzing and 
articulating issues, developing a position, and assessing the degree of support among 
members, particularly those who are not part of the AC (S3, S4). In 2012 the AC 
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reinforced the need to support small groups in taking action without the support of all 
members, however at least one AC member thinks consensus is critical when it comes to 
taking positions. “I never could figure out how you could, how Sustain Ontario could, 
stand up and support particular policies if people weren’t agreeing on those policies… 
We have to find a way to ensure that whatever policies are being promoted by Sustain in 
fact are being supported by all members” (AC13). This is an area where greater 
institutionalization around a position-taking process may be desirable from the 
perspective of internal legitimacy.  
 
Position-taking to date has been largely ad-hoc as an effective process has not been 
identified and the ultimate decision-maker remains unclear. The Director noted, “I never 
know… do I get to make this call? Do I have to vet it again? Where does the vetting stop, 
who makes the final decision?” (S3). As an example, she described the development of 
the backgrounder on ecological goods and services. Sustain was unable to satisfactorily 
address the concerns of one member who had strong opinions. Sustain went through a 
process with a lot of people “to negotiate something that everybody could be on the same 
page with, but we didn't get it right… there was no directed process and there was no rule 
around how we had to come up with it, and in the end the member ended up publicly 
criticizing the policy position” (S3). This illustrates how difficult it can be to negotiate 
agreement among such a diverse group of members. In this instance, the absence of a 
defined process likely detracted from internal and external legitimacy. 
 
When a provincial food and agriculture issue is acknowledged by government, in new 
research, or captures public attention, staff try to ‘take the pulse’ on the issue with 
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members to determine whether Sustain should take a stance on it, and what that position 
should be (S4). Director Nuaimy-Barker reported that efforts to get people on the same 
page is “of huge value… we often get to a place where we get to positions we agree on, 
[but] it takes a lot of doing, and dialogue, to get there” (S3). Levkoe (2014) reports that 
all the PNOs he studied spent significant time negotiating with members.  
 
In some cases, emerging issues are not yet ripe for action inside or outside the Alliance. 
When there is limited awareness and understanding or disagreement on an issue, as was 
the case with raw milk (the question of legalizing the sale of raw milk received 
significant media attention in Ontario in 2011 – see for example, Abma, 2011), staff 
sometime create educational opportunities for members. This may take the form of 
webinars, the dissemination of information and research, or conference presentations. 
This approach reflects an assumption that education and dialogue leads to a more 
nuanced understanding and that through such a process members might eventually find 
common ground.  
 
On issues that are ripe for action, but that are particularly divisive for members, Sustain 
sometimes opts for a neutral position. This can involve highlighting different perspectives 
and outlining where an issue needs to move without saying how exactly (S4); or standing 
back and leaving an issue to others (AC6). Other groups periodically approach Sustain to 
formally ‘endorse’ their campaigns and in some cases, Sustain has agreed to do so.  
 
One example of this relates to a decision on whether Sustain should endorse Food and 
Water First’s campaign to protect Class 1 farmland. OMAFRA describes Class 1 
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farmland as having “the highest capability to support agricultural land use activities” 
(OMAFRA, 2014b). This class of land represents a very small proportion of arable land 
in Ontario, most of which surrounds the GTA, an area at the greatest risk from urban 
sprawl. Given that the definition of ‘prime agricultural land’ includes at least Class 1 
through 3 land (Provincial Policy Statement, 2005), and much of Ontario’s food 
production occurs on land that is not Class 1, it could be argued that this is too narrow to 
represent the interests of stakeholders across the province. Prior to this Sustain had 
advocated more broadly for farmland preservation (see Vote ON postcard on pages 186-
187). 
 
After reaching out to AC members for guidance, rather than formally endorsing the 
campaign, staff opted for a compromise approach, profiling Food and Water First’s 
campaign on Sustain’s website under ‘Related Campaigns’ (Related campaigns, 2013). 
Other examples of related campaigns Sustain has profiled include “Fair Wages Now”, 
“We Want Northern Chicken” and “Save the Bees”. The range illustrates the diversity of 
issues Sustain’s members are interested in.  
 
Sustain does not define ‘Related Campaigns’ on its website. The content describing 
related campaigns typically replicates messages from the campaign source and includes 
links to more information and in some cases an opportunity to pledge support. Sustain 
does not provide context indicating why the Alliance has included a particular campaign, 
or Sustain’s position vis-à-vis each campaign issue. This appears to be a missed 
opportunity to enrich the dialogue around each issue, many of which are more nuanced 
than they are framed in the campaigns. In the absence of an explanation, site visitors and 
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external stakeholders might mistakenly conclude that Sustain does endorse related 
campaigns (AC7, S5). Associating the Alliance even loosely with specific issues and 
related campaigns has potential implications for Sustain’s internal and external 
legitimacy, both positive and negative.  
 
One AC member and one former policy maker I interviewed suggested that obtaining 
support for Sustain’s positions from groups that have more political power, such as large 
farm organizations, would demonstrate greater policy strength and increase Sustain’s 
influence (AC5, PM10). Cultivating public support is another area of consideration. As 
one policy maker representing a political perspective noted, “You can write the best 
policies in the world, and they’re not going to go anywhere if there is no political power 
behind them… that political power comes from the ability to move and influence votes” 
(PM2). Another policy maker suggested that if Sustain wants to shift a food system that is 
dominated by large conventional actors the Alliance might consider working more 
closely with those actors (PM3). He cited the example of American environmentalists 
that worked with large corporations (e.g. Adam Werbach, the former President of the 
Sierra Club, who consulted to Wal-Mart on sustainability; and The Environmental 
Defense Fund’s collaboration with McDonalds to improve the sustainability of retail and 
fast food practices). 
 
Sustain did find common ground with conventional farm groups on some issues, for 
example incorporating food literacy into the LFA. The Director noted, “it can be easy to 
be aligned with other groups until it gets to a certain point… [for example] sustainability 
has been defined in a way we and more conventional groups can agree on, but it breaks 
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down at the level of practice” (S3). Although the Alliance has engaged most agricultural 
groups in conversation, to date Sustain has not invested significant energy in trying to 
bring these groups into the tent. One AC member noted that “it can be hard to get some 
major agricultural voices to the table… they’re not ready for the collaborative dynamic 
Sustain has created where you sit at the table and provide your best input, but there’s no 
vote after” (AC6). He added that Sustain’s consensus orientation contrasts sharply with 
the culture of traditional farm organizations that tend to “be majoritarian oriented… 
voting on issues”. As noted above and in Chapter 5, some external stakeholders have 
suggested that finding ways to engage such groups in dialogue would benefit both sides.   
 
6.4.2 The Local Food Act 
The LFA is one example of an emergent opportunity that Sustain seized. Two policy 
makers suggested Sustain helped create this opportunity by promoting the concept of an 
Act in the “Menu2020” report and through efforts leading up to the 2011 provincial 
election (PM1, PM2). Sustain produced a series of ‘good food policies’ related to 
education, health and the economy and encouraged members to promote these in their 
communities (Good food policies by sector, 2011). The concept of a local food act, and 
the Act, once introduced, gave the Alliance a clear focus for its government relations and 
policy development efforts in 2011-2013. It was ideal because the Act was provincial in 
scope and all members could buy into it on some level and advocate for it in their own 
communities. 
 
During the 2011 election, the Liberal party included the concept of a ‘Local Food Act’ in 
their 2011-2015 Plan (Liberal Party of Ontario, 2011). The Liberals subsequently won a 
  201 
minority government and began working on the Act soon after. Then Minster of 
Agriculture, Ted McMeekin, eventually introduced the Act in October 2012 as Bill 130 
“An Act to enact the Local Food Act, 2012”.  
 
In February 2012 two representatives of OMAFRA met with Sustain’s AC to better 
understand Sustain and how the network might contribute to the development of the LFA. 
They encouraged Sustain to gather research and consult with provincial members to 
identify regional barriers and solutions. They requested Sustain submit recommendations 
on the LFA by late summer (Sustain Ontario, 2012a).  
 
Sustain subsequently designed a process to engage its membership in an expansive online 
and offline consultation process. While the process was ultimately effective from the 
perspective of engaging members and gathering input, it was challenging to implement 
given available time and resources. In addition to being time-consuming to aggregate and 
integrate the diverse feedback received, distilling it into recommendations that all could 
support was a significant challenge. The inclusivity of the process enhanced legitimacy 
internally and externally, however with limited resources, staff acknowledged future 
processes must be more efficient and effective (S3). This desire to balance inclusivity and 
efficiency is another example of a common network tension identified by Provan and 
Kenis (2008). 
 
During the summer of 2012, staff assembled writing teams to develop six ‘policy 
backgrounders’ on issues identified through the consultation process. Topics included 
ecological goods and services; food literacy, student nutrition and food services in 
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school; institutional procurement; land use planning; and forest and freshwater foods (the 
last backgrounder was developed in collaboration with the True North Community Co-
operative, Ontario Nature, and Environment North). Teams included a draft writer (an 
AC, staff member or intern), and 5-10 content experts and thought leaders (mainly AC 
members). The draft writers solicited input from experts, reviewed literature, sought out 
examples of innovative solutions in Ontario and beyond, and developed a draft document 
for their team and the Director to review and refine. The six backgrounders had a similar 
format and were produced in approximately two months. Drafts were posted on Sustain’s 
website for visitors to comment on (Good food policies – Backgrounders, 2012); 
feedback was incorporated into the final versions disseminated to policy makers.  
 
One of Sustain’s AC members is the Executive Director of Canadian Environmental Law 
Association (CELA). Her involvement led to an extended collaboration between Sustain 
and CELA on policy development and promotion around the LFA (AC3). Staff from the 
two organizations worked together on the development of a ‘Statement of purpose’ for 
the Act (Sustain Ontario, 2012c) which was endorsed by ninety groups/organizations out 
of Sustain’s then approximately 380 members (many of whom were individuals), and an 
accompanying set of ‘Drafting notes’ to inform government discussions (Sustain Ontario 
and CELA, 2012). This collaboration leveraged Sustain’s members’ knowledge of food 
and agriculture issues and CELA’s knowledge of the legislative drafting process and 
experience writing content for government. The collaboration was described by both 
parties as mutually beneficial: it extended Sustain’s policy development capacity while 
CELA’s staff expanded their understanding of the complexity and range of food system 
issues (AC3, S3). In early 2013, CELA and Sustain co-published a series of six ‘Policies 
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from the Field’ reports profiling promising policies from other jurisdictions (CELA and 
Sustain Ontario, 2013). According to two representatives from CELA, the topics were 
identified through the consultation with Sustain’s members above (O2, O3). These 
included increasing access to local food; innovative financing for food and farm; and 
preserving agricultural land for local food production. Both organizations posted the 
documents on their website which expanded their accessibility and visibility.  
 
In February 2013, supported by a grant from Metcalf, CELA drafted a substantive 
‘Model bill’ that reinforced the need for targets, accountability, public participation, and 
government coordination of local food (CELA, 2013). Their mandate was to create a 
politically feasible bill (O2, O3). Short timelines made a second consultation with 
Sustain’s membership impossible and so although the model bill drew on the 
foundational work done with Sustain, it was not co-branded with, or endorsed by, 
Sustain. Despite this, according to two CELA staff members, in meetings with 
government CELA acknowledged its collaborative relationship with Sustain (O2, O3).  
 
6.4.3 Perspectives on Sustain’s policy work  
Responses to Sustain’s materials and policy recommendations were mixed. On the 
positive side, all interviewees described Sustain’s materials as generally good; one 
commended Sustain for being ‘more evidence- than ideologically-based’ (PM1). When 
asked to comment on the viability of the Alliance’s policy recommendations, those I 
interviewed indicated they were ‘mostly viable’. One policy maker in the premier’s office 
noted that Sustain was “one of the top three groups” government went to on the 
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development of the LFA. When I asked about others, he said, they really were “the go-to 
group” (PC3). 
 
Some policy makers indicated there is room for improvement. One noted that some of the 
content proposed for the LFA might have been better matched to other policy levers 
(PM4). For example, he suggested food literacy issues might be more appropriately 
addressed at a programmatic level than a legislative level. Another former policy maker 
commented that one of Sustain’s recommendations related to procurement was seen as 
potentially conflicting with interprovincial and international trade rules (PM10). Later in 
the interview he noted that, Sustain in some cases:  
communicated ideas that are sort of non-starters with the government… [that 
can give] government the impression that they don’t understand policy making, 
that they don’t understand the government’s limitations. And to a certain 
degree, any good advocacy NGO pushes things that might be non-starters with 
government… but you only do that when you have to do it, when the 
government is at odds with your agenda and you have no other choice.  
 
These examples may explain why two civil servants and two policy makers raised 
questions about Sustain’s policy acuity during interviews (PM5, PM6, PM7, PM9). Other 
policy makers were more forgiving, acknowledging that Sustain is new to this kind of 
work (PM3, PM4). This suggests Sustain, as new actors in the policy space, may have 
benefitted from a kind of ‘honeymoon period’.  
 
Although Sustain was aware that some ‘asks’ were aspirational and extended beyond the 
scope of an Act, the Alliance choose to use the opportunity to highlight five major issues 
along with a range of related solutions. Director Nuaimy-Barker described the process of 
identifying what to advocate for as a “really careful balancing act, because we don’t want 
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to delegitimize ourselves” (S3). She indicated Sustain attempted to articulate asks that 
were reasonable but which would move government somewhat “beyond their comfort 
zone”, and “seed ideas for the next round”. One policy maker noted that some of 
Sustain’s ideas have been “placed on the policy shelf… until another window of 
opportunity opens” (PM4). I think this is an indication that Sustain’s approach of 
presenting a broad range of solutions may eventually bear fruit.  
 
Two civil servants and two policy makers I interviewed, including one political 
representative, indicated government expects advocates to be clear about their priorities, 
ideally bringing their ‘top three’ asks (PM7, PM8, PM9, PM10). The civil servants 
reinforced that government has difficulty dealing with groups that are “trying to be all 
things to all people” (PM5, PM6). Sustain was not willing to reduce its ‘asks’ to three, 
and that left two policy makers (PM7, PM9) and two civil servants (PM5, PM6) I 
interviewed wondering what Sustain really wants. 
 
According to the Director, Sustain found it challenging to restrict the number of LFA 
recommendations because priorities shifted continuously as new input and advice was 
received from diverse members and other advisors concerning issues and tactics (S3). 
She explained that draft recommendations were first reviewed and refined by the AC; the 
group provided critical feedback on clarity, language and helped assess the degree of 
consensus. The Alliance also engaged a government relations consultant to help frame its 
final recommendations and staff reported the guidance he provided was valuable (S3). 
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Following a Liberal leadership racer, in March 2013 the Liberal government re-
introduced the LFA as Bill 36 – An Act to enact the Local Food Act, 2013. Shortly after, 
Sustain and ten other organizations (including two large conventional agricultural 
associations) collaborated on a submission of recommended amendments. Committee 
hearings were held in the fall of 2013 and several amendments were subsequently 
introduced such as “a requirement that the Minister shall establish goals or targets to 
aspire to in the areas of improving food literacy in respect of local food…” (Singh, 
2013c). Targets were something that Sustain had advocated for inclusion from the start 
(S3).  
 
Another amendment formally acknowledged forest and freshwater food in the definition 
of ‘local’, an issue First Nations groups had tried unsuccessfully to bring attention to for 
years. At the November 2013 AC meeting that I observed, one member credited the 
Alliance’s efforts for this ‘win’ as he believed that without Sustain’s support, forest and 
freshwater foods might have been overlooked again. It seems possible that Sustain’s 
collaboration with other groups on a policy backgrounder about this topic (see page 202) 
demonstrated broad support and reinforced the case for this amendment.  
 
Sustain and its members engaged politicians from all parties and policy makers at OMAFRA 
in discussions about possible content for an Act in 2012-2013. The amended Act was passed 
by a unanimous vote on November 5, 2013 (Bill 36, 2013). In a blog post, Sustain heralded 
this as a victory for local food (Singh, 2013c). The LFA does not address the sustainable 
                                                 
r The Liberal Premier, Dalton McGuinty resigned in October 2012 and the Liberals subsequently initiated a 
leadership race to replace him. During that time Ontario’s Legislative Assembly was prorogued and all bills 
in process ‘died’, including Bill 130, Promoting Local Food Act, 2012.  
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dimensions of local food, so many members considered it only a partial victory. Despite that 
shortcoming, the Act is widely considered an enabling platform upon which to implement a 
variety of solutions (Sustain Ontario, 2013c). According to one Co-Chair the definition of 
sustainability remains a topic of ongoing discussion with government (email communication 
May 31, 2014). One AC member commented, with respect to the LFA, “it made us realize 
collectively as a sector, movement, network, we can put things out there and they will be 
considered, if we have ideas, and if we frame them properly, they will be picked up” (AC7).  
 
6.5 IN SUMMARY  
This chapter illustrates some of the interconnections that exist between structures, 
strategies and processes as illustrated by the infinity symbol in Figure 4.1. Sustain’s 
‘Examine and research’ strategy contributed positively to the Alliance’s external 
legitimacy with policy makers. Efforts in this area helped the Alliance acquire positive 
external profile and assisted Sustain in bringing diverse perspectives to the policy table. 
This work was foundational to the development of viable policy solutions and it 
contributed to the adaptation and implementation of solutions and innovation on the 
ground (Sustain’s second long-term goal or outcome).  
 
Although research is an important foundation for policy development and government 
relations, by 2013, Sustain’s capacity to ‘conduct’ research remained limited from a 
structural (i.e. member and staff) perspective. To date, much of what the Alliance 
characterizes as research might more accurately be termed knowledge translation. Other 
organizations and institutions in Ontario (e.g. Nourishing Ontario and universities) have 
significantly greater capacity to conduct research. As noted previously, the Acting 
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Director was attempting to expand and strengthen relationships with external researchers; 
this might prove to be a useful strategy leading to mutually beneficial partnerships. 
Researchers might be interested in working with Sustain’s members to better understand 
local food system challenges and innovations. This local data, in the hands of highly 
skilled, better resourced researchers, might produce research that policy makers would 
consider highly legitimate.  
 
The Alliance’s campaign work on the 2010 municipal elections in various communities 
and the 2011 provincial election expanded awareness of Sustain’s vision for local, 
sustainable food and farming in communities around Ontario and among municipal and 
provincial candidates. One policy maker, a political representative (PM8), reported that 
while he regularly hears from industry groups during campaigns and between elections, 
he rarely hears from representatives of non-profit organizations. Sustain’s campaign work 
encouraged and enabled members to engage local politicians and policy makers in 
constructive dialogue informed by research. 
 
Sustain’s approach to government relations exemplifies an emergent process and strategy 
characterized by ongoing learning and adaptation. Sustain’s staff and GRWG regularly 
reflected on what worked and the shifting environment, and adapted strategies and 
tactics. This illustrates how some choices may be more appropriate under certain 
conditions and points in time than others, and that choices may need to be re-made 
periodically. The issue-focused and government relations education Sustain delivered to 
members, along with research findings strengthened members’ motivation and capacity 
to engage in advocacy and government relations work. One Co-Chair noted, “Members 
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are not quiet, they do their own advocacy. I think the value of Sustain, [of] coming out to 
the AC, and conference, helps them contextualize [their work] and tell a better story” 
(AC1).  
 
Sustain’s large, diverse provincial membership played an important role in its policy 
development and government relations strategies. As Sustain formalizes its membership 
model, the number, and possibly the regional distribution, of its membership is likely to 
shrink. Come future elections, Sustain may find it more challenging to have a local 
presence in communities around the province. Sustain may need to develop new 
processes to enlist the help of former members (i.e. those who are no longer eligible for 
membership) and other ‘supporters’ in future government relations and policy 
development work.  
 
The Alliance took advantage of the interest Sustain’s publications garnered at the 
political level to get local food and farming on the government agenda and then leveraged 
subsequent opportunities to engage policy makers in dialogue. After the concept of a 
LFA took root, Sustain responded to feedback received from internal and external 
‘experts’ and shifted the focus of its government relations work from the political level to 
the bureaucratic level. This approach seems to have served the Alliance well and has kept 
Sustain’s members engaged in government discussions on local, sustainable food and 
farming.  
 
Sustain’s ability to aggregate thought is valued, however this work depends on the 
Alliance’s ability to develop efficient and effective processes to consult with members, 
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find common ground or consensus, and craft viable positions. To date, agreeing on 
positions has been challenging, and it is not yet clear if the new decision-making process 
(see Chapter 5) will facilitate this. From a structural point of view, the 40-member AC 
may be too large and diverse a group to set priorities and make decisions in a timely way.  
 
The LFA consumed much of Sustain’s attention and energy from 2010-2013 and it 
focused the Alliance’s government relations and policy development work. Thanks in 
part to work related to the LFA, government (and bureaucrats at OMAFRA) increasingly 
looks to Sustain as an aggregator of thought, and to Alliance members for perspectives on 
local food and farming issues. Having a clear focus for government relations and policy 
development was useful given Sustain’s capacity limitations and learning curve as new 
actors in the policy space.  
 
The LFA primarily concerned one Ministry, OMAFRA, and this allowed Sustain to focus 
its government relations efforts in one place as the Alliance experimented and learned 
how to navigate the policy space. While Sustain appreciates that sustainable food and 
farming issues need to be addressed by other ministries, time and resource limitations 
precluded Sustain from developing extensive relationships with other government 
ministries. To enhance the sustainability of Ontario’s food system Sustain will need to 
leverage its experience working with OMAFRA and expand its government relations 
efforts to other ministries in future. Since different ministries have different cultures and 
values, Sustain may need to adapt its strategies and processes.  
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The LFA appears to have been a ‘glue’ that unified, at least to some extent, Sustain’s 
membership and helped align their collective interests. Going forward, government, and 
particularly OMAFRA, will likely expect Sustain to have a position on a wide variety of 
food and farming issues. These issues may be more regional or niche-like than the LFA 
and be relevant only to a sub-set of members (as was the case with flocking options). 
Whether Sustain will have the right, or sufficient numbers of members involved to take 
informed positions on these issues is unclear. Sustain may need to develop relationships 
with, and enlist the support of, a broader range of expertise outside its formal 
membership. In 2013 Sustain was just developing a process to understand and 
communicate which members endorse particular positions. This process will need to be 
inclusive and efficient so Sustain can respond in a timely way.     
 
During these formative years, Sustain experimented continuously and reflected on and 
evolved it strategies and processes related to policy development and promotion. The 
Alliance’s member consultation processes needs to continue to evolve to more optimally 
balance inclusion and efficiency. Designing effective processes for establishing priorities 
and defining positions requires additional experimentation and continued negotiation. 
Whether consensus will be the most appropriate approach to decision-making in every 
instance is unclear, it may not always be necessary. Greater clarity around such processes 
will give members more confidence in Sustain, enhance internal legitimacy, and assist the 
Alliance in more clearly communicating its priorities and positions externally.  
 
Sustain’s ability to frame ideas, support them with evidence, and align them with 
government priorities enabled government to ‘hear’ them. As one policy maker in the 
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premier’s office stated, “The way they develop policy is helpful… their tone and tenor is 
helpful… the way they develop their pieces, their policy work and communications is just 
a very user-friendly approach” (PM3). A political staffer with knowledge of the file noted 
that Sustain’s ‘social enterprise’ mindset and framing was well-aligned with the Liberal 
government (PM1). Carter (2011) reinforces that being philosophically aligned with the 
party in power is helpful.  
 
One policy-maker indicated government is interested in bridging urban and rural 
interests, and Sustain appears well-positioned to help (PM7). To date, Sustain has not 
emphasized consumer and urban perspectives, perhaps because the Alliance has tried to 
position itself as a provincial network concerned with sustainable food and farming. Or 
perhaps it is because at this stage, its members are concerned about addressing issues that 
are less consumer-oriented. Adopting more of a consumer focus going forward represents 
a strategic choice, one that may be more difficult to make after the new membership 
model is introduced, since individuals will only be eligible to become non-voting 
‘supporters’.  
 
Swings in public interest and opinion related to local, sustainable food will continue to 
affect government’s interest in the issues Sustain and its members are working on. 
Whether public interest remains high is not clear, however Sustain seemed to benefit 
from this when first entering the policy space. This suggests in future it might be helpful, 
or even necessary, to develop strategies and processes to engage the public to help keep 
local, sustainable food and farming top of mind and on governments’ agendas. 
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The Director, in reflecting on how conversations have evolved, inside and outside of 
Sustain, since she arrived, said, “I think we’ve successfully changed the way people 
understand food systems… [there is a] different understanding, a more expansive 
understanding of food systems…” (S3). This, in and of itself, is a significant 
accomplishment which represents a solid foundation for Sustain to build on. 
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CHAPTER 7: CASE DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS 
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
My research examined Sustain’s formation and formative years. Sustain structured and 
wove a diverse, cross-sectoral network as a vehicle to influence public policy related to 
food and farming in the province of Ontario. Because Sustain is a network, and a network 
administrative organization (Provan and Kenis, 2008, see page 52), it is important to 
analyze the network as a whole. Plastrik and Taylor (2006) suggest the evaluation of 
networks should consider progress in network development as well as in network-related 
outcomes.  
 
In this chapter I assess Sustain’s network development and progress toward the 
Alliance’s long-term policy reform goal or outcome, “New laws, regulations and policies 
are enacted and implemented that reflect Sustain’s vision” (Sustain, 2013i, p. 3). I do so 
by examining the Alliance’s policy contributions in an attempt to assess its influence on 
policy reform. As Sustain’s overarching objective of positive food system change is a 
long-term outcome and it is still early days, I do not attempt to assess the Alliance’s 
success at that level.  
 
Table 7.1, Framework for discussion, on the next page is an adaptation of Plastrik and 
Taylor’s work on network evaluation (2006) and their Network Health scorecard (2009). 
The table outlines the flow of the discussion and analysis in this chapter. Plastrik and 
Taylor’s scorecard evaluates network health in four dimensions: network purpose, 
performance, operations and capacity. Although this appears to broadly address most 
dimensions of network health, I added ‘strategy’ to purpose and ‘response to tensions’ 
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based on Provan and Kenis’ (2008) work as it seems Sustain’s response to tensions 
impacted the Alliance’s network health and development. In my analysis of these 
dimensions I introduced some factors that were not identified in the scorecard – e.g. staff 
skills and adaptive capacity as part of capacity.  
 
Table 7.1, Framework for discussion 
PROGRESS IN 
NETWORK 
DEVELOPMENT 
NETWORK 
CONNECTIVITY 
Network structure and evolution 
Linkages 
Information flow 
NETWORK 
HEALTH 
Purpose and 
Strategy 
Clarity 
Strategy  
 
Capacity 
Members – skills and 
connections 
Staff – skills  
Funding – sustainability 
Adaptive capacity 
 
 
Performance  
Joint work 
New knowledge and 
insights 
Value created 
Achieving more than a 
single organization 
 
Operational 
Processes 
Internal communication 
Engagement 
Accountability 
mechanisms 
Decision-making 
Response to 
tensions 
Flexibility vs. stability 
Efficiency vs. 
inclusiveness 
Internal vs. external 
legitimacy 
PROGRESS IN 
NETWORK-
RELATED 
OUTCOMES 
POLICY 
INFLUENCE 
Forms of influence 
LFA 
Other policy areas 
 
Approximately four years into its journey Sustain has experienced a variety of successes 
in terms of cultivating a healthy network, generating internal and external legitimacy, and 
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influencing public policy. In this chapter I explore the factors in the right side of the chart 
above to assess Sustain’s progress in both network development and network-related 
outcomes. In chapters 5 and 6 I identified factors that contributed to, and detracted from, 
Sustain’s internal and external legitimacy. Although Sustain does not identify legitimacy 
as an outcome, the literature I reviewed indicates it impacts a coalition’s ability to have 
influence. In this chapter I analyze whether Sustain employed ‘inside-out’ and/or 
‘outside-in’ strategies to build legitimacy since Human and Provan (2010) indicate both 
are important. In Chapter 8 I go on to identify key factors that other policy-focused 
coalitions and networks should be mindful of based on Sustain’s experience. 
 
7.2 DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS 
Growing academic and community interest in social networks reflects, in part, a 
recognition that networks offer some distinct benefits compared with other forms of 
organizing. Some characterize this as the potential to generate ‘network effects’.  
 
We have seen, for instance, that some networks unleash effects that have great 
power to innovate, disturb, ignite, and dramatically change systems. This 
power depends on balancing the underlying tensions of networks in ways that 
do not settle permanently on too much order or too much chaos, but instead 
“spiral” between these states…. most people seem to want to build networks 
that they can control, stabilize, and use instrumentally for their own ends. 
Thus, they may end up sacrificing much of the power that networks can 
unleash. Their more “conservative” networks tend to become more like 
organizations over time. ~ Plastrik and Taylor, 2010, p. 24. 
 
The ability to achieve network effects appears related to network connectivity and health. 
As noted in Chapter 3, Plastrik and Taylor (2010) identify four network effects that non-
profit networks may want to pursue: rapid growth and diffusion, small-world reach, 
adaptive capacity, and resilience. I highlight evidence that suggests the Alliance achieved 
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these effects. Sustain selected and implemented structures, strategies and processes to 
establish and strengthen connections between members. There are indications that the 
network is reasonably healthy. I also revisit some of the network tensions that Sustain 
encountered and how the Alliance responded to those.  
 
7.3 PROGRESS IN NETWORK DEVELOPMENT: NETWORK CONNECTIVITY 
In Chapter 5, I described Sustain’s ‘network organization structure’ to illustrate the roles, 
responsibilities and interconnectedness of different network structures. In this section, I 
analyze the Alliance’s ‘network structure’ as defined by researchers who study social 
networks (Granovetter, 1973, Burt, 1992) and social movement networks (Diani, 2003, 
Krebs and Holley, 2002, Plastrik and Taylor, 2006). I examine how choices Sustain made 
in structuring the network, and the weaving and convening strategies and processes the 
Alliance implemented, enhanced network connectivity. 
 
Plastrik and Taylor (2010) use the word ‘connectivity’ to describe a network’s structure, 
as well as the things that can travel through established ‘linkages’ or relationships in this 
structure, such as information and resources. Levkoe (2014) uses the metaphor of a 
‘rhizome’ to describe the structure of Canada’s food networks. He characterizes these 
networks as “heterogeneous, decentralized and deeply interconnected” (Figure 1.1, p. 
10).  My data supports this characterization of the Alliance’s network structure.  
 
As noted in Chapter 2, prior to the formation of Sustain, Ontario’s provincial food 
movement was quite fragmented and decentralized. Many involved in the movement 
were connected to others that worked in a similar interest area (e.g. food security or 
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organic farming) or who were proximate geographically. These actors connected 
periodically at local and regional events or conferences. I think the structure of the 
overall provincial food network at that time could be characterized as ‘scattered clusters’ 
(Krebs and Holley, 2002) or ‘segmented/decentralized’ (Diani, 2003).  
 
Through its ‘Network’ strategy, Sustain has woven diverse actors from the sustainable 
food and farming movement together. New connections established within and beyond 
Sustain’s network represent linkages and in some cases, ‘bridges’ to other networks 
(Burt, 1992, Granovetter, 1973). By 2013 these linkages connected individuals from all 
parts of the food system in communities across the province. Sustain’s network structure 
exhibits some characteristics of a ‘star/wheel’ (Diani, 2003) or ‘hub and spoke’ model 
(Krebs and Holley, 2002), with Sustain as the central ‘hub’, convening and connecting 
formerly unconnected members in multiple on- and off-line spaces. Without Sustain as a 
network ‘weaver’, few in its broader membership might have connected. Krebs and 
Holley (2002) suggest the ‘hub and spoke structure’ is a common phase in network 
evolution and development, and that the prominence of a central hub can be a 
vulnerability. As we saw in Chapter 3, they indicate network weavers have an important 
role to play in actively evolving network structures. Sustain’s staff and some members 
have played these roles (see Chapter 5).  
 
Some evidence suggests the Alliance’s network structure is evolving beyond the ‘hub and 
spoke’ model. In 2013 several AC members I interviewed indicated they directly contact 
other members to access information and seek support around particular issues (AC5, 
AC12, AC14). This indicates at least some members no longer rely on Sustain as the 
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‘hub’. WG chairs and Sustain’s staff and interns have taken on weaving roles in the WGs 
facilitating connections and collaboration. So, although most WGs are still ‘spaces’ 
hosted by Sustain, some appear to be examples of discrete hubs. In more sophisticated 
WGs, members appear better connected to each other than to Sustain. The Ontario Edible 
Education Network WG attracted significant interest from members and non-members of 
Sustain and is now quite self-sufficient with a dedicated staff coordinator. One intern and 
one staff member I interviewed described it as a ‘mini Sustain’ (S2, S3); another staff 
member characterized it as a WG that had become a network (S5). The image this brings 
to mind is one of a fractal, or a pattern that repeats at different scales. Krebs and Holley 
(2002) suggest this is a positive structural evolution and this may indicate that Sustain’s 
network structure is evolving toward a ‘multi-hub small-world’ model. Such a model 
might enable Sustain to extend and strengthen its presence in different regions, and/or 
establish robust WGs focused on strategic food and farming issues, as it did with the 
Ontario Edible Education Network. If, like that network, these WGs become largely self-
sufficient, Sustain might be able to reallocate resources to policy development and 
external relations.  
 
Below I examine how Sustain’s weaving and convening efforts strengthened network 
connectivity. By 2013 Sustain appeared to be a network of networks; members’ personal 
and professional connections assisted the network in attracting new members and 
establishing linkages with other networks in and beyond Ontario. The size and diversity 
of Sustain’s membership contributes positively to the Alliance’s legitimacy in the minds 
of policy makers (see Chapter 6).  
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Sustain experienced fairly rapid growth in membership; this is generally considered to be 
a positive network effect and an indication of a healthy network (Plastrik and Taylor, 
2007). There appear to be a number of explanations for this growth. As noted in Chapter 
5, in 2009-2011 the founding members of Sustain, and its first two Directors helped 
convene (Gray, 1991a) and grow the size and diversity of the network by using their 
professional networks and ‘informal relationships’ to attract new members (Takahashi 
and Smutney, 2001). 59% of the members who responded to Sustain’s 2013 member 
survey indicated they first learned about membership by word of mouth (Nicoara, 2013). 
If members did not consider Sustain to be legitimate (in the form of network as ‘entity’ 
and ‘interaction’ – Human and Provan, 2000), it is unlikely they would expend their 
social capital to attract new members to the Alliance.  
 
Also noted in Chapter 5, network growth continued in 2012-2013 without any formal 
outreach process or active effort. In New Rules for the New Economy, Kevin Kelly (1999) 
uses examples such as the internet and the fax machine to illustrate that, “The value of a 
network explodes as its membership increases…” (p. 25). Sustain’s growth may have 
achieved this kind of momentum by 2012, with its increasingly diverse membership 
helping attract new members from different parts of the province. Additionally, I think 
Sustain’s continued growth and diversification of membership is a reflection of the 
visibility and legitimacy Sustain (‘network as entity’ – Human and Provan, 2000) has 
acquired over the last few years, thanks in part to its ‘Showcase’ strategy.  
 
Network boundaries are often described as porous, as opposed to defined and ‘bounded’ 
(Scearce, 2011). Initially Sustain’s membership was loose and unbounded (see Chapter 
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5), however the introduction of a formal membership model in late 2013 defines clearer 
network boundaries through the establishment of membership criteria and expectations. 
In combination with fees, this model introduces greater mutual accountability.  
 
Sustain will preserve some porousness by encouraging individuals who are no longer 
eligible for membership to register as ‘supporters’. Another way Sustain maintains 
porous boundaries is at the level of WGs. Non-members have always been encouraged to 
participate, and through these groups Sustain’s members have engaged and collaborated 
with a broader community of practice which expands the Alliance’s access to information 
and expertise. Actively promoting the benefits of membership to WG members may be a 
useful tactic for growing Sustain’s membership. 
 
As noted in Chapter 5, a clearer definition of membership may enhance Sustain’s internal 
and external legitimacy. As one 2013 survey respondent commented, “Boundaries - we 
can't keep thinking that including everyone in a big tent is a good idea. We need to be 
clear about what Sustain stands for - and that will exclude some organizations - but only 
if we have that clarity can we hope to have an impact…” (Nicoara, 2013). At the time of 
writing it was unclear how the new membership model will be received by current 
members and prospective member organizations; Sustain’s membership profile will 
likely look very different. Under the new model, only organizations will be eligible for 
membership, and members will be expected to participate in various ways, contributing 
financially and otherwise. This will likely translate into a drop in numbers and possibly 
diversity. Smaller, younger, organizations in less well-resourced parts of the province 
may be less likely to join and so Sustain may need to find other ways to engage and learn 
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from these groups that may be innovating at the edges of the food system. After the 
model is implemented, Sustain will be able to more accurately describe its member 
composition and this may enhance the Alliance’s legitimacy in the eyes of policy makers.  
 
The camaraderie and discussions I observed at AC meetings suggest useful connections 
have been established among diverse members. Several interviewees (AC4, AC12, 
AC14) and survey respondents commented that their networks had evolved and 
diversified as a result of their involvement with Sustain; another indicated long-standing 
relationships had deepened (AC6). One survey respondent, whose organization is based 
in northern Ontario noted they connected to a member in southern Ontario who “helped 
them understand how large-scale produce operations could work in the north” (Nicoara, 
2013). Another member, based in southwestern Ontario, accessed training opportunities 
for their staff through a new connection with a member in their region (AC5). These 
examples of members connecting with other members suggests Sustain has achieved the 
‘small-world reach’ network effect (Granovetter, 1973, Milgram, 1967, Plastrik and 
Taylor, 2010), at least among some members. Although I did not formally analyze the 
‘density’ of ties that exist in Sustain’s network (Granovetter, 1973), based on my 
observations and comments made in interviews, ties appear densest among AC members 
who connect in person periodically.  
 
Communication is considered by some ‘the lifeblood’ of a network (McLeod Grant, 
2010) and the linkages established between network members facilitate the flow of 
information and diffusion of ideas (Granovetter, 1973, Plastrik and Taylor, 2007). While 
some information flows informally between individual members, as noted in Chapter 5, 
  223 
Sustain has created on- and off-line spaces that enable members to access and exchange 
information and knowledge.  
 
Sustain uses technology effectively to facilitate the exchange and dissemination of 
information and ideas. This includes social media and an interactive website which has 
become the hub for everything related to local, sustainable food and farming (S5); as 
well as webinars and web-based conference calls. These vehicles enable Sustain to 
rapidly disseminate information within and beyond Sustain’s membership. Scearce 
(2011) reinforces that digital tools are important channels through which network 
members can “…share information with new and old colleagues and coordinate 
action” (p. 5). These physical and virtual spaces have contributed to Sustain’s second 
long-term goal of spreading on-the ground adaptations and innovations. As one 
member commented anonymously in Sustain’s 2013 member survey,  
I am informed of and can advocate for initiatives that support my work and 
broader food systems change, but that I would not otherwise have the 
knowledge or capacity to be aware of. For example, Student Nutrition was 
NOT on my radar until [Sustain] shared information in a way that made it 
meaningful to me. (Nicoara, 2013, p. 16) 
 
Members’ willingness to share information with other members and provide input when 
requested suggests a level of trust has been established and that members have some 
degree of confidence in Sustain’s organizational structures, strategies and processes. 
While almost all AC members and staff I interviewed indicated levels of trust within the 
Alliance seem to them relatively high, one noted that they had started to hold back 
because they didn’t feel their input made a difference (AC10). I later discovered that trust 
in the Network may be more precarious than my 2013 interviews suggest. When I 
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checked back with interviewees in 2014 to confirm permission to include paraphrased 
comments and quotations, I was asked to drop some content. Concerns were expressed 
about lack of anonymity with the interview codes attached, and there was a feeling the 
content might damage relationships.  
 
This hints at a lack of confidence or trust in Sustain’s processes – ‘network as interaction’ 
(Human and Provan, 2000). During an interview conducted by an intern as part of 
Sustain’s evaluation process, Director Nuaimy-Barker expressed concern about 
continuing to rely on person-based trust as the network grows, indicating she felt the need 
to: “[create] systems that people understand and processes that they can trust” (Vu-
Nguyen, 2013). This suggests greater formalization or institutionalization may help 
improve internal legitimacy.  
 
The first two Directors brought Sustain’s network organizational structure to life. During 
an interview as part of Sustain’s developmental evaluation process, Director Nuaimy-
Barker described the first phase of her time at Sustain in early 2011 as “figuring out how 
the constellation model worked” and the next as “experimenting… particularly around 
Working Groups” (Vu-Nguyen, 2013). She sensed Sustain was just concluding this 
experimental phase when she went on leave in early 2013, with Sustain moving towards a 
“systemization phase”, which involved “creating better systems and rules and structure” 
(ibid).  
 
 
7.4 PROGRESS IN NETWORK DEVELOPMENT: NETWORK HEALTH  
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Sustain’s network composition is critical to its ability to aggregate thought, identify 
barriers and solutions and cultivate the external legitimacy required to influence policy. 
By 2013, Sustain’s network included diverse, sustainable food and farming leaders from 
multiple sectors. Researchers have described networks as dynamic, living, evolving 
entities (Katcher, 2010, Kearns, 2003), so the notion of assessing the ‘health’ of Sustain’s 
network resonates for me. As with any living entity, the health of a network is complex 
and multi-dimensional (Plastrik and Taylor, 2007), and constantly shifting. In this section 
I assess Sustain’s network health by analyzing the network’s purpose and strategy, 
capacity, performance, operational processes and response to tensions.  
  
7.4.1 Purpose and strategy 
 
We have trust and goodwill built between a small group of individuals that had 
understood that they were on the same page...  But with increasing complexity 
and inclusivity, for example, of geography and different individuals coming to 
the table, that wasn't going to be enough, this relationship-based common 
understanding that we're all fighting for the same thing.  ~ Director Nuaimy-
Barker interview. 
 
Gray (1989) reinforces the importance of collaborative groups, networks and coalitions 
articulating and agreeing on a common purpose. Sustain’s purpose is articulated in the 
Alliance’s ‘Terms of Reference’: “Sustain is working towards a healthy, ecological, 
equitable and financially viable food system for Ontario” (Sustain Ontario, 2013a, p.1). 
 
Initial statements articulating Sustain’s purpose and vision were drafted by the first 
Director, informed by founding members’ discussions. At an AC meeting in 2012 one 
member commented, “whether or not we have a common story about the food system or 
common values isn’t clear at this time” (Sustain Ontario, 2012a). Based on my 
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observations at the March 2013 AC meeting, the language used to describe Sustain’s 
vision for the food system doesn’t resonate with, or completely satisfy, all members. My 
own experience assisting collaborative groups and associations to develop purpose 
statements suggests this is not uncommon. Finding language that resonates for all is 
particularly challenging when a group has diverse interests and comes from different 
sectors with different values and language. Levkoe (2014) identifies significant overlap in 
the visions of the PNOs he studied, which suggests that most are quite broad.  
 
The Alliance has gradually clarified its purpose through AC dialogue about Sustain’s 
strategies and processes, and development of the Theory of Change including the 
outcomes map (see Appendix B). The Theory of Change is a living document which has 
evolved, and will continue to evolve to reflect changes in understanding. Today it 
articulates Sustain’s vision, and its role and strategies for achieving this vision (discussed 
in more detail below). The theory helps ensure activities and processes undertaken by 
staff are aligned with Sustain’s vision, and to some degree it informs work done by WGs. 
The new membership model clarifies Sustain’s purpose by articulating the value the 
Alliance offers members. The continued growth of Sustain’s membership suggests its 
purpose and vision are sufficiently clear and compelling to attract new members. 
 
As noted in Chapter 5, Sustain’s members were motivated to get involved in the network 
to be part of a recognized voice; to support public education; and to influence policy. The 
first and third reasons are aligned with the work Sustain has been engaged in to date, 
while the second is less aligned since Sustain’s educational efforts have focused mainly 
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internally on members and those working in food and farming rather than the general 
public. Later in this chapter I assess the Alliance’s influence on policy reform.  
 
While Sustain’s purpose may be reasonably clear internally, as noted in Chapter 6, some 
external stakeholders are unclear what Sustain is all about. The name, ‘Sustain’, leads 
some to see the Alliance as strictly an environmental group (O5 and Vu Nguyen, 2013). 
One policy-maker and two civil servants from OMAFRA suggested Sustain needs a 
stronger ‘elevator pitch’ to succinctly communicate what the Alliance is all about (PM5, 
PM6, PM9). As the Acting Director observed in an interview as part of Sustain’s 
evaluation process, “…it’s not easy to explain [a] cross-sectoral organization working on 
multiple outcomes (Vu Nguyen, 2013). More effectively communicating Sustain’s 
purpose might enhance the Alliance’s ability to connect to, and enhance its legitimacy 
with, external stakeholders.  
 
Although Sustain, like Sustain UK, reflects the perspectives of eaters or ‘consumers’, to 
date the Alliance has not emphasized this perspective. One staff member and one policy 
maker from OMAFRA reflected during interviews (S4, PM7) that it might be beneficial 
for Sustain to more explicitly articulate and promote this consumer perspective in its 
work. Doing so might assist the Alliance in attracting attention and support from 
members of the general public, i.e. voters, who, at the end of the day, influence actions 
taken by government (PM2).   
 
Sustain’s “Theory of Change” articulates five broad strategies: ‘Network’, ‘Showcase’, 
‘Examine and research’, ‘Policy reform’ and ‘Government relations’ (Sustain, 2013i). 
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The first two are focused internally on network and organization development, while the 
other three are more external, related to policy development and promotion. These 
‘deliberate’ strategies (Mintzberg, 1987, 1994) were roughly defined during Sustains’ 
early meetings, however other aspects of Sustain’s strategies (e.g. specific tactics and 
related processes) have been emergent. Each strategy was explored in Chapters 5 and 6. 
Collectively these strategies focus Sustain’s ‘organizational network’ work on weaving 
and nurturing a network with the capacity, and I argue, the legitimacy, to influence 
policy. Much of the implementation of these strategies relies on staff to initiate and 
actively engage and coordinate members. 
 
As a pioneering network, determining how to achieve Sustain’s vision was unclear 
initially, and the broad strategies Sustain articulated enabled the Network to respond to 
emergent opportunities, such as the LFA. An emergent approach to strategy is 
increasingly recognized as valuable for organizations working in a continuously changing 
environment where the future is unpredictable (Mintzberg, 1987, 1994). It requires 
ongoing monitoring of the external environment and recalibration of priorities, something 
that was challenging for the AC (see Chapter 6). Despite that, the combination of 
deliberate and emergent strategies Sustain adopted appears to have served the Alliance 
well in its formative years. 
 
Strategies for which the ‘what and how’ to implement were particularly unclear initially 
included ‘Government relations’ and ‘Policy reform’. As noted in Chapter 6, staff and 
AC members experimented, reflected and adapted strategies and processes in these areas. 
In mid-2013, the GRWG chair indicated the group was planning to develop and articulate 
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a government relations strategy (AC7). Capturing some of Sustain’s learnings (i.e. 
successes and challenges) related to government relations and policy reform in the form 
of more detailed strategies and tactics might be beneficial in educating new members. 
 
By 2013 the Alliance had not articulated a tactical roadmap outlining what needs to 
change over the short, medium and long term to transform Ontario’s food system (S3, 
S5). As noted in Chapter 6, the OFNS represents a starting point for such a map, 
something that could form the basis of a ‘meta-strategy’ for Sustain and the broader 
movement (Huxham and Macdonald, 1992). Engaging the broader provincial food and 
farming movement in this kind of discussion would be beneficial, and it is something that 
Sustain could do at the Bring Food Home conference. A ‘map’ could assist network 
members and others in better understanding how the work they do intersects with work 
being done by other actors. It might also assist Sustain in identifying short-term priorities 
and specific issues for WGs to focus on. To date, Sustain’s WGs are not clearly aligned 
with Sustain’s provincial vision for food system transformation. Since staff support WGs, 
this suggests not all are an optimal investment of Sustain’s limited resources.   
 
Although legitimacy-building is not articulated as a strategy, Sustain has employed a 
‘dual legitimacy-building’ strategy, engaging a combination of ‘outside-in’, and ‘inside-
out’ strategies (Human and Provan, 2000) and processes as described in Chapter 3 (see 
page 80). Prior to the formation of Sustain, Sustain UK’s example contributed positively 
to the legitimacy of ‘network as form’ and ‘network as interaction’. The UK experience 
demonstrates that collaborating in a big tent network ‘form’ is not only possible, but 
powerful. The Metcalf Foundation also legitimized ‘network as form’ and ‘network as 
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interaction’ by convening leaders from different sectors to consider the possibility of 
working in a network and funding the development of the first paper, “Food Connects Us 
All” (Metcalf Foundation, 2008a).  
 
After Sustain was formed considerable work was undertaken to give Sustain’s growing 
membership confidence in network as ‘form’, ‘entity’ and ‘interaction’. The Alliance’s 
first two Directors introduced structures, strategies and processes to support the network. 
Sustain’s ‘Network’ strategy represents an ‘inside-out’ strategy because it focuses on 
cultivating a connected, healthy network with confidence in ‘network as form’ and 
‘network as interaction’. As illustrated in Chapter 5, Sustain invested significant 
resources in weaving the network and this helped build internal legitimacy. Members, 
and particularly AC members, learned what was involved in working in a network and 
most came to appreciate how connecting, dialoguing and collaborating in joint initiatives 
delivers benefits on different levels, legitimizing ‘network as interaction’.  
 
Sustain’s ‘Showcasing’, ‘Examine and research’, ‘Policy reform’ and ‘Government 
relations’ strategies could be characterized as ‘outside-in’ and ‘inside-out’ strategies as 
they helped Sustain build legitimacy in the form of ‘network as entity’, by establishing an 
identity and presence for the network which was recognized externally. For example, 
Sustain’s website and the “Menu 2020” paper (Baker, Campsie, Rabinowicz, 2010) 
showcase not only barriers and solutions, but also position Sustain as a network of 
diverse leaders seeking change. These strategies contributed positively to internal 
legitimacy in the form of ‘network as interaction’ since members engaged in collective 
action through the development of papers, policy backgrounders, and election campaigns. 
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This joint work enabled members to accomplish significantly more than any single 
member organization could, while the publications enhanced Sustain’s external 
legitimacy.  
 
During Sustain’s early years, the Alliance initially focused on building internal 
legitimacy. By doing so Sustain was able to attract and retain members that could 
collaborate and help cultivate external legitimacy. It appears Sustain expanded to a dual 
legitimacy building strategy around 2010, possibly prompted by the development of 
“Menu 2020” and the 2010 municipal election campaign. Human and Provan (2000) 
suggest such a dual ‘inside-out’ and ‘outside-in’ approach to legitimacy building is key to 
long-term network sustainability. This approach seems to have worked for Sustain as 
there is evidence members and policy makers consider the Alliance to be legitimate.  
 
7.4.2 Capacity 
In Plastrik and Taylor’s scorecard, capacity refers to the members involved in a network 
and whether they possess the skills and connections to advance network goals. Since 
Sustain is also a network ‘organization’, I also assess its organizational capacity in terms 
of staff and funding. I analyze one other dimension of capacity and that is ‘adaptive 
capacity’. Foster-Fishman, Berkowitz, Lounsbury, Jacobson, and Allen, 2001 indicate 
that the capacity to learn and change in response to what is learned is a factor in network 
success. Adaptive capacity too, is in part dependent on Sustain’s membership since 
members enable the network to monitor and respond to opportunities in the external 
environment. 
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Sustain’s founding members were mainly Metcalf grantees or otherwise part of the 
Foundation’s network since Metcalf catalyzed the formation of Sustain (see Chapter 2). 
Most were based in Southern Ontario and represented urban food perspectives; it is 
unclear if many of those who participated in discussions in 2007-2008 have extensive 
backgrounds in farming. Since Sustain’s membership expanded initially through the 
founding group’s extended networks, despite efforts to diversify, by 2013 Sustain was 
still perceived by many to be more interested in urban food issues than farming. This has 
detracted somewhat from the Alliance’s internal and external legitimacy. As noted in 
Chapter 5, some members expressed concern that urban perspectives dominate 
discussions while some external stakeholders questioned whether Sustain really 
understands agriculture in Ontario. This may explain why the Alliance has not 
emphasized its consumer perspective.   
 
Sustain’s membership composition and engagement processes are described in Chapter 5, 
along with the network organization staff structure. Because the Alliance has a lean staff 
team, designing and implementing strategies and processes relies on members’ 
willingness to lend their knowledge, expertise and energy as volunteers. Members, and 
especially AC members, have been actively involved and have extended Sustain’s policy 
development capacity significantly. Members have also been instrumental in planning 
events such as the biennial Bring Food Home conference and topical forums. As noted in 
the section on network connectivity above, members’ networks helped the Alliance 
attract and diversify its membership.  
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It appears there is potential for continued membership growth, based on the number of 
people I met at Bring Food Home in 2013 whose organizations were not members and/or 
who were attending the conference for the first time. Strategically recruiting leaders from 
around Ontario that support the Alliance’s vision for the food system could enhance 
Sustain’s capacity, legitimacy and power. The new membership model and clearer value 
proposition should assist Sustain in attracting new members and filling gaps or ‘structural 
holes’ (Burt, 1992) such as farm perspectives. Whether the newly introduced membership 
fees will dissuade organizations from continuing their involvement or becoming members 
remains to be seen.  
 
A network’s ability to monitor, interpret and adapt to the changing environment depends 
partly on its membership. The capacity to ‘sense’ opportunities is a critical input to 
emergent strategy (Kania, Kramer, Russell, 2014). Simo (2009) reinforces that the active 
participation of diverse stakeholders can enhance a group’s sensitivity and ability to 
respond to shifts in the external environment. As sector leaders, most AC members are 
well-connected in their professional and geographic communities and this gives them 
access to a range of information and insight about their environment. I observed formal 
and informal information exchange during all of the AC meetings I attended. 50% of 
respondents in the 2013 member survey indicated they often or sometimes “shared ideas, 
innovations and resources within Sustain Ontario and its networks”. Another 44% 
indicated they rarely or never did so, although they did not say why (Nicoara, 2013 p. 
12). This may indicate Sustain should consider developing additional channels or more 
effective processes to encourage and facilitate knowledge exchange. WG participants I 
interviewed indicated they valued the opportunity to learn from others about what was 
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happening in different parts of the province, something that was particularly true for 
those involved in the Municipal Regional WG. Such information sharing has contributed 
positively to individual and collective learning. As one respondent commented in the 
member survey, “My own awareness of food issues has grown exponentially” (Nicoara, 
2013, p. 17). 
 
Sustain’s developmental evaluation process was designed to encourage reflection, 
learning and adaptation, something those who study networks identify as important 
(Foster-Fishman, Berkowitz, Lounsbury, Jacobson, Allen, 2001, Scearce, 2011). The 
Evaluation group, which I participated in (see Chapter 4), provided a space to reflect on, 
and question, Sustain’s structures, strategies and processes. During the development of 
Sustain’s ‘Theory of Change’ and outcomes map the group engaged the AC in discussion 
periodically. The group designed a member consultation process and drafted related 
consultation tools in 2012-2013; data gathering began in winter 2013 and extended into 
November. In addition to a consultant, the process relied heavily on interns and 
volunteers, and this significantly extended the data collection and analysis timeline.  
 
The Acting Director presented some preliminary evaluation findings at Sustain’s 
November 2013 AC meeting (McKay, 2013). His presentation characterized Sustain’s 
constellation WG structure as “a work in progress… the most poorly understood 
component of Sustain Ontario’s work… Project initiation, roles and accountabilities, 
regular reporting and evaluation need to be built in” (ibid, p. 10). As stated in Chapter 5, 
many WGs rely more heavily on staff/interns than was originally intended.  
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Plastrik and Taylor (2010) note that resilience under stress, or the ability to respond to 
changes and disruptions, is another desirable network effect. Sustain’s smooth transition 
between its three Directors is an indication of Sustain’s resilience (AC7) and underscores 
the benefits of Sustain’s decentralized leadership model (see Chapter 5). During each 
transition, SC members and staff provided additional support. Sustain’s focus shifted 
somewhat with each Director; one founding AC member I interviewed described this as a 
shift from a high-level provincial policy focus, to a more programmatic focus, and then 
back to a focus on policy and government relations (AC13). The AC exercised leadership 
in redirecting Sustain’s focus back to policy reform, however the detour may have 
detracted somewhat from Sustain’s internal legitimacy. Despite this, three AC members 
indicated Sustain’s work evolved and benefitted from the different knowledge, expertise 
and experience each Director brought to the role (AC1, AC2, AC15). 
 
Sustain’s work as a ‘network organization’ is multifaceted, and is both internally and 
externally oriented. Staff develop processes and implement Sustain’s strategies in 
collaboration with members. Staff and interns play important weaver roles, convening, 
connecting, communicating with and engaging members (Sustain’s ‘Network’ strategy). 
They also document and promote member projects, innovations from around the province 
and research findings (Sustain’s ‘Showcase’ strategy). Sustain augmented its capacity to 
conduct research by participating in research partnerships with academics and other 
organizations. These partnerships resulted in the production of research papers which 
assisted Sustain in gaining an audience with policy makers and enhanced the Alliance’s 
external legitimacy.  
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Staff members are also actively involved in Sustain’s policy development, promotion and 
government relations efforts. All staff play multiple roles, with some degree of 
specialization. Interns are recruited for specific knowledge, but because Sustain is often 
their first opportunity to work in their field of study, most have research skills but limited 
practical experience. This means Sustain must rely on and leverage members’ expertise 
in mission-critical areas such as policy development. While this approach engages 
members and generates a sense of ownership, Sustain did consider hiring a staff member 
dedicated to policy analysis and development (Vu Nguyen, 2013). One AC member I 
interviewed suspected this “could pay off in spades” (AC16); however it was not an 
option within Sustain’s 2013 budget. In 2013 this was $378,596, approximately 55% of 
which was allocated to salaries, 10% to Tides Canada for their administrative support, 
10% to office expenses, and the remainder for program expenses such as meetings, travel, 
and research (email communication with the Director, November 14, 2014).   
 
Sustain generates modest revenues hosting webinars for members and doing contract or 
consulting work for members, other groups, and municipalities. For the first time in 2013 
the Bring Food Home conference generated revenue through a combination of fees and 
sponsorships (approximately $12,000 of which came from members). Staff estimated 
2014 membership fees might range from $10-15,000 (ibid).  
 
Ultimately, Sustain’s organizational sustainability is tied both to its ability to attract and 
retain members, and secure sufficient grant funding. There are limited sources of funding 
to support the substantial work involved in weaving and nurturing a network, and policy 
development and promotion, despite the fact this work is considered valuable. Private and 
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government foundations are a common source of network funds (GEO, 2013, McLeod 
Grant, 2010, Scearce, 2011), and support from the Metcalf Foundation, the Ontario 
Trillium Foundation, The Greenbelt Foundation, and the Heart & Stroke Foundation has 
been critical during Sustain’s formative years. This funding enabled Sustain to establish, 
evaluate and develop the network and undertake research, policy development and 
promotion.  
 
Sustain’s Director and Program Manager develop the Alliance’s budget, then refine it in 
consultation with Tides Canada’s finance person; the budget is then reviewed and 
approved by the SC (email communication with the Director, Dec. 1, 2014). Sustain’s SC 
also approves the topics of funding proposals developed by the Director and other staff. 
The Director anticipates that future funding will be less flexible and tied to more clearly 
defined projects and outcomes (S3). That may force Sustain to divert resources from 
network development and engagement which could negatively impact network health and 
the Alliance’s capacity to engage in research, government relations, policy development 
and promotion.  
 
7.4.3 Performance  
In Plastrik and Taylor’s (2009) scorecard, the questions related to performance assess 
whether joint work is taking place, new knowledge and insights are generated, and value 
is being created; and whether the network is achieving more together than organizations 
could alone – such as influencing policy reform. In each of these dimensions, there is 
evidence to suggest Sustain is ‘performing’ reasonably well. 
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Joint work in a network refers to collaborative work undertaken by members which 
contributes to a shared vision. Joint work is most evident at the WG level where groups 
examine, and, in some cases, take collective action on issues of interest. Although few 
WGs reflect the full diversity of Sustain’s membership, two staff members and one intern 
indicated during interviews that cross-sectoral collaboration does occur at the WG level 
(S2, S3, S4). The development of policy backgrounders and advocacy efforts during 
election campaigns (see Chapter 6) are other examples of how Sustain engages its 
broader membership in collective action.  
  
Sustain’s efforts to convene discussions with members, engage the broader provincial 
food movement (e.g. at Bring Food Home) and educate members (e.g. via newsletters, 
the website and webinars) generates new knowledge and insights. My observations of AC 
discussions suggests that as diversity increased, the complexity of food and farming 
issues became more apparent and perspectives on those issues diverged. This was 
reflected in the comments of one AC member who commented, “divisions between rural 
agriculture and urban mindsets became more prominent” (AC17). Scharmer (2007) 
describes differences in world views and values as ‘social complexity’. This social 
complexity appears to have made it more challenging for Sustain to establish priorities 
and identify solutions that reflect and respect members’ disparate concerns and interests. 
At the same time, the dialogue, augmented by educational opportunities, may have 
contributed to a better understanding of systemic issues. 43% of member survey 
respondents in 2013 indicated that members of their organization “have a better 
understanding of the barriers and challenges to implementing Good Food Ideas as a result 
of their involvement with Sustain” (Nicoara, 2013, p. 6).  
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The 2013 survey asked members to comment on the unique values Sustain contributes to 
bringing about a more sustainable food and farming system. 83% identified Sustain’s 
“ability to bring together diverse groups for problem solving”; 63% noted “having 
positive working relationships with key stakeholders and decision-makers”; 62% said 
“properly disseminating research and documentation of Good Food ideas and system 
issues” (Nicoara, 2013). Survey comments also identified the strength of membership 
numbers, and staff’s ability to work on policy issues that other organizations are unable 
to spend significant time on. 
 
The continued participation of network members at various levels (e.g. on the AC, SC 
and in WGs) suggests members also receive something of value. Part of the value lies in 
the opportunity to make new connections: 29% of survey members identified “business 
networking opportunities” as a motivation for their involvement. One survey respondent, 
in commenting on their motivation for becoming involved noted, “Mainly, to be a part of 
a strong and united voice on Ontario food and farming issues; and to learn and share best 
practices and opportunities happening across the province” (Nicoara, 2013, p.4). 
 
The interviews I conducted and other member survey responses highlighted examples of 
how Sustain achieves more as a network than members could alone. As discussed in 
Chapter 6, members reported they made use of Sustain’s election toolkit materials, policy 
backgrounders and letters to engage local and provincial policy makers in dialogue. 
Members’ collective advocacy and government relations efforts helped get food on the 
policy agenda and embed the concept of a local food act into provincial party campaign 
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platforms in 2011. The Alliance’s work also informed government deliberations before 
and after the LFA was introduced in 2012. I assess Sustain’s influence on policy reform 
later in this chapter.  
 
7.4.4 Operational processes 
In Plastrik and Taylor’s (2009) scorecard, the questions related to operations focus on 
processes such as internal communications, engagement, accountability mechanisms and 
decision-making. These processes were described in Chapters 5 and 6. In this section I 
discuss the efficacy of these processes and highlight how they impacted the Alliance’s 
legitimacy. Since many of these operational processes are internally focused, most 
impacted Sustain’s internal more than external legitimacy. 
 
As illustrated in Chapter 5 and the section on Network Connectivity above, Sustain’s 
internal communication processes facilitate the exchange of information among diverse 
network members. Sustain effectively leverages technology platforms to disseminate 
information and facilitate connections among geographically dispersed members. Virtual 
communication platforms complement the network’s less frequent opportunities to 
connect and engage in dialogue in person. Sustain disseminates most information and 
communications electronically, including newsletters, social media updates and 
publications.  
 
The geographic reach of Sustain’s network means that in-person meetings are an 
expensive proposition for the Alliance as convenor and host, and for some members. 
While Sustain recognizes that in-person dialogue is important and valued by members, it 
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is costly to convene the AC twice annually. In his November 2013 presentation to the 
AC, The Acting Director acknowledged that biannual meetings may no longer be 
financially viable (McKay, 2013). In addition to AC meetings, some WGs, periodic 
forums, and the biennial Bring Food Home conference are other spaces where members 
connect for in-person dialogue.  
 
Opportunities to engage in dialogue and discussion, in person and electronically, have 
been critical to keeping members informed and evolving collective understanding. As 
part of the 2013 member survey, some respondents suggested additional and more 
frequent opportunities to engage in dialogue would be helpful. Ideas included: more 
targeted strategic sector-wide events and forums; discrete websites for each WG; 
problem-solving webinars; regional meetings between conferences; and monthly web-
based update meetings (Nicoara, 2013).  
 
One apparent weak link in Sustain’s internal communication processes relates to WGs. 
Although staff provide brief updates on each WG’s activities at AC meetings, those 
biannual updates are inadequate for keeping Sustain’s AC and larger membership 
apprised of their activities. In addition, no defined communication process has been 
established to link policy-focused WGs with the GRWG that has been guiding Sustain’s 
overall government relations efforts. This means WGs may inadvertently pursue 
activities that detract from Sustain’s legitimacy.  
 
Sustain’s internal feedback processes also appear somewhat underdeveloped. Over time 
AC meeting minutes have become more formal and detailed, identifying decisions, ideas 
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or proposals, and action items. Limited resources or timing mean that not all suggestions 
and ideas are acted on, and one interviewee suggested that Sustain sometimes fails to 
‘close the loop’ and let the AC know the status of activities not acted on (AC11).  
 
Another communication process that could be improved is the way Sustain consults with 
its broader membership. As noted in Chapter 6, Sustain has not yet designed efficient and 
effective processes to gather and interpret input from the broader membership. Staff are 
often left to interpret and aggregate diverse input and craft a position or recommendation 
that reflects that input. After doing so, there is no process for the position or 
recommendation to be affirmed by members or even the AC or SC before being publicly 
communicated. This appears to be a gap in Sustain’s communication process which may 
detract from internal legitimacy. 
          
A healthy network is fueled by engaged members who contribute time, expertise and 
other resources including financial ones (Mizrahi and Rosenthal, 2001, Pasquero, 1991). 
As noted in Chapter 5, AC members (including the SC and Co-Chairs) tend to be the 
most actively engaged segment of Sustain’s membership. Although Sustain relies heavily 
on the contributions of members as volunteers, its membership does not represent a major 
source of financial resources, something I revisit below. 
 
As the core of Sustain’s leadership, the AC’s active engagement enhances Sustain’s 
internal and external legitimacy. Nearly all AC members are actively involved, whether 
lending their expertise at meetings, on ad hoc committees (e.g. the conference committee, 
governance committee) or in policy development. AC members have different 
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expectations for engagement, derived partly from their own organizational cultures. 
Although almost all interviewees indicated they found AC meetings useful, some 
expressed concern about the quality and content of the group’s dialogue, while four 
indicated they thought the AC could be engaged more effectively (AC11, AC13, AC14, 
AC17).    
 
Sustain alerts all members of opportunities to get involved and provide input. According 
to two staff members (S3, S5), compared to the AC, Sustain’s larger membership engages 
sporadically and contributes less in terms of time, expertise and resources. If Sustain 
could mobilize more members, particularly during municipal and provincial election 
campaigns, they could potentially amplify Sustain’s messages and increase its external 
legitimacy and influence.  
 
As an engagement vehicle, Sustain’s WGs have been somewhat successful in 
encouraging and enabling smaller groups of members and non-members to take action on 
issues. Some focus on provincial policy issues, while others are essentially a forum for 
information exchange. The WGs have been somewhat less effective as spaces for 
individual members to exercise leadership. This may be because staff initially assisted 
groups in getting started (e.g. scheduling meetings and communicating on behalf of the 
WG) and in doing so, unintentionally created dependence. The growing number of WGs 
Sustain was supporting in 2012-2013 started to put a strain on Sustain’s small staff team.  
 
In terms of financial resources, a few member organizations have contributed financially 
in the form of conference and event sponsorships. As noted in Chapter 5, going forward, 
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all members will be asked to pay a sliding scale membership fee based on their 
organizational budget. This expectation reflects Sustain’s need to achieve financial 
sustainability as a network organization, however as noted above membership fees are 
expected to generate only a small percentage of Sustain’s budget. The broader 
membership’s willingness to contribute financially may be an indication of the value they 
think Sustain has delivered to date to their organization and the broader sustainable food 
movement. This too may prove to be an indication of Sustain’s internal legitimacy.  
 
Contracts typically define Sustain’s external accountabilities. For example, as a Tides 
Canada Initiatives project, Sustain is accountable to Tides Canada. According to the 
Director, Tides’ reporting expectations are fairly rigorous (email communication, Nov. 
14, 2014). The Alliance is also accountable to its various funders for fulfilling the terms 
of funding agreements, and reporting back on work undertaken and results. Sustain’s SC 
is responsible for ensuring external compliance and it provides oversight of staff 
reporting.  
 
Accountability mechanisms related to Sustain’s constellation governance structure and 
internal processes are less clearly defined. As noted in Chapter 5, the lack of clarity 
around the roles and responsibilities of the SC and AC has generated a degree of 
confusion and mistrust. The institutionalization of processes may help address these 
concerns that have detracted from internal legitimacy. Another example of a gap in 
accountability mechanisms is evident in the relationship between WGs and Sustain. 
Currently, WGs that Sustain supports are connected only loosely to Sustain and the 
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Alliance’s broader strategy; expectations around alignment, reporting and external 
communications are not clearly defined.  
 
Sustain’s new membership model and a documented decision-making process (to be 
approved in 2014) should enhance internal and external legitimacy and accountability. 
The new membership model more clearly defines accountabilities by setting out 
expectations for members and outlining the value Sustain offers members (see Chapter 
5). Sustain’s decision-making process should improve accountability and internal 
legitimacy by increasing transparency.  
 
As Sustain’s network grew and diversified from 2009-2013, negotiating the different 
interests involved when making decisions became increasingly challenging. The lack of 
clarity and resulting confusion around who makes different decisions and how decisions 
are made generated some frustration for staff who are unsure whether and when they are 
able to make decisions, and mistrust on the part of some members. This appears to have 
detracted from internal legitimacy. 
 
The Alliance’s original intent was to allow for independent, non-consensus-based 
decisions and action, specifically at the level of WGs. This approach gave rise to some 
internal tensions, as was the case with the Flocking Options WG (see Chapter 6). Because 
actions taken by Sustain’s WGs reflect back on the network as a whole, they potentially 
detract from the network’s internal and external legitimacy.  
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Despite periodically stating the Alliance is not about consensus, as noted in Chapter 6, 
when it comes to taking action and articulating positions, such as articulating 
recommendations on the LFA, Sustain did seek, and reached, consensus. When I asked 
the Director whether Sustain really is about consensus, she reflected that maybe they 
want to be… but to date have relied more on “whoever ‘shows up at the table’, since 
consulting with everyone to confirm agreement requires substantial time and energy” 
(S3). This is understandable when timelines for acting on opportunities are short and 
consulting broadly might mean missing out on an opportunity. This illustrates the tension 
Sustain experiences between efficiency and inclusivity, something Provan and Kenis 
(2008) identify as a common network tension. Sustain does not appear to have achieved a 
balance that satisfies all network members, so staff will need to continue to be mindful of 
this tension when consulting with members. Other examples of network tensions Sustain 
experienced are discussed in the section below.   
 
As noted in Chapter 5, Sustain developed a decision-making framework in mid-2013 to 
document examples of the kinds of decisions different groups within Sustain are 
responsible for. While the framework provides greater clarity and should enhance 
transparency, the document is quite detailed, illustrating the complexity of decision-
making in a diverse, cross-sectoral network. The process defines Sustain’s decision-
making approach as consensus-based, and reinforces this does not mean that everyone 
agrees. Such a framework should be helpful for staff who are frustrated by the lack of 
clarity and give members greater confidence in the process. The Acting Director 
questioned the functionality of the process as it was defined (email communication to the 
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evaluation group October 24, 2013). If it works in practice it should enhance internal 
legitimacy.   
 
Another means by which Sustain has clarified decision-making is through Sustain’s new 
membership model. The model specifies that support for Alliance positions will be 
assumed, unless members specifically object. This approach will be significantly more 
efficient, and it is broadly inclusive. This puts the onus on members to pay attention to 
draft positions Sustain shares and respond if they have concerns. Although this approach 
is more transparent, members who participate in other associations that vote and rule by 
majority (a common approach in conventional farm associations), may not consider such 
a process to be legitimate.  
 
7.4.5 Response to tensions  
As noted in Chapter 4, Provan and Kenis (2008) identified three tensions that networks 
need to respond to: flexibility versus stability, efficiency versus inclusiveness, and 
internal versus external legitimacy. These tensions exist in a dynamic, shifting balance. 
Each side of the tension has value in different circumstances so both need to be 
maintained to some degree. Plastrik and Taylor (2010) suggest, “Each tension presents 
network decision-makers with key choices that are present and evolve throughout a 
network’s lifespan” (p. 10).  
 
These tensions were evident in Sustain’s approach to WGs, consultation and decision 
making, and the formation of policy recommendations. I explore how Sustain 
experienced and responded to these tensions below. Sustain’s experience suggests 
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networks should attempt to maintain a dynamic balance rather than continually 
emphasizing one side of the tension over the other. 
 
The ‘flexibility versus stability’ tension appears to be a common pressure in maturing 
organizations. “As organizations grow, they tend to further institutionalize policy and 
strategic decisions. The organizational structure creates drag and the groups begin to 
move more slowly and adapt to change less quickly.” (Kearns, 2003, p.4). This suggests 
institutionalization provides greater stability, but at the expense of flexibility and 
nimbleness. Flexibility and adaptability are desirable network effects, and stifling those 
may detract from network health and impact. At Sustain this tension was evident in a 
desire to encourage experimentation to discover what works, and the sense the Alliance 
needs to institutionalize processes and practices (i.e. formalize organizational policies). 
From the perspective of legitimacy, because institutionalization provides greater clarity 
and transparency, it might enhance legitimacy, particularly internally.  
 
This tension was evident in Sustain’s approach to WGs. As noted in Chapter 5, after a 
period of experimentation, in 2013 Sustain was considering providing WGs with more 
direction in the form of expectations and criteria for forming a new WG. According to the 
Acting Director, staff were somewhat resistant to the idea of auditing WG activities and 
imposing expectations, expressing concerns that such an approach might stifle energy and 
motivation (S5). At Sustain, most issue and policy-focused WGs were initiated by 
members or non-members, although Sustain created some more operational WGs to 
support its work as a network organization.  
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“RE-AMP”, a US-based national energy network, opted for a more directive and 
deliberate strategy, establishing working groups to advance specific levers for change 
identified by the network (McLeod-Grant, 2010). That strategy reportedly served RE-
AMP well, however it might be less suitable for Sustain where the WG constellations are 
designed to be nimble vehicles that assist the network in understanding and responding to 
emerging issues and issues of interest to members. Resource limitations suggest Sustain 
might benefit from being more strategic in allocating staff support to existing and new 
WGs.  
 
Staff at Sustain experienced the ‘efficiency versus inclusiveness’ tension not only in the 
Alliance’s approach to decision-making, but also in consulting with, and gathering input 
from, the broader network. As one member commented about Sustain in the 2013 survey, 
“Cumbersome processes, can get caught in dialogue and unable to respond quickly when 
needed” (Nicoara, 2013, p. 23). The consultation process that informed Sustain’s LFA 
recommendations emphasized inclusivity and consumed significant time and resources 
(see Chapter 6). The initial consultation process was well communicated and transparent; 
however what was less clearly communicated was how input would be incorporated into 
the final LFA recommendations. As noted previously the final recommendations were 
challenging to frame and limit in number. In addition to ideas collected through the 
consultation process, Sustain’s recommendations were informed by tactical input on 
advocacy and government relations strategies. I think that the inclusive initial 
consultation process contributed to internal legitimacy, but that the back-end of the 
process may have detracted somewhat from internal legitimacy.  
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Tight deadlines sometimes forced Sustain to prioritize efficiency over inclusiveness. For 
example, to pull the policy backgrounders together quickly staff established and engaged 
small groups of subject matter experts (see Chapter 6). Although staff invited the larger 
membership to comment on drafts, limited feedback was received, possibly because 
members deferred to experts’ perspectives. This approach to consultation seemed to more 
effectively balance the efficiency-inclusiveness tension. While designing consultation 
tools such as a member survey is significant work the first time around, refining such 
tools is substantially less work. Regularly scheduled consultation processes, such as an 
annual or biennial member survey, or a policy priorities poll, might give members a sense 
of confidence, knowing they will have an opportunity to provide input.  
 
Tensions related to ‘internal and external legitimacy’ also emerged periodically. When 
crafting LFA recommendations for government, Sustain attempted to balance members’ 
expectations to have their issues represented, with government’s expectations that the 
Alliance present a small number of priorities. As noted in Chapter 6, policy makers I 
interviewed indicated that government expects advocacy groups to bring government 
their top three asks. Sustain opted to present a larger number of solutions to provide 
government with a more holistic picture of required food system changes, but also 
because they were attempting to be responsive to members’ diverse interests. The 
Alliance’s multiple ‘asks’ led some policy makers to question what Sustain really 
wanted. In this instance, Sustain’s desire to be responsive to members – i.e. to be 
internally legitimate, was in tension with, and may have detracted from, the Alliance’s 
external legitimacy in the eyes of policy makers.  
 
  251 
 
7.5 PROGRESS IN NETWORK-RELATED OUTCOMES: POLICY INFLUENCE 
Since policy reform is one of Sustain’s two long-term goals on the way to transforming 
the food system, in this section, I assess the Alliance’s efforts to influence and reform 
public policy. The data I gathered suggests the choices Sustain made about policy 
development and promotion related strategies (i.e. ‘Examine and research’, ‘Government 
relations’, and ‘Policy reform’) and how to implement these strategies (i.e. the processes 
used), enabled the Alliance to influence policy reform in some areas, particularly the 
introduction and content of the LFA. I outline evidence that suggests the Alliance’s 
ability to influence the LFA benefitted from the ‘coupling’ of Kingdon’s (2003) three 
‘streams’ as described in Chapter 3. I identify factors that indicate Sustain has acquired 
some legitimacy in the food and farming policy space.   
 
On November 5, 2013, the Ontario government passed Bill 36, the Local Food Act, 2013 
with a unanimous vote by 101 MPPs (Bill 36, 2013). The passage of the Bill was 
announced in a news release from OMAFRA (2013b):  
 
The Local Food Act will benefit people by making the connection between 
buying local and helping grow an important Ontario industry. If we increase 
demand for homegrown food, we will create jobs and boost the agri-food 
sector’s contributions to our economy…  ~ Minister Kathleen Wynne. 
 
In a blog post, Sustain heralded the passage of the LFA, as a “major victory and step 
forward for Ontario’s local food movement”  (Singh, 2013c). The notion of a farm, food, 
and health act for the province was something Sustain had worked toward since 
promoting the concept in the lead-up to the 2011 provincial election. While it is 
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impossible for an advocacy group to take sole credit for any public policy change, 
evidence suggests the Alliance’s efforts contributed to the passage and content of the Act.  
 
74% of 2013 member survey respondents identified Sustain’s ability to advance policy as 
“a unique capacity Sustain contributes to food system change” (Nicoara, 2013). This 
suggests many members, who admittedly may be biased, consider Sustain to be a 
legitimate actor in the policy space. Accurately measuring influence around public policy 
change is particularly challenging given the many players and interests involved in the 
policy space. Long-time lobbyist Sean Moore (2005), in a report prepared for the Muttart 
Foundation, defined various forms of influence, most of which Sustain has demonstrated 
to some degree. These include: 
- motivating government to “initiate/modify/sustain/continue/terminate/limit 
something by way of law, regulation, policy, program or other expenditure”;  
- being ‘at the table’ for consultations;  
- being acknowledged by media, government and other organizations as a ‘player’;  
- successfully gaining funding or a mandate from government; 
- influencing the definition of criteria; 
- increasing decision-makers’ understanding (2005, p. 9). 
 
Chapter 6 illustrates that much of Sustain’s government relations and advocacy work to 
2013 focused on working with government on the introduction and content of the LFA. 
This ‘inside’ strategy (Gormley and Cymrot, 2006) was selected in part because Sustain 
had established relationships with individuals in the premier’s office. It was also because, 
according to Director Nuaimy-Barker, “The kinds of issues we’re dealing with are not 
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popular issues” with the general public (S3), even those related to the LFA, such as 
whether government sets targets, or forest and freshwater foods are included in the 
definition of ‘local’. Individuals I interviewed inside and outside of Sustain cited factors 
that suggest Sustain had influence, starting with its efforts to get food and farming issues 
on the political agenda (Kingdon, 2003) in 2010-2011 with the Alliance’s Vote ON Food 
& Farming election campaigns.  
 
Sustain entered this policy space at an ideal time. As noted in Chapter 2, public discourse 
around where food is produced, how it is produced, and food insecurity was growing in 
the mid-2000s, particularly in large urban communities. Government recognized a 
problem existed (Kingdon’s (2003) first ‘stream’: a problem is recognized) and wanted to 
respond, but lacked connections to the diverse set of actors involved in local, sustainable 
food and farming. When Metcalf and Sustain published the two context papers in 2008 
and 2010 highlighting barriers and solutions, government recognized the Alliance could 
help policy makers understand diverse perspectives and possibly bridge urban and rural 
food and farming interests. 
 
Policy makers I interviewed indicated they were receptive to Sustain as a new voice for a 
variety of reasons: Sustain appeared knowledgeable; the Alliance was respectful of 
regional issues; and Sustain gave voice to perspectives government wanted to better 
understand (PM1, PM5, PM6, PM7, PM8). Miller, Razon-Abad, Covey and Brown 
(1994) note that “inside allies” are crucial to achieving policy change and enhancing the 
legitimacy of coalitions inside government. As illustrated in Chapter 6, Sustain appears to 
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have developed productive relationships with at least some policy makers who might be 
characterized as allies.   
 
During interviews, some policy makers indicated they reached for Sustain prior to the 
introduction of the LFA to help them better understand regional food and farming issues 
and the broader political landscape (PM1, PM2, PM3). This suggests Sustain fulfilled the 
role of ‘knowledge broker’ as described by Hargadon (1998, 2002). The Alliance also 
offered policy makers a variety of solutions to identified problems, evidence of 
Kingdon’s (2003) second ‘stream’: policy solutions are available. One policy maker 
indicated he sought Sustain’s assistance in analyzing proposed policies (PM8). As we 
saw in Chapter 6, one policy maker in the premier’s office indicated Sustain was “the go-
to group” on the LFA. I think these examples demonstrate that Sustain ‘increased 
understanding’ which is another indicator of policy influence (Moore, 2005). These 
examples support MacRae’s (2009) contention that CSOs possess the information and in-
depth knowledge to inform the details of policy and program design. Policy makers’ 
efforts to seek out Sustain’s perspective suggests that they consider Sustain to be a 
credible and legitimate player in the policy process with relevant knowledge and insights.  
 
Moore (2005) and MacRae (2009) reinforce that understanding how the policy process 
works is important for those wanting to have influence. Although we saw in Chapter 6 
that some policy makers questioned Sustain’s policy acuity, Sustain learned through 
doing and adapted its government relations strategy and tactics. Spokespeople initially 
engaged government on the political side as some individuals in the premier’s office were 
receptive to the ideas presented in the two context papers (see Chapter 2). These 
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relationships, along with the Alliance’s work with all parties in the lead-up to the 2011 
provincial election helped get local food on the government’s agenda. After the Liberals 
were re-elected in 2011 (making the possibility of a local food act more real) Sustain 
shifted its attention to developing relationships with policy makers at OMAFRA. 
Recruiting an Acting Director from OMAFRA assisted Sustain in better understanding 
the ministry and expanding its network of relationships there.  
 
Kingdon’s (2003) third ‘stream’ specifies a political climate that makes action possible. I 
think the provincial political climate contributed to the passage of the LFA in 2013. In the 
2011 election, the Liberal party retained power but lost its majority, ceding seats to the 
Progressive Conservatives and the New Democratic Party (NDP), mainly in South-
western and Northern Ontario (Lupton, 2011). Some speculate this was partially due to 
an urban-rural divide exacerbated by the Liberal’s 2009 Green Energy Act and anger in 
some rural communities over plans to erect wind turbines (Howlett and Ladurantay, 
2011). In October 2012, the Liberals introduced Bill 130, an Act to Enact the Local Food 
Act, and shortly thereafter, premier McGuinty resigned as party leader (Howlett, 
Morrow, Waldie, 2012). The Legislature was prorogued during the Liberal leadership 
race and Bill 130 died.  
 
Kathleen Wynne succeeded McGuinty as premier after winning the Liberal leadership 
race in early 2013. Both premiers appreciated the key role food and farming plays in 
Ontario’s rural and urban economies. Wynne assumed the role of Minister of Agriculture 
and Food and re-introduced the LFA as Bill 36 in March 2013 (OMAFRA, 2013a). 
During legislative discussions of the LFA in 2013, premier Wynne reinforced her 
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commitment to local food. Her April 9, 2013 address to the Legislative Assembly of 
Ontario highlights some of the reasons the issue stayed on the government’s agenda:  
Wherever I go, I see that more and more people are joining the local food 
movement, and it’s doing great things for Ontario: It’s supporting our farmers, 
it’s strengthening our communities and it’s building our economy. From my 
perspective, that’s what the agri-food sector is about. It’s about making sure 
that we understand how important the agri-food industry is to Ontario…. I 
chose to take on the role of Minister of Agriculture and Food because I wanted 
to raise the profile of this important industry. ~ Premier Kathleen Wynne. 
 
Local food was one area where all political parties were able to find common ground in 
2013. Each was mindful of the public and media attention local food was receiving and 
appreciated food and agriculture’s role as a significant economic contributor. Post-
recession, its growth potential appeared to be one of the few economic bright spots in 
Ontario. On April 17, 2013, Toronto-based NDP MPP Jonah Schein delivered a speech in 
the Ontario Legislature entitled “Put Food First” (Schein, 2013). He argued the need for a 
stronger LFA and reinforced the importance of supporting farmers and increasing access 
to sustainable local food. He referenced Sustain and its recommendations related to food 
literacy.  
 
By 2013, OMAFRA appeared to be looking to Sustain as a kind of ‘one-stop shop’ for 
alternative perspectives on issues related to local food and farming. As noted in Chapter 
6, OMAFRA invited Sustain ‘to the table’ for discussion on several occasions, another 
indication of influence according to Moore (2005). Three ‘allies’ ensured Sustain was 
involved in relevant consultation processes (see Chapter 6). These examples too, 
reinforce Sustain had come to be seen as ‘a player’ in the food and farming policy space 
(Moore, 2005).  
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Shortly after the reintroduction of the LFA as Bill 36, some of Sustain’s 
recommendations were reinforced in a joint letter submitted to the Premier and Minister 
of Agriculture and Food on March 28, 2013 by the Ontario Federation of Agriculture 
(OFA), and the Ontario Fruit and Vegetables Growers Association (OFVGA), Sustain 
and several of its network members (Sustain Ontario, 2013b). The OFA and OFVGA are 
both large conventional agriculture associations that are significant actors in the 
agricultural policy space, and both have lengthy historical connections to OMAFRA. 
These actors drafted an initial letter responding to Bill 36 and asked Sustain if the 
Alliance would support it. This is an indication that even some conventional agricultural 
actors are starting to see Sustain as ‘a player’ in the policy space.  
 
Sustain agreed to sign onto the letter, and requested OFA and OFVGA incorporate 
content the Alliance’s staff drafted reinforcing the importance of improving basic food 
literacy and food access (S2). Sustain’s proposed content was included in the letter which 
also reinforced that the LFA should incorporate measures to address regional economic 
development and provide incentives for environmentally sustainable practices. Food 
literacy was eventually incorporated into the final Act, along with annual government 
reporting, something Sustain had advocated for all along (S3). Researchers such as 
MacRae (2009) and Leach and Mazur (2013) reinforce the power of forming alliances 
with ‘strange bedfellows’ when attempting to influence policy. In this instance, the 
submission of the joint letter with the OFA and OFVGA likely enhanced their collective 
influence. This may explain why, as we saw in Chapter 6, several policy makers 
encouraged Sustain to engage traditional farm groups in dialogue.  
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During legislative discussions of the second reading of the LFA in April 2013, members 
on all sides of the House referred to Sustain, some Alliance members (e.g. Just Food and 
RAIN – the Rural Agri-Innovation Network), and Sustain’s recommendations (Singh, 
2013b). The language used by policy makers when debating the LFA reflected some of 
Sustain’s recommendations, e.g. on food literacy, food hubs, and forest and fresh water 
foods (Mantha, 2013). The adoption of advocate’s language by government is another 
indication of influence according to one former policy-maker I interviewed (PM10). 
Some of Sustain’s members were subsequently consulted on the definition of local used 
in the Act. As noted in Chapter 6, at the November 2013 AC meeting, one member 
credited Sustain’s efforts for the inclusion of ‘forest and freshwater foods’ in the 
definition of local used in the final Act.  
 
While some of Sustain’s recommendations were incorporated in the final LFA passed on 
November 5, 2013, it does not specifically address the ‘sustainable’ dimensions of local 
production. Consequently the final content of the LFA was not entirely satisfactory to 
members, many of whom consider it a partial win. It is unclear whether an over-emphasis 
on internal legitimacy as discussed in the previous section affected the Alliance’s ability 
to present a clear, focused ask to government. Although the absence of references to 
sustainability in the LFA may suggest Sustain’s influence was limited, most of those I 
interviewed consider the Act something to build on. The Act did establish a Local Food 
Fund investment fund which will inject $30 million over three years into local food 
initiatives around Ontario. Sustain and many of its members are eligible to apply and may 
benefit from this investment. The decision-making process has been slow due to the large 
number of applications government received (S3). An update on OMAFRA’s site 
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indicates they are reviewing the program after receiving more than 300 applications 
totalling $60 million in requests by June 30, 2014 (OMAFRA, 2014c).  
 
Sustain’s Acting Director, who had previously worked in government, suggested Sustain 
and its members could have done more to acknowledge steps government took – e.g. by 
writing policy makers to express their support for decisions made and the LFA (S5). One 
policy maker I interviewed reinforced the value of doing this, noting that government 
appreciates positive media and opportunities to publicly celebrate success (PM8).   
 
In its first five years Sustain made significant progress establishing relationships with 
policy makers. It appears Sustain’s work with government and OMAFRA on the LFA 
was constructive and it may have helped establish the Alliance as trusted advisors. 
OMAFRA’s website page on local food includes a link to Sustain as a resource 
(OMAFRA, 2014a). If Sustain continues to grow and engage its membership in 
developing viable policy solutions, I think the Alliance is well positioned to have greater 
influence on Ontario’s food system in future.  
 
In addition to the LFA, a few other policy changes may reflect work undertaken by 
Sustain and/or Sustain’s WGs. Sustain’s Community Compost WG attempted to 
influence changes to composting standards. In September 2012 the Ontario Ministry of 
the Environment introduced a new Composting Framework that updated standards from 
1991 and 2004 (ECO, 2013). Prior to this change, Sustain had raised awareness around 
community composting issues. In 2011 Sustain’s Director and its now Operations 
Manager (who at the time worked for a Toronto-based food security agency) contributed 
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to the development of a paper published by Toronto Food Policy Council that highlighted 
issues related to composting in Toronto (Vidoni, 2011). Later, in 2012, Sustain and 
Community Compost WG members presented on composting at the Urban Agriculture 
Summit where they identified a need for exemptions for small scale composters (Young, 
2012). The Framework, which was updated in 2013, addresses some of the issues 
identified by Sustain in Reg.347 (Section 3 (2) 25 and 26) under the Environmental 
Protection Act (EPA) which states, “no approvals are required for transport and use of 
compost if standards are met”. 
 
Campaigns initiated and promoted by other WGs have also been issue-specific; e.g. the 
‘Flocking options’ campaign focused on expanding options for small chicken producers 
(Flocking options, 2014) and a meat-focused campaign began by highlighting challenges 
stemming from the closure of provincial abattoirs. OMAFRA held consultations on 
proposed changes to meat regulations in 2013 and Sustain’s Meat and Abattoirs WG 
made a formal submission on the proposed amendments. To date these more issue-
specific initiatives appear to have been successful in bringing attention to specific 
challenges within the provincial food system, however it is not clear they have influenced 
policy reform. This suggests Sustain should consider how to adapt its strategies and 
tactics to move such issues forward in future.  
 
Although Sustain’s work highlights the interconnections between food system issues and 
priorities in other ministries such as education and health, the Alliance has been less 
successful in engaging policy makers in these ministries. Staff indicate this is partly a 
reflection of a lack of resources, as well as the fact that these ministries do not yet fully 
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appreciate how food and agriculture relates to their desired outcomes. We saw in Chapter 
6 that Sustain, as co-lead of the Ontario Collaborative Group in Healthy Eating and 
Physical Activity’s (OCGHEAPA) Design Team/WG, helped organize a successful inter-
ministerial dialogue to orient ministry staff to the OFNS in 2013. This meeting expanded 
awareness about how food system issues impact other issue areas and established new 
connections between policy makers and civil society groups. These connections should 
facilitate future dialogue.  
 
Two policy makers I interviewed reinforced that policy change ultimately comes about in 
response to public pressure (PM2, PM7). Sustain entered as a new, alternative voice in 
what is a crowded policy space dominated by large conventional agricultural groups that 
are interested in maintaining the status quo. As noted above, Sustain’s entry appears to 
have been well-timed given the rising interest in local food issues, a void in voices and 
the political climate. Sustain’s Vote ON Food election campaigns attempted to leverage 
this public interest by encouraging members and their community networks to engage 
local politicians throughout the province. 65% of members surveyed in 2013 indicated 
their organization communicates sustainable food and farming policy solutions to policy 
makers and decision makers at various levels of government (e.g. the LFA, Flocking 
Options, the ONFS, and municipal and regional issues). Although not directly aimed at 
the general public, Sustain’s ongoing social media outreach and ‘Growing Good Food 
Ideas’ video series educates broader audiences about food and farming issues and 
innovations. Sustain appreciates the importance of building public support, but due to 
resource and capacity limitations has not focused significant effort outside government 
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on public education and communications. Whether to shift tactics (and resources) to build 
public support represents a strategic choice for future consideration.  
 
Sustain’s ‘Growing Good Food Ideas’ video series was co-funded through an OMAFRA 
grant. Moore (2005) suggests that successfully securing government funding is another 
indication of influence. In Chapter 6, we saw that several policy makers agreed. One 
from OMAFRA suggested that awarding Sustain this small pool of funding may have 
been a test of the Alliance’s ability to work with government (PM7). In the fall of 2013 
the Alliance applied for a larger grant as part of the province’s $30 million Local Food 
Fund.  
 
Several internal stakeholders acknowledged progress made by Sustain. One SC member 
interviewed mid-2013 characterized this as ‘a new moment’ for the Alliance, noting that 
Sustain’s relationship with policy makers has evolved and the Alliance is shifting away 
from advocacy into more of an advisory role (AC7). Sustain has established some 
external legitimacy, and now needs to expand on its work with OMAFRA to other 
government ministries, and other levels of government to influence policy reform. 
 
 
7.6 IN SUMMARY 
Sustain has structured and woven a diverse provincial network that reflects all parts of the 
food system. Actors in Ontario’s sustainable food and farming movement are better 
connected and informed than they were prior to the establishment of Sustain. Network 
organizational structures, strategies and processes introduced to date appear to have been 
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largely appropriate for Sustain’s early years. Together, these have enabled network 
members to connect, lend their expertise and take action on issues of common interest.  
 
According to the four dimensions of network health examined in this chapter, i.e. purpose 
and strategy, capacity, performance and operational processes, Sustain’s network appears 
reasonably healthy. This is important as the network is the vehicle Sustain uses to 
cultivate legitimacy and implement its strategies to achieve policy reform. There appears 
to be room for improvement in some areas of network health such as clarity of purpose, 
and communicating Sustain’s objectives externally. In terms of capacity, continuing to 
access and engage committed volunteers with relevant skills will be important going 
forward. Sustain may also want to secure resources to hire staff to focus on policy 
development and analysis, since that is such a core part of the Alliance’s work. 
Continuing to refine strategies and formalize processes related to decision-making, 
priority-setting and strategy development and implementation should contribute 
positively to internal legitimacy and enhance overall network health.  
 
Sustain has started to become more institutionalized; however the impact of this on 
network health is not yet clear. The Director and one Co-Chair are mindful of what might 
be lost if institutionalization stifles flexibility (S3, AC1), so continuing to maintain a 
balanced approach in this and other network tensions will remain important.  
 
Sustain encountered a number of contradictions which proved challenging to resolve.  
Malinsky and Lubelsky (2011), in their guide to network evaluation, note this is not 
uncommon in networks. At Sustain, contradictions often appeared in the form of 
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questions framed as “should we do X or Y”. We saw examples of this in Chapters 5 and 
6: should we allow individuals to be members, or restrict membership to organizations? 
Should Sustain take positions, or not? Are we about consensus, or not? Such ‘either/or’ 
framing can be divisive. Malinsky and Lubelsky (ibid) found that, for the networks they 
studied, “Framing these paradoxes as pairs of complementary tendencies rather than as 
either/or choices proved to be helpful” (ibid: 29). They suggest networks may be better 
served by framing questions in a ‘both/and’ way. Although some at Sustain initially 
framed membership questions in an either/or way, others attempted to reframe the 
question by asking, “what would be lost if individuals were excluded”? In Sustain’s case, 
the questions above could be reframed as, ‘how can we define membership based on 
organizations, and continue to include individuals who are not connected to an 
organization?’ Sustain eventually arrived at such a ‘both/and’ solution, formally 
establishing two membership classes with different rights and responsibilities, one for 
organizations (members with voting rights) and one for individuals (supporters without 
voting rights). This may be a useful approach to engage in future.  
 
When confronted with such contradictions, Sustain may also want to ask what choice 
makes sense now, in the broader context. It can be helpful to remember that after a choice 
is made, a network can implement it, study the impact, and if necessary make another 
choice. This is particularly useful to keep in mind when the choice does not require a 
significant investment of resources. This might expedite decision-making and enable the 
Alliance to maintain momentum and learning.  
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From 2009-2013 Sustain invested substantial energy internally, growing, structuring, 
weaving and nurturing a legitimate, healthy network. In parallel, the Alliance worked 
externally, engaging in research, brokering knowledge, establishing relationships with 
government, and cultivating legitimacy in the policy space. The Alliance’s dual 
internal/external legitimacy building strategy, which Human and Provan (2000) reinforce 
is important, assisted Sustain in cultivating legitimacy and contributed to policy 
influence.  
 
On the policy reform side, Sustain entered the policy space at an opportune time. The 
Alliance’s chosen strategies and processes, to reform policy by examining and 
researching issues and working with government (an ‘inside’ strategy), were somewhat 
successful. The Alliance’s ability to aggregate thought and develop thoughtful policy got 
Sustain invited ‘to the table’. The Alliance made effective use of the expertise of 
individuals and groups from different sectors to document research and develop largely 
viable solutions and recommendations for policy makers’ consideration. In doing so 
Sustain established constructive relationships with some policy makers on the political 
and bureaucratic sides.  
 
Sustain benefitted from the public interest in food and farming over the last few years and 
this, to some degree, legitimized the Alliance’s place at the table. Whether public interest 
in local food and farming will wax or wane is unclear. As Sustain’s network reach 
continues to grow, more communities can be engaged in the conversation. Continuing to 
support and mobilize network members to share and amplify sustainable food and 
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farming solutions in communities across the province may help maintain and magnify 
public interest.  
 
As noted in Chapter 6, it appears Sustain has emphasized the interests of actors in 
sustainable food and farming (many of whom are members) over consumers’ (i.e. eaters’) 
perspectives on food and farming. While this may have been done in the interest of 
internal legitimacy or in an attempt to legitimize the Alliance as a voice in the 
agricultural policy space, one wonders whether highlighting the perspectives of the 
province’s consumers would reinforce that Sustain is acting in the public interest. This 
would require Sustain to shift to more of an ‘outside’ government relations strategy 
(Gormley and Cymrot, 2006) with greater emphasis on public education and engagement. 
Doing so would require new tactics and related processes. A shift in this direction might 
enhance the Alliance’s legitimacy in the eyes of government; increase the general 
public’s understanding of the importance of moving to a more sustainable food system; 
and convince Ontarians, many of whom live in urban communities, to cast their vote for 
sustainable, local food and farming. The ability to mobilize public support and bring 
voters to the table would increase Sustain’s power and influence in the policy space.  
 
Ontario’s food system is dominated by conventional agricultural actors and institutional 
players, many of whom are invested in, and interested in maintaining, the status quo. 
These actors have long-standing relationships with OMAFRA and represent large 
numbers of conventional producers of all sizes. As a comparatively smaller network of 
mainly alternative actors, Sustain’s ability to influence policy reform in such a system 
may be limited. Sustain has started to engage in dialogue with some conventional groups 
  267 
on some issues, however deeper and more frequent dialogue might enhance 
understanding on both sides. If Sustain could find common cause with conventional 
farming groups, their collective voice could be difficult for government to ignore. As we 
saw earlier, the joint submission on the LFA in the spring of 2013, appeared to influence 
content in the final Act. Bill 36 was amended so that the definition of local food includes 
“forest and freshwater food”; the amended Bill also specifies the Minister will establish 
goals or targets in three areas: “improving food literacy in respect of local food”, 
“encouraging increased use of local food by public sector organizations”, and “increasing 
access to local food” (Ontario government, 2013).  
 
Sustain has positioned the Alliance, and is considered by some policy makers, as an 
aggregator of thought. For government, it is helpful to have such a group convene and 
synthesize the perspectives of diverse alternative actors in the food and farming system. 
Sustain’s Director reinforced in an interview that doing the hard work of negotiating and 
distilling recommendations that most network members can support is important (S3). 
Sustain needs to design more efficient and effective processes to facilitate that 
challenging and time-consuming work. By 2013 Sustain’s visibility and profile had 
grown; members and external stakeholders will likely expect the Alliance to have a 
position on more emerging local food and farming issues. If Sustain does not have an 
informed and timely response or defined position it may detract from the Alliance’s 
external legitimacy, influence and power.  
 
Interviews with policy makers suggest coalitions can play a valuable role in policy 
reform. One policy maker suggested that a group like Sustain “that produces reports and 
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compiles statistics and supporting documents related to specific public policies can help a 
political party… and other organizations to mobilize public support” (PM2). Another 
former policy maker commented that government dislikes surprises and the value of a 
coalition can be “in anticipating for government where the pitfalls and the issues might be 
around a policy” (PM10). If, as was suggested in chapter 6, Sustain engages in more 
dialogue with conventional agricultural groups, the Alliance might be in a better position 
to communicate how proposed policy solutions might be received by different groups.  
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CHAPTER 8 FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION 
 
In an attempt to answer my research question, I focused on Sustain Ontario: the Alliance 
for Healthy Food and Farming as a case study. In this Chapter I outline key findings and 
conclusions related to my research question: how does a non-governmental, cross-
sectoral policy coalition’s choices related to structures, strategies, and processes, 
affect its ability to cultivate legitimacy and influence public policy? 
 
8.1 FINDINGS 
Sustain built a diverse cross-sectoral alliance and cultivated internal and external 
legitimacy by selecting and employing a combination of five strategies: two focused 
internally on network- and organization-building, and three focused externally on 
research, government relations and policy reform. Although it would be impossible to 
replicate Sustain’s experience exactly, other coalitions may benefit from taking the 
following findings into consideration when making choices about structures, strategies 
and processes.  
Sustain’s ability to have a modest, but still significant, influence on public policy stems 
from: 
1. The Alliance’s network organizational structures and membership that enabled 
Sustain to engage and leverage requisite skills and knowledge. 
2. Two network- and organization-building strategies and related processes that 
fostered internal relationships and facilitated widespread member engagement and 
enabled Sustain to aggregate thought. 
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3. The development and dissemination of materials such as research reports, 
education and election materials, and policy recommendations to policy makers 
and the public that filled a gap and were well received. 
4. Three interconnected policy-related strategies and processes that enabled the 
Alliance to establish relationships with policy makers grounded in mutual respect. 
I elaborate on each of these findings below.  
Network organizational structures and membership: Sustain’s network organizational 
structures, consisting of the AC, SC, WGs, staff and the membership are described in 
Chapter 5 (Table 5.1 on page 131 provides an overview). As noted in that chapter, these 
structures are a variation on the constellation governance model articulated by Tonya 
Surman (2006). Founding members hoped the model would facilitate active participation 
and dialogue, and collaboration on areas such as policy development and promotion. 
Sustain’s organizational structures enable interested members from diverse sectors to 
participate in a variety of ways and spaces.  
Members with significant interest and commitment can apply to participate as an AC or 
SC member; these two groups provide leadership for the Alliance. AC and SC members 
and the AC’s Co-Chairs invest substantial time and energy in Sustain’s work, lending 
their diverse expertise and engaging their communities and professional networks on 
Sustain’s behalf. Many of these members are considered sector leaders – their collective 
knowledge and expertise have helped shape Sustain’s strategies, and policy development 
and promotion work.  
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The AC and SC structures decentralize network leadership by sharing it among 
approximately 40 members (the SC is a sub-set of AC members). The SC focuses more 
on operations and administration, while the AC provides strategic guidance and policy 
direction. Although decentralization of leadership is useful in a network, the large size 
and diversity of the AC makes it difficult for this group to identify policy priorities for 
the Alliance. At the same time, AC members individually and collectively enhance 
Sustain’s external legitimacy; this is particularly true of the Co-Chairs who act as 
spokespeople for the Alliance. Paradoxically, the lack of clarity of the respective roles 
and expectations of these two overlapping groups sometimes detracts from internal 
legitimacy.  
The Alliance’s WG structure enables members and non-members to take action on issues 
of common interest. WGs provide an opportunity for individuals and groups from 
different parts of the province and from different sectors to engage in discussion and 
action. This structural element was designed to decentralize leadership and promote self-
organization, however staff provide more support to these WGs than originally 
anticipated. This porous structure does, however, extend Sustain’s reach and access to 
knowledge and expertise beyond its membership and enhances the Alliance’s ability to 
respond to emerging policy issues.  
One of the challenges related to WGs has been in maintaining connectedness with other 
WGs and Sustain as a whole. Another challenge relates to ensuring strategic alignment 
between issues addressed by WGs and the Alliance’s broader vision and strategy. We 
saw in Chapter 6 that when a WG promoted a position that was not widely shared, it 
caused confusion and detracted somewhat from internal and external legitimacy. It 
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remains unclear if the benefits of self-organized WGs outweigh a more strategic approach 
to organizing and resourcing WGs around priority policy issues that are clearly aligned 
with Sustain’s vision for a sustainable local food system.   
Sustain’s staff fulfill many of the key ‘backbone’ support roles identified by Kania and 
Kramer (2011). They weave and support the network by connecting and convening 
members, showcasing solutions, facilitating dialogue, and aggregating thought. Sustain’s 
two Directors and Acting Director each brought different skills and expertise that have 
contributed to Sustain’s evolution and internal and external legitimacy. With a lean staff 
complement, all staff play multiple roles. Sustain supplements its staff capacity with 
interns who extend the Alliance’s capacity in areas such as public policy development. 
Questions concerning staff capacity limitations in the areas of research and policy 
development might benefit from additional consideration. Although between staff and 
interns, members and volunteers, Sustain appears to have the capacity and processes in 
place to develop and promote viable policy solutions in a non-partisan way, there are 
indications that in future, processes may need to be adapted so that Sustain can be more 
proactive and respond rapidly to fleeting windows of opportunity.   
As with the AC, external stakeholders such as policy makers pay attention to individual 
staff and volunteer leaders. Sustain’s Co-Chairs and Directors cultivated constructive 
relationships with policy makers by taking a solutions-oriented approach, sharing 
relevant research and information, and engaging them in dialogue. Although the 
Alliance’s approach has been largely well-received, as discussed in Chapter 6, some 
policy makers questioned the extent to which urban-based staff understand the realities of 
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agriculture in Ontario. In contrast, the fact that Sustain’s Co-Chairs have ‘skin in the 
game’ enhanced the Alliance’s legitimacy in the eyes of some policy makers. 
From 2009-2013 Sustain cultivated a diverse membership that grew beyond the 
Alliance’s largely urban roots in Southwestern Ontario to approximately 450 members. 
Although most in the broader membership are not active participants, members represent 
a constituency that engages periodically in dialogue about how to cultivate a more 
sustainable food system in Ontario. Although not members of Sustain, a much larger 
community is connected to Sustain via social media (e.g. more than 9000 Twitter 
followers). The size and diversity of the Alliance’s membership and larger constituency 
assists Sustain in promoting policy solutions and generally enhances the Alliance’s 
external legitimacy.  
In 2013 Sustain developed a new paid membership model that was to be launched at the 
end of the year (see Chapter 5). Once implemented, this model will enable Sustain to 
more clearly define and engage its members (and supporters) and generate some revenues 
to support its work (as well as that of its members). Although Sustain’s staff anticipate 
the new model will reduce the number and diversity of the membership initially, the 
formalization of membership will enhance accountability and internal legitimacy by 
clarifying mutual expectations. The additional transparency concerning who is ‘invested’ 
in Sustain’s work will likely enhance the Alliance’s legitimacy in the eyes of policy 
makers who pay attention to coalition composition. 
Staff and members periodically reflected on what has worked well and less well with 
respect to the Alliance’s initial structures. As noted in Chapters 5 and 6, increasing 
connectivity between structural elements, clarifying roles and responsibilities, and 
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addressing some gaps in Sustain’s network structures and related processes while 
continuing to balance network tensions (Chapter 7), would help enhance the Alliance’s 
internal legitimacy, keep members actively engaged and contribute to network health.  
 
Overall, Sustain’s network organizational structures and related processes have served 
the Alliance reasonably well to date. They enabled the Alliance to attract and engage a 
diverse network and to leverage network members’ skills and expertise. Within these 
structures, those who are actively involved have implemented the five core strategies and 
related processes described below.  
 
Two network- and organization-building strategies and processes: The Alliance defined 
and implemented two strategies which I characterize as network- and organization-
building: “Network” and “Showcase” (see Chapter 5). Through these strategies and 
related processes Sustain attracts and engages diverse members in dialogue and collective 
action, and promotes good food ideas being implemented in different parts of the 
province. These two strategies contributed positively to Sustain’s internal and external 
legitimacy.   
 
The “Network” strategy involves reaching out to prospective members, and convening 
and connecting members in various on- and off-line ‘spaces’.  In implementing this 
strategy, Sustain’s staff play many of the “weaver” roles identified by Krebs and Holley 
(2002): convening, facilitating, acting as network guardians, and coordinating projects. 
The Alliance convenes members to facilitate collaboration and the exchange of ideas, and 
to build capacity to implement sustainable food system solutions. Dialogue in these 
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spaces enhances collective understanding of the interconnectedness of food, health, social 
justice, environmental, and farming issues and helps identify common ground. This 
strategy and related weaving processes appear particularly important given that Sustain 
has such a diverse, cross-sectoral membership.  
 
The network’s collective knowledge and expertise assists the Alliance in identifying 
windows of opportunity (Kingdon, 2003) and articulating viable solutions informed by 
innovative work being done on the ground. Staff develop and implement processes to 
consult with members on emerging issues, priorities and draft policy solutions. These 
processes remain a work in progress. In late 2013 Sustain was in the midst of more 
clearly defining its decision-making and priority-setting processes and a strategic 
planning initiative was on the horizon.  
 
The Alliance’s “Showcase” strategy involves identifying and promoting emerging 
solutions – i.e. “good food ideas” – underway in Ontario and beyond. Sustain documents 
successes and challenges in various forms to expand understanding, inspire adaptation 
and replication, inform a common vision, and highlight the need for policy reform. I 
consider this strategy internal because it enables members of the network to identify 
others working on similar issues and it expands awareness and understanding of complex 
food system issues. In some respects, however, it can be considered an external strategy 
in the sense that ‘showcased’ solutions are ultimately shared with the general public and 
policy makers.  
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The Alliance’s biennial conference, Bring Food Home, is a key vehicle through which 
Sustain, its members, and others showcase their experience and ideas. The conference has 
grown in size and sophistication, attracting members, non-members, and policy makers 
from across the province. It has become a useful space for those interested in sustainable 
food and farming to meet and connect with others to explore innovative solutions and 
make sense of complex problems. The conference highlights Sustain’s ability to convene 
diverse members of the provincial food and farming movement and this likely contributes 
positively to the Alliance’s external legitimacy.  
 
Ontario’s vast geography means that technology is critical to Sustain’s ability to reach 
out to and engage members, the public, and policy makers in different communities. The 
Alliance uses its website, social media, teleconferencing, webinars and videos (see 
‘Growing Good Food Ideas’ videos on page 165) to communicate with and engage 
members and others, disseminate reports, and showcase solutions. Although collaborating 
virtually can be challenging, these tools are critical as they enable Sustain to solicit input 
from members and assist the Alliance in finding common ground.  
 
These two strategies are interconnected and contribute positively to Sustain’s internal and 
external legitimacy. Sustain’s ability to convene and actively engage a highly diverse 
membership allows it to produce a range of materials (see below) including policy 
recommendations that are generally considered viable. These strategies also enhance the 
legitimacy of the network as ‘entity’, ‘form’ and ‘interaction’ (Human and Provan, 2000) 
for internal and external stakeholders.  
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These and the three policy-related strategies described below were to some degree 
deliberate but also emergent. Broad strategies were defined at a high level. More detailed 
strategies, tactics and related processes evolved or were developed as Sustain learned 
from experience and responded to opportunities.  
 
Development and dissemination of materials: As noted above, Sustain documents 
challenges and solutions in various forms and often uses technology to disseminate 
materials. Materials the Alliance and its members have developed include case studies, 
research papers, educational webinars, policy papers and election materials. Most are 
available on Sustain’s website for members, the general public and policy makers to 
access. Internal and external stakeholders alike can, and do, assess the quality of the 
content. In general, these materials are valued and have contributed positively to 
Sustain’s internal and external legitimacy. Sustain paid attention to framing (e.g. with the  
‘good food ideas’ branding) and invested in design and this appears to have helped some 
of the Alliance’s materials ‘stick’ (Heath and Heath, 2007) over time. 
 
Network members are invited, and have, contributed to the development of Sustain’s 
materials. This is particularly true in the case of policy documents, such as the briefs and 
backgrounders Sustain produced to inform the LFA. Some more operational WGs, like 
the Government Relations WG, assisted in the development of election materials, which 
members disseminated in communities across the province in advance of municipal and 
provincial elections. Staff’s attention to content, framing and design enhanced the 
professionalism of these materials which in turn contributed to Sustain’s internal and 
external legitimacy.  
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As discussed in more detail below, Sustain also shares relevant materials directly with 
individual policy makers. The first two Metcalf-funded Solutions papers (Baker, Campsie 
and Rabinowicz, 2010, Metcalf Foundation, 2008a), which have come to be associated 
with Sustain, were critical to opening doors to discussions with policy makers. These 
papers were well-received in part because they are research-based and told a story that 
reflected the public’s growing interest and concern about local food and sustainable food 
production. Although these papers didn’t contain recommendations, they mapped out 
interconnected issues, profiled ‘good food ideas’ and gave voice to actors that the 
government previously had limited connections to. These context papers helped 
communicate and to a certain extent ‘brand’ Sustain’s interests and they established a 
platform for longer-term dialogue. 
 
Three interconnected policy-related strategies and processes: Sustain’s policy-related 
strategies include: “Examine and research”, “Government relations” and “Policy reform” 
(see Chapter 6). In combination, these strategies implemented by members and staff 
enabled Sustain to develop productive relationships with policy makers. Focusing efforts 
on these three strategies assisted Sustain in getting local food on the provincial agenda 
and influencing the content of the LFA.  
 
During the discussions that lead to the formation of Sustain, founding members began 
identifying barriers to a sustainable food system, interconnected issues, and innovative 
solutions. Research was undertaken to better understand the provincial context and 
findings were documented in the first of a series of five Solutions papers sponsored by 
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Metcalf between 2008 and 2010. Since that time Sustain has published other research 
reports including six working papers in 2013 entitled, “Policies from the Field”. A 
number of these reports were developed in collaboration with other researchers and 
organizations, and this approach extended Sustain’s research capacity. Sustain uses 
research and reports to document what is happening in the field, showcase local and 
international solutions, and expand understanding. Sustain’s ability to aggregate thought 
from researchers and experts in the field and translate those into viable policy 
recommendations is valued by policy makers and made the Alliance a “go-to” group for 
some. 
 
Sustain’s materials helped position the Alliance as ‘knowledge brokers’ (Hargadon 1998, 
2002). Sustain’s spokespeople and members used research and other materials Sustain 
produced as an opportunity to reach out to and engage policy makers in discussion. While 
in some cases the research the Alliance shared confirmed what government already 
believed or suspected, in other cases it introduced new perspectives; policy makers 
reported that both types have value. The literature I reviewed indicates that some policy 
makers value information, research and evidence more than others and interviews with 
policy makers affirmed this. Sharing quality research and information may have triggered 
the principle of reciprocity described by Cialdini, (2008) and made policy makers more 
receptive to Sustain’s ideas and recommendations.  
 
Research reports were an important ingredient in Sustain’s “Government relations” 
strategy. As noted in Chapter 6, the Alliance selected an ‘inside’ strategy that involved 
building relationships and working with government (Gormley and Cymrot, 2006). 
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Spokespeople initially cultivated relationships with representatives from all political 
parties; more recently they have engaged more policy-makers working in the bureaucracy 
(mainly in OMAFRA), something researchers such as MacRae (2009) reinforce is 
important. When meeting with policy makers, Sustain’s spokespeople employed positive, 
constructive approaches with a view to gaining a better understanding of government 
priorities and constraints while helping deepen policy makers’ understanding of food 
system challenges. 
 
Sustain’s spokespeople and its members engaged all political parties in the lead-up to, 
and between, elections in 2010-2013. The Alliance first developed election materials to 
motivate and support members in engaging municipal candidates in 2010. That 
experience informed the more robust Vote ON Food campaigns launched in advance of 
the 2011 and 2013 provincial elections. Members’ efforts in 2011 may have contributed 
to all parties including local food in their electoral platforms, and to the Liberal Party 
proposing a ‘local food act’. After the Liberals introduced Bill 130: an Act to enact the 
Local Food Act, 2012, Sustain engaged representatives from all parties in discussions 
about the intent and content of the Act. Spokespeople were transparent about Sustain’s 
non-partisan government relations approach and this appears to have enhanced the 
Alliance’s legitimacy in the eyes of policy makers. Sustain’s solution-orientation also 
appears to have served the Alliance well.   
 
Sustain’s ‘Policy reform’ strategy was guided by the knowledge and expertise of network 
members and available research. This enabled the Alliance to identify policy gaps and 
possible solutions informed by work underway in the field (in Ontario and beyond). In 
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the case of the LFA, Sustain consulted broadly with network members to identify priority 
‘asks’. The interconnectedness of local food issues and the diversity of members made it 
challenging to distill the number of asks into the three that government expects. Sustain 
opted to go with more than three, to more accurately communicate members’ diverse 
interests, and in the belief that discussions would continue. This decision left some in 
government wondering what Sustain really wanted. I was unable to discern from 
interviews with policy makers how problematic this lack of clarity was, as those I 
interviewed appeared interested in continuing to engage in dialogue with Sustain. Some 
policy-makers indicated they value having a go-to group to help them understand the 
growing number of alternative actors working in food and farming. I sense Sustain, in the 
early days, benefitted from a kind of ‘honeymoon period’ where the Alliance was given 
the benefit of the doubt by some in government who appreciated Sustain was learning 
and had potential. 
 
These three policy-related strategies are interconnected and together they enabled Sustain 
to enter the policy space at a time when there was a void in the area of sustainable food 
and farming. Few of Sustain’s members have the capacity to develop and promote policy 
independently and some that are charitable organizations might have been otherwise 
reluctant to engage in advocacy in the midst of the advocacy chill (Kirkby, 2014). 
Working as part of the Alliance, members were able to share their knowledge and 
expertise and lend their voice to a coordinated effort to reform public policy. This part of 
Sustain’s work, when it reflected members’ diverse interests, enhanced the Alliance’s 
legitimacy internally. The quality of Sustain’s research, materials, and the Alliance’s 
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solutions-oriented approach contributed positively to Sustain’s external legitimacy and 
enabled the Alliance to achieve a degree of influence.  
 
While many aspects of Sustain’s interconnected structures, strategies, and processes 
worked well and contributed positively to the Alliance’s legitimacy, a number of factors 
detracted from internal and external legitimacy. These factors too, underscore the 
interconnectedness of structures, strategies and processes as illustrated by the infinity 
symbol (see Figure 8.1 below). Structurally, confusion related to roles and 
responsibilities within the constellation model detracted from internal legitimacy and 
contributed to complex and unclear decision-making processes. This in turn made it 
challenging for Sustain to agree on whether and what positions to take, which some 
internal stakeholders indicated is problematic when advocating for systemic change. 
Another structural issue concerns the disconnects and limited alignment between 
Sustain’s WGs and the rest of Sustain. In some instances a WG’s related campaign 
detracted from internal legitimacy, creating divisions between members. Externally some 
of the policies promoted as part of these campaigns were seen a ‘non-starters’ politically, 
which detracted from external legitimacy. Another structural issue appears to be the 
limited involvement of members (and staff) with a ‘farming’ perspective, despite 
Sustain’s efforts to diversify. Some external stakeholders pointed this out when 
questioning the Alliance’s policy acuity. Finally, Sustain lacks specific goals and 
priorities for transforming the food system. Mapping the pathway to a more sustainable 
local food system might enable Sustain and its members be more focused, proactive and 
prepared to respond to emerging opportunities for policy reform.  
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Sustain’s choices in its formative years were informed by the expertise and understanding 
available at the time as it was pioneering. During this early life cycle stage, the Alliance 
experimented, took calculated risks, and reflected on the impact of its choices. Sustain 
gradually adapted some of its structures, strategies and processes in response to how 
these impacted legitimacy and influence. In late 2013, concurrent with the passage of the 
LFA which had been a focus the Alliance’s efforts for the previous two years, Sustain 
was nearing the end of a developmental evaluation process. I agree with the member that 
characterized it as a ‘new moment’ for Sustain. The Alliance appears to be on the verge 
of a new stage of development. It seems an opportune time for Sustain to pause, and 
make new choices informed by its experience – i.e. to refresh structures, strategies and 
processes while continuing to monitor, and respond to, emerging policy windows and 
shifts in the external environment.  
 
My research into Sustain’s journey and these findings confirmed the initial conceptual 
model that I hypothesized based on my literature review (see Chapter 3), that a policy 
coalition’s structures, strategies and processes are interconnected and choices related to 
these are important and strategic as they impact legitimacy and policy influence. Figure 
8.1 below presents an update of the original model detailing how Sustain’s choices 
related to structures, strategies and processes positively impacted, and in some cases 
detracted from, the Alliance’s legitimacy. The diagram identifies additional external 
factors that impacted Sustain’s legitimacy and also indicators of Sustain’s policy 
influence.  
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Double-headed arrows have been introduced between the three core constructs (i.e. 
Sustain’s choices, legitimacy and influence) in Figure 8.1 to reinforce the importance of 
monitoring the external environment and how choices made about structures, strategies 
and processes impact legitimacy and influence – positively or negatively. Such feedback 
information can alert a coalition to the need to make new choices and adapt structures, 
strategies or processes. Choices, in and of themselves, are not good nor bad, and should 
be considered temporary rather than static. In other words, choices related to these 
interconnected variables should change over time.  
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8.2 CONCLUSION  
Sustain was established at a time when public interest around local and sustainable food 
and farming was trending, and there was a void in the policy space (see Chapter 2). The 
provincial government appeared interested in responding to the growing public interest, 
but lacked relationships with leaders in the local, sustainable food and farming 
movement. Whether or not they paid attention to all the different external factors 
surrounding legitimacy in Figure 8.1, founding members convened by the Metcalf 
Foundation recognized ‘kairos’ was at play and seized the moment. The group 
determined that forming an Alliance and working as a network would enable diverse 
leaders to exchange perspectives, better understand systemic barriers, and develop and 
promote sustainable food and farming policy solutions. Sustain was formed in late 2008.  
 
For Sustain to do its network development work and influence policy, it must access a 
range of skills, expertise and financial resources all of which potentially contribute to 
Sustain’s legitimacy. Metcalf’s initial investments enabled Sustain to begin structuring 
and weaving a diverse cross-sectoral network with the capacity to develop and promote 
policy solutions. The Acting Director commented that he expects Metcalf’s continued 
investment in Sustain would enhance Sustain’s legitimacy in the eyes of policy-makers 
(S5). In Chapter 6 we saw that several policy makers commented that working with 
government in a contractual arrangement and successfully fulfilling contracts (such as for 
the “Growing good food ideas” videos) enhances an organization’s legitimacy.  
 
This research highlights that legitimacy has been an important factor in Sustain’s ability 
to engage in the policy space and influence policy reform. The five core strategies 
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described above assisted Sustain in cultivating legitimacy internally with members, and 
externally with other stakeholders, in a relatively short period, 2009-2013.  
 
As discussed in chapters 5-7, when assessing legitimacy, internal and external 
stakeholders pay attention to a network’s composition, activities and processes; as well as 
decisions, materials, and communications. As a result, perceptions of internal and 
external legitimacy fluctuate constantly. I assert that the cultivation of legitimacy is 
something policy-focused networks need to consider when choosing and implementing 
structures, strategies and processes. Additionally, because choices made at one point in 
time may or may not endure, it is critical for networks to monitor the impact of choices 
made and changing conditions in the external environment. This information will help a 
coalition determine if it is time to make new choices.   
 
Sustain’s combination of deliberate and emergent strategies served the Alliance well in a 
policy environment where ‘windows of opportunity’ open and close quickly (Kingdon, 
2003). Because the Alliance, and its products and actions, were trusted and respected by 
internal members and external audiences alike, Sustain achieved a degree of policy 
influence particularly in relation to the LFA (see Chapter 7). Other organizations aiming 
to create change through policy reform might draw on Sustain’s experience with respect 
to both internal network- and organization-building, and external policy-focused, 
strategies and processes. 
 
Significant effort, skill and resources are required to weave, convene and consult with 
network members on an ongoing basis. A network organization’s approach to this 
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internal work affects a network’s health, ability to generate desired network effects, and 
capacity to develop and promote viable policy solutions. Sustain’s network appeared 
reasonably healthy in 2013, however maintaining the network’s health and effectiveness 
will require continued attention. At the same time, Sustain needs to continue to focus on 
its desired outcome – transforming the food system – and ensure that work done to weave 
and nurture the network does not detract from the Alliance’s externally focused policy 
reform efforts. 
 
This study has demonstrated that there are important connections between a policy 
network’s structures, strategies and processes and its ability to influence policy reform. 
This suggests that choices in each of these areas are strategic in nature and need to be 
continually examined and refreshed over time. As external conditions change, different 
choices will need to be made concerning how to structure and weave a network and the 
specific tactics and processes used to influence policy reform if a network is to maintain 
and enhance its legitimacy and influence. 
 
8.2.1 Considerations for nascent networks  
Achieving systemic change is complex and often requires government intervention at a 
policy level. Systems transformation cannot be achieved by any single organization, nor 
by government acting in isolation. Non-governmental organizations and civil society 
actors have significant knowledge and expertise to inform policy discussions. Because 
social issues are complex and often interconnected, working as a network or coalition can 
expand collective understanding and enable a group to exert more influence than the 
same set of organizations acting independently.  
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It appears that cross-sectoral coalitions and alliances such as Sustain can offer policy 
makers distinct value compared to a single issue organization. Such groups can help those 
working on interconnected issues and policy makers understand the broader landscape 
including the interests of diverse actors. Convening diverse actors in dialogue and 
conducting research enabled Sustain to identify barriers and formulate policy solutions. 
Adequate skills and effective processes enabled the Alliance to aggregate thought and 
develop informed, viable solutions that reflected diverse interests compared to single 
issue or sector coalitions. Coalitions like Sustain appear to be in a better position to 
demonstrate they are acting in the broader public interest.  
 
Although working in a cross-sectoral network or coalition can produce positive network 
effects (see Chapter 7), the work of bringing together different perspectives, culture and 
language is challenging. Networks can attract many by offering a broad vision, but as we 
saw at Sustain this can make it difficult to find common ground and balance the interests 
of diverse members. Designing a network that can attract and effectively engage the right 
mix of actors and finding ways for them to work together effectively is an important 
aspect of a network’s strategy that will impact its ability to effect change. Some groups 
expend a great deal of time and energy on collaboration and dialogue with few tangible 
results. By virtue of its composition and issue focus, each network is unique, 
nevertheless, this study demonstrates that networks need to consider the 
interconnectedness of structures, strategies, processes and outcomes and make, and re-
make, deliberate choices in these areas. It appears a network can benefit from having a 
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backbone support organization (Kania and Kramer, 2011), such as Sustain had, to 
coordinate and facilitate its work and evaluate the results.  
 
Public policy decisions are influenced by multiple actors and external factors. Networks 
wanting to influence policy need the capacity to monitor the changing environment and 
identify windows of opportunity. Although government generally sets the agenda, and 
Kingdon (2003) suggests influencing what is on the agenda is often more challenging 
than responding to what is already on it, Sustain was credited with having influenced the 
agenda on local food. Sustain’s experience suggests understanding what is on the agenda 
and then evolving policy reform strategies by blending deliberateness and emergence is 
useful. Maintaining sufficient flexibility and nimbleness to respond to emergent 
opportunities is critical since windows of opportunity often close quickly (ibid). Sustain 
relies heavily on its members and volunteers to do policy development work and network 
connections enable the Alliance to engage members with specific expertise as 
opportunities arise. A coalition’s capacity to sense and seize opportunities is dependent 
on members, and Sustain’s diverse, cross-sectoral members were an important factor. 
Cultivating active, committed members and designing processes to efficiently and 
effectively collect, analyze and act on member input is also important.  
 
Working in networks is messy and, as illustrated in Chapter 7, fraught with contradictions 
and tensions. Network tensions such as flexibility and institutionalization, inclusivity and 
efficiency, and internal and external legitimacy exist in a dynamic balance that shifts 
continuously in response to choices made and actions taken. Focusing strictly on one 
dimension is not recommended as each has complementary value. Responding to, and 
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representing the interests of, diverse members is challenging; through dialogue, listening 
and negotiation Sustain in some cases arrived at solutions that satisfied most members. 
Sustain’s desire to be inclusive meant the Alliance at times tried to be all things to all 
people and this stretched available resources and detracted somewhat from external 
legitimacy. When Sustain was unable to satisfactorily integrate or resolve diverse 
interests it appeared to detract from internal legitimacy. It is helpful if network members 
are comfortable working with ambiguity and are willing to listen, experiment, reflect and 
adapt. Sustain’s developmental evaluation process reinforced the value of 
experimentation, reflection and being open to the unexpected.  
 
8.2.2 Research limitations   
To develop a detailed case study of a cross-sectoral policy coalition, I examined one 
alliance that is not strictly policy-focused. Therefore some of the choices Sustain made 
about structures, strategies and processes were designed not strictly to cultivate 
legitimacy and influence policy reform but to foster connections required to spread and 
implement innovations on the ground.  
 
Additionally, this study represents a snapshot of Sustain’s formative years. The Alliance 
continues to reflect, learn and evolve and already it looks different than the story 
documented here. While Sustain’s experience is singular and cannot be replicated 
exactly, I think the Alliance’s choices may offer insights for other policy-focused 
networks, particularly those in the early stages of development. 
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In studying Sustain, I focused my attention on the Alliance’s leadership (i.e. AC members 
and senior staff), rather than on members at the periphery who are less actively involved. 
I felt it was important to connect with those who are most actively involved on the large 
AC. This means I may have missed out on the perspectives of some less engaged 
members. Consequently, the broader membership’s part in, and perspective on, Sustain’s 
story is not well represented here, with the possible exception of member survey 
comments.  
 
Finally, because I was concerned with understanding Sustain’s structures, strategies and 
processes and how they impacted the network and its policy reform efforts, I did not 
interview many conventional actors engaged in the policy space. Doing so might have 
provided a more nuanced understanding of the Alliance’s legitimacy in the policy space 
and the potential for Sustain to form unusual alliances in future.   
 
8.2.3 Thoughts on future research 
As cross-sectoral policy coalitions are a relatively new phenomenon, I think more and/or 
comparative studies of other Canadian coalitions would help determine whether specific 
structures, strategies and processes are particularly suited to such groups. I also think a 
closer examination of the types of policy solutions cross-sectoral coalitions generate 
compared to those developed by less diverse interest groups, and their respective 
influence would be instructive.  
 
While I think Sustain’s diverse network enables the Alliance to develop informed and 
viable policy recommendations, Sustain’s efforts during its first five years focused 
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mainly on one Ministry, OMAFRA. Although the Alliance appreciates multiple 
ministries have a role and interest in transforming the provincial food and farming 
system, Sustain had limited resources to engage other ministries in policy conversations 
during its formative years. It remains unclear whether Sustain will be able to build 
bridges between ministries and persuade them to develop and implement integrated 
policy solutions. Different strategies and processes may be required to promote integrated 
policy development and that too might be useful to understand.  
 
Although member diversity is an asset for Sustain on many levels, it also presents 
challenges. The Alliance’s new membership model is expected to, at least temporarily, 
shrink the size and diversity of the tent. How that will impact Sustain’s legitimacy and 
ability to develop systemic solutions to complex, interconnected issues remains unclear. I 
continue to wonder how cross-sectoral coalitions can determine whether they have 
engaged an optimal level of diversity. 
 
Research by Creech and Willard (2001) suggests it takes approximately five years to 
establish a productive and influential network as it is a new way of working for many. 
Sustain turned five in 2013 and so the fact that the Alliance has experienced some 
success in influencing policy reform is encouraging. Sustain is a diverse network of 
skilled leaders in sustainable food and farming, with the capacity to develop and promote 
viable policy solutions, constructive relationships with policy makers, and internal and 
external legitimacy. This represents a promising foundation that will enable the Alliance 
to achieve its potential and increase the sustainability and innovation of Ontario’s food 
system in the interest of all Ontarians. 
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APPENDIX A: GLOSSARY OF TERMS 
 
Advocacy: “the act of speaking or of disseminating information intended to influence 
individual behaviour or opinion, corporate conduct, or public policy and law." (Moore, 
2005, p. 8 attributed to VSI Paper “Working Together”). See also ‘public policy 
advocacy’.  
 
Advocacy coalition: “people from a variety of positions (elected and agency officials, 
interest group leaders, researchers, etc.) who share a particular belief system – for 
example a set of basic values, causal assumptions and problem perceptions – and who 
show a non-trivial degree of coordinated activity over time” Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 
1993, p.25) 
 
Agenda/political agenda: Kingdon (2003) defines the political ‘agenda’ as “the list of 
subjects or problems to which government officials and those around them are paying 
serious attention” (p. 3). 
 
Agenda setting: government determines or ‘sets’ the agenda, however others may 
influence the issues that receive government attention/the consideration of policy makers. 
 
Alliance: similar to a coalition, in that it involves groups working together to advance 
shared interests. 
 
Backbone organization: A separate organization with dedicated staff that creates and 
manages collective impact initiatives. Skilled staff “plan, manage, and support the 
initiative through ongoing facilitation, technology and communications support, data 
collection and reporting, and handling the myriad logistical and administrative details 
needed for the initiative to function smoothly. (Kania and Kramer, 2011, p. 40). 
 
Bridge in a network: a node that connects parts of the network that are otherwise 
unconnected; this node may connect the network to other networks. Individuals who are 
‘bridges’ are sometimes referred to as ‘boundary spanners’.  
 
Civil society organizations (CSOs): non-profit and charitable organizations that work to 
address a range of societal issues. 
 
Coalition: “a group of people, groups, or countries who have joined together for a 
common purpose” (Merriam Webster dictionary online). Although a coalition is often 
considered short-term or temporary, the term is sometimes applied to groups that work 
together over longer periods; some develop formal agreements outlining the terms of 
their cooperation. See also ‘policy coalition’. 
 
Collaboration: “a process through which parties who see different aspects of a problem 
can constructively explore their differences and search for solutions that go beyond their 
own limited visions of what is possible” (Gray, 1989, p. 5). 
 
Collaborative capacity: the resources and conditions to support and facilitate 
collaboration towards common goals. 
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Convenor: an individual or organization that identifies the need or opportunity for 
collaboration. The convenor’s role in a collaboration is “to identify and bring all the 
legitimate stakeholders to the table” (Gray, 1989, p. 71). 
 
Design (in a coalition): intentional decisions made regarding how a coalition is 
structured (see structure), what it focuses on (see strategy) and how it undertakes its 
collective work (see processes). 
 
Government relations: “...the service function associated with leading, advising or 
assisting an organization to achieve its political and public-policy objectives.” (Moore, 
2005, p. 8)  
 
Governance: “the purposive means of guiding and steering a society or community”… 
comprised of “a particular set of organizational arrangements.” (Lowndes and Skelcher, 
1998). Governance agreements are often defined through terms of reference, membership 
criteria, policies and practices governing interactions (e.g. decision-making, conflict 
resolution, accountability). 
 
Hub: A dominant node in a network, and the central node in an ego-centered network 
(Burt, 1992). 
 
Influence: “The capacity to have an effect on the character, development, or behaviour 
of someone or something, or the effect itself” (Oxford Dictionary online). In the context 
of a policy-focused coalition, the goal is to influence decision-makers in government.  
 
Issue networks: “Shared-knowledge group[s] having to do with some aspect (or, as 
defined by the network, some problem) of public policy" (Heclo, 1978, p.103).  
 
Knowledge broker: “Knowledge brokers work within many different domains, and 
routinely recombine past experiences in new ways and for new audiences” (Hargadon, 
2002, p. 43). An individual, organization or network may fulfill this role.  
 
Knowledge transfer: “the process by which knowledge is transferred to people and 
organizations that can benefit” (Shields and Evans, 2008 cited Zarinpoush and Gotlib’s 
definition). 
 
Legitimacy: “a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are 
socially desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of 
norms, value, beliefs and definitions” (Suchman, 1995, p. 574). 
 
Link: A relationship or connection between network actors or nodes. A link may be 
identified by the presence of information flows or other forms of exchange. 
 
Lobbying: “…direct communications with public office holders and their advisors as 
part of an effort to influence a decision of government.” (Moore, 2005, p. 8)  
 
Network: multiple definitions exist, the following emphasize different dimensions.  
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- “…a structure involving multiple nodes – agencies and organizations – with 
multiple linkages.” (McGuire and Agranoff, 2007 p. 1).  
- “People connected by relationships” (Scearce, p. 5)  “vehicles for motivating 
people to act and mobilizing collective action” (ibid, p. 8).  
- “…systems of relatively autonomous actors that are working in concert to achieve 
shared goals or pursuing individual goals within a shared system.” (Malinksy and 
Lubelsky, 2008, p.12) 
 
Network boundary: in a ‘bounded’ network, boundaries are clearly defined and 
participants are known (Scearce, 2011). In ‘unbounded’ networks, boundaries are fuzzy 
and it may be unclear who is, or is not, a member of the network. Beyond a network 
boundary there are no linked nodes (Plastrik and Taylor 2010). 
 
Network weaver/weaver: “A Network Weaver is someone who is aware of the networks 
around them and explicitly works to make them healthier (more inclusive, bridging 
divides)” (June Holley, 2010). An individual or organization that “knit[s] together 
networks by introducing people to one another, encouraging new people to join, 
brokering connections across differences and helping participants identify and act on 
opportunities” (Scearce, 2011, p. 16). 
 
Node: a network member connected by relationships to other members; a node may be a 
person, group or organization within a network (Krebs and Holley, 2002). 
 
Non-governmental, cross-sectoral policy coalition: a group of organizations (i.e. issue-
focused organizations that may operate on a non-profit or for profit basis) and possibly 
individuals from different sectors that join forces to advocate for changes to public policy. 
 
Policy coalition (or policy network): a group that engages in coordinated, collective 
action to influence policy decisions and raise awareness of issues with government. I use 
the terms policy coalition and policy network interchangeably in this paper since the 
definition of policy network varies. One broad definition is: 
- Börzel (1997) defines a ‘policy network’ as: "a set of relatively stable 
relationships which are of non-hierarchical and interdependent nature linking a 
variety of actors, who share common interests with regard to a policy and who 
exchange resources to pursue the shared interests acknowledging that co-
operation is the best way to achieve common goals” (p. 1). 
 
Policy entrepreneur: “people who seek to initiate dynamic policy change” (Mintrom, 
1997, p. 739 cited Baumgartner and Jones 1993; King 1988; Kingdon 1984; Polsby 1984) 
 
Processes (in a policy coalition or network): for the purpose of this research, processes 
refers to activities undertaken by a coalition or network to develop and engage their 
members in joint work, e.g. convening, connecting, engaging, consulting, developing 
strategy and policy, promoting policy, and decision-making. 
 
Public Policy: “Public policy refers to decisions taken concerning the selection of goals 
for society and the means of achieving them. It consists of the approaches agreed upon by 
governments, as the custodians of the collective resources and rules, to address particular 
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problems or circumstances.” (Carter, 2011, p. 428). Public policy decisions may take the 
form of legislation, regulations, by-laws, etc.  
 
Public policy advocacy: the approach, strategies and tactics employed by external 
interests to influence decisions of government. (Moore, 2005, p. 8) 
 
Public policy development: relates to the process and substance of exploring and 
creating options for government action or policy (Moore, 2005, p. 8) 
 
Resilience: the ability to withstand and endure stresses, or shocks to a system 
 
Strategic inquiry: “a process of informal but methodical inquiry into the political and 
public-policy environment surrounding an issue prior to – and, in the course of – an 
advocacy initiative”; “an analytical framework designed to produce insight and 
intelligence relevant to formulation of a specific “ask” of Government and the advocacy 
strategy and plan to advance it” (Moore, 2010, p. 15). 
 
Strategy (in a coalition): this refers to the choices a coalition makes regarding how best 
to invest its available resources. A coalition’s choices may be ‘deliberate’, identified and 
articulated in a strategic framework (e.g. vision, mission, strategic priorities and 
directions) and other plans that guide the coalition’s work. Strategy also refers to 
emergent strategies, which may not be formally articulated. These are identified and 
pursued in response to changing conditions and opportunities not anticipated in the 
strategic framework.  
 
Structure (in a coalition): in the context of this research, structure refers to the 
composition, roles, and sub-structures or group (e.g. defined governance structures) a 
coalition designs to organize and accomplish its work 
 
Weaver: see ‘network weaver’. 
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APPENDIX B: OUTCOMES MAP 
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APPENDIX C: LIST OF INTERVIEW CODES AND DATES 
 
I conducted 39 semi-structured interviews in total with 38 internal and external 
stakeholders. Two were joint interviews with two participants. I conducted two follow-up 
interviews and one two-part interview. Chapter 4, Methodology contains additional 
information about the interviews and participants, including sampling. 
 
5 Staff and Interns, 7 interviews 
ID Format Date 
S1 In-person July 3a, 2013 
S2 Telephone July 8a, 2013 
S3 
 
In-person July 9, 2013 & 
February 4, 2014 
S4 In-person August 7a, 2013 
S5 First in-
person, 
second by 
telephone 
August 7b, 2013 & 
May 13, 2014 
  
17 Advisory Council Members, 17 interviews 
Note: includes both Co-Chairs and four Steering Committee members 
ID Format Date 
AC1 Telephone June 10, 2013 
AC2 Telephone June 11, 2013 
AC3 In-person June 26a, 2013 
AC4 Telephone June 26b, 2013 
AC5 Telephone July 2, 2013 
AC6 Telephone July 3b, 2013 
AC7 In-person July 4a, 2013 
AC8 In-person July 4b, 2013 
AC9 Telephone July 5a, 2013 
AC10 Telephone July 8b, 2013 
AC11 Telephone August 8, 2013 
AC12 Telephone August 13, 2013 
AC13 Telephone August 16, 2013 
AC14 Telephone August 22, 2013 
AC15 Telephone September 24, 2013 
AC16 Telephone November 5, 2013 
AC17 Telephone November 12, 2013 
 
10 Policy Makers, 10 interviews 
Note: included one joint, and one two-part interview 
ID Format Date 
PM1 In-person June 18a, 2013 
PM2 Telephone June 18b, 2013 
PM3 Telephone June 18c, 2013 
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PM4 In-person June 19a, 2013 
PM5 
PM6 
In-person, 
joint 
interview 
June 19b, 2013 
PM7 Telephone June 26c, 2013 & 
July 4c, 2013 
PM8 In-person July 3c, 2013 
PM9 In-person July 5b, 2013 
PM10 Telephone July 8c, 2013 
 
6 Other Stakeholders, 5 interviews 
ID Format Date 
O1 In-person August 21a, 2013 
O2 
O3 
Telephone, 
3-way 
call/joint 
interview 
August 21b, 2013 
O4 In-person September 17, 2013 
O5 Telephone November 4, 2013 
O6 Telephone April 25, 2014 
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APPENDIX D: SUSTAIN’S HISTORICAL MILESTONES  
2008: Metcalf published “Food Connects Us All”; in late 2008 Sustain was formally 
incorporated, established as a project of Tides Canada with a Steering Committee and an 
Advisory Council (the 21 individuals convened by The Metcalf Foundation). 
2009: First Director, Lauren Baker, hired. Sustain adopted a provincial mandate. Baker 
started to structure the network and engaged some AC members in operational working 
groups (e.g. elections, governance). CCs appointed by SC in discussion with larger group.  
March 2010: First Bring Food Home Conference hosted in Kitchener-Waterloo. CCs 
endorsed by the AC. 
June 2010: Metcalf published context paper, “Menu 2020: Ten Good Food Ideas”. 
Director Baker was lead author. Paper proposed a new policy framework for Ontario to 
align food systems policies with public health policies.  
June-October 2010: Sustain created municipal election-focused campaign. “Ontario 
elections campaign 2010: Putting healthy, local, sustainable food on the municipal plate”.  
September 2010: First official in-person meeting of Advisory Council (AC). Broad 
strategy articulated.  
January 2011: Second Director, Ravenna Nuaimy-Barker, hired. Program Co-ordinator 
hired shortly after.  
Summer-fall 2011: Sustain created provincial election-focused campaign. “Vote ON 
Food and Farming”. 
October 2011: Bring Food Home Conference hosted in Peterborough. Closing session 
led to the formation of multiple issue-based Working Groups. 
Fall 2011: Local Food Act (LFA) incorporated into Ontario Liberal party’s election 
platform, “Forward Together: The Ontario Liberal Plan 2011-2015” (2011: 34). Liberals 
won a minority in the October 6, 2011 election.   
June-July 2012: Sustain conducted expansive consultation on LFA recommendations 
and Ontario Food and Nutrition Strategy (OFNS). 
July-August 2012: Development of Statement of Purpose for the LFA, endorsed by 155 
member organizations. Development of six “Policy backgrounders”.  
September 2012: Submission of LFA recommendations in form of a Briefing Note. 
October 4, 2012: Bill 130: An Act to enact the Local Food Act, 2012 and to amend the 
Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs Act with respect to program creation and 
other matters. Introduced by The Hon. T. McMeekin, Minister of Agriculture, Food and 
Rural Affairs. 
February 2013: Publication of six “Policies from the Field”, most in collaboration with 
CELA.  
March 25, 2013: Bill 36: An Act to enact the Local Food Act, 2013. LFA re-introduced 
by The Hon. K. Wynne, Minister of Agriculture and Food.  
March 2013: Director left on 1-year leave; Acting Director, Brendan McKay, hired (on 
leave from OMAFRA). 
November 2013: Conference hosted in Windsor. New membership model launched.  
